Roger Teichmann – författare

This book examines in detail Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas on thought, thinking, will and intention, as those ideas developed over his lifetime. It also puts his ideas into context by a comparison both with preceding thinkers and with subsequent ones. The first chapter gives an account of the historical and philosophical background, discussing such thinkers as Plato, Descartes, Berkeley, Frege and Russell. The final chapter looks at the legacy of, and reactions to, Wittgenstein. These two chapters frame the central three chapters, devoted to Wittgenstein’s ideas on thought and will. Chapter 2 discusses the sense in which both thought and will represent, or are about, reality; Chapter 3 considers Wittgenstein’s critique of the picture of an "inner process", and the role that behaviour and context play in his views on thought and will; while Chapter 4 centres on the question "What sort of thing is it that thinks or wills?", in particular examining Wittgenstein’s ideas concerning the first person ("I") and concerning statements like "I am thinking" or "I intend to do X".

This book examines in detail Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas on thought, thinking, will and intention, as those ideas developed over his lifetime. It also puts his ideas into context by a comparison both with preceding thinkers and with subsequent ones. The first chapter gives an account of the historical and philosophical background, discussing such thinkers as Plato, Descartes, Berkeley, Frege and Russell. The final chapter looks at the legacy of, and reactions to, Wittgenstein. These two chapters frame the central three chapters, devoted to Wittgenstein’s ideas on thought and will. Chapter 2 discusses the sense in which both thought and will represent, or are about, reality; Chapter 3 considers Wittgenstein’s critique of the picture of an "inner process", and the role that behaviour and context play in his views on thought and will; while Chapter 4 centres on the question "What sort of thing is it that thinks or wills?", in particular examining Wittgenstein’s ideas concerning the first person ("I") and concerning statements like "I am thinking" or "I intend to do X".

The essays in Logos and Life, mainly dating from 2014 and later, cover topics in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, ethics and philosophy of language. There are numerous strands connecting these four areas, which Roger Teichmann highlights: in this sense the collection exhibits thematic unity as well as diversity. Several of the essays take as their starting points the ideas and philosophical methods of Wittgenstein and of Elizabeth Anscombe, and so will be of interest to anyone studying those philosophers. A newly written Introduction serves to indicate the main themes and arguments of the book, and provides an overall statement of Teichmann’s philosophy.

The essays in Logos and Life, mainly dating from 2014 and later, cover topics in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, ethics and philosophy of language. There are numerous strands connecting these four areas, which Roger Teichmann highlights: in this sense the collection exhibits thematic unity as well as diversity. Several of the essays take as their starting points the ideas and philosophical methods of Wittgenstein and of Elizabeth Anscombe, and so will be of interest to anyone studying those philosophers. A newly written Introduction serves to indicate the main themes and arguments of the book, and provides an overall statement of Teichmann’s philosophy.

Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay 'Modern Moral Philosophy’ contributed to the transformation of the subject from the late 1960s, reversing the trend to assume that there is no intrinsic connection between facts, values, and reasons for action; and directing attention towards the category of virtues. Her later ethical writings were focused on particular ideas and issues such as those of conscience, double-effect, murder, and sexual ethics. In this collection of new essays deriving from a conference held in Oxford these and other aspects of her moral philosophy are examined. Anyone interested in Anscombe’s work all want to read this volume.