Shelly Kagan – författare

People differ in terms of how morally deserving they are. And it is a good thing if people get what they deserve. Accordingly, it is important to work out an adequate theory of moral desert. But while certain aspects of such a theory have been frequently discussed in the philosophical literature, many others have been surprisingly neglected. For example, if it is indeed true that it is morally good for people to get what they deserve, does it always do the same amount of good when someone gets what they deserve? Or does it matter how deserving the person is? If we cannot give someone exactly what they deserve, is it better to give too much-or better to give too little? Does being twice as virtuous make you twice as deserving? And how are we to take into account the thought that what you deserve depends in part on how others are doing? The Geometry of Desert explores a number of these less familiar questions, using graphs to illustrate the various possible answers. The result is a more careful investigation into the nature of moral desert than has ever previously been offered, one that reveals desert to have a hidden complexity that most of us have failed to recognize.

Most of us believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand of us. We also think that certain types of acts are simply forbidden, even when necessary for promoting the overall good. Here Kagan argues that attempts to defend these sorts of moral limit are inadequate. In thus rejecting two of the most fundamental features of commonsense morality, the book offers a sustained attack on our ordinary moral views.

Most people agree that animals count morally. But how, exactly, should we take animals into account? According to a prominent position in contemporary philosophical discussions, animals and people have the very same moral status, so in our moral deliberations the otherwise similar interests of people and animals should be given the same weight and consideration. In How to Count Animals, more or less, Shelly Kagan rejects this view. In its place,Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach, one in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. Unfortunately, most moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take into account these differences in moral status. By arguing for a hierarchical account ofmorality—and exploring what appropriate, status sensitive principles might look like—Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally.

Most people agree that animals count morally. But how, exactly, should we take animals into account? According to a prominent position in contemporary philosophical discussions, animals and people have the very same moral status, so in our moral deliberations the otherwise similar interests of people and animals should be given the same weight and consideration. In How to Count Animals, more or less, Shelly Kagan rejects this view. In its place,Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach, one in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. Unfortunately, most moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take into account these differences in moral status. By arguing for a hierarchical account ofmorality—and exploring what appropriate, status sensitive principles might look like—Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally.

Most people agree that animals count morally. But how, exactly, should we take animals into account? According to a prominent position in contemporary philosophical discussions, animals and people have the very same moral status, so in our moral deliberations the otherwise similar interests of people and animals should be given the same weight and consideration. In How to Count Animals, more or less, Shelly Kagan rejects this view. In its place, Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach, one in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. Unfortunately, most moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take into account these differences in moral status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality--and exploring what appropriate, status sensitive principles might look like--Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally.

Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all. Or they might be bothered by questions like these: What could objective moral facts possibly be like? Isn't it obvious that morality is simply relative to particular societies and particular times? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview?Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.

Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all. Or they might be bothered by questions like these: What could objective moral facts possibly be like? Isn't it obvious that morality is simply relative to particular societies and particular times? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview?Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.

Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren''t really any moral facts at all. Or they might be bothered by questions like these: What could objective moral facts possibly be like? Isn''t it obvious that morality is simply relative to particular societies and particular times? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview?Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.

Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren''t really any moral facts at all. Or they might be bothered by questions like these: What could objective moral facts possibly be like? Isn''t it obvious that morality is simply relative to particular societies and particular times? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview?Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.

This volume contains a selection of essays on the structure and methods of normative ethics by Shelly Kagan. The essays are grouped in three parts. Part I contains a cluster of essays on the structure of normative ethics. These essays provide a systematic survey of the basic normative factors, introduce the concept of evaluative focal points, and examine competing theories about the foundations of normative ethics. The essays in Part II explore the various methods of normative ethics, critically examining the role of thought experiments and the practical difficulty of following moral principles given various epistemic limitations. Part III brings together two essays relating to practical ethics, in particular on whether consequentialist theories can adequately deal with collective action problems, and on whether speciesism is morally wrong. The volume also contains a preface by Kagan, an introduction co-written by the two editors, and a commentary by the two editors that identifies interrelations between Kagans published works and points to criticisms and developments of his work by other philosophers. This volume is the first in a two-volume collection of Kagans essays. Its successor, Rethinking Intrinsic Value & Other Essays on the Good, collects essays on value, well-being, and desert.

This volume contains a selection of essays on the structure and methods of normative ethics by Shelly Kagan. The essays are grouped in three parts. Part I contains a cluster of essays on the structure of normative ethics. These essays provide a systematic survey of the basic normative factors, introduce the concept of evaluative focal points, and examine competing theories about the foundations of normative ethics. The essays in Part II explore the various methods of normative ethics, critically examining the role of thought experiments and the practical difficulty of following moral principles given various epistemic limitations. Part III brings together two essays relating to practical ethics, in particular on whether consequentialist theories can adequately deal with collective action problems, and on whether speciesism is morally wrong. The volume also contains a preface by Kagan, an introduction co-written by the two editors, and a commentary by the two editors that identifies interrelations between Kagan's published works and points to criticisms and developments of his work by other philosophers. This volume is the first in a two-volume collection of Kagan's essays. Its successor, Rethinking Intrinsic Value & Other Essays on the Good, collects essays on value, well-being, and desert.

This volume contains a selection of essays on the structure and methods of normative ethics by Shelly Kagan. The essays are grouped in three parts. Part I contains a cluster of essays on the structure of normative ethics. These essays provide a systematic survey of the basic normative factors, introduce the concept of evaluative focal points, and examine competing theories about the foundations of normative ethics. The essays in Part II explore the various methods of normative ethics, critically examining the role of thought experiments and the practical difficulty of following moral principles given various epistemic limitations. Part III brings together two essays relating to practical ethics, in particular on whether consequentialist theories can adequately deal with collective action problems, and on whether speciesism is morally wrong. The volume also contains a preface by Kagan, an introduction co-written by the two editors, and a commentary by the two editors that identifies interrelations between Kagan's published works and points to criticisms and developments of his work by other philosophers. This volume is the first in a two-volume collection of Kagan's essays. Its successor, Rethinking Intrinsic Value & Other Essays on the Good, collects essays on value, well-being, and desert.

Most of us believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand of us. We also think that certain types of acts are simply forbidden, even when necessary for promoting the overall good. Here Kagan argues that attempts to defend these sorts of moral limit are inadequate. In thus rejecting two of the most fundamental features of commonsense morality, the book offers a sustained attack on our ordinary moral views.

Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration. In How to Count Animals, more or less, Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally.

People differ in terms of how morally deserving they are. And it is a good thing if people get what they deserve. Accordingly, it is important to work out an adequate theory of moral desert. But while certain aspects of such a theory have been frequently discussed in the philosophical literature, many others have been surprisingly neglected. For example, if it is indeed true that it is morally good for people to get what they deserve, does it always do the same amount of good when someone gets what they deserve? Or does it matter how deserving the person is? If we cannot give someone exactly what they deserve, is it better to give too much-or better to give too little? Does being twice as virtuous make you twice as deserving? And how are we to take into account the thought that what you deserve depends in part on how others are doing? The Geometry of Desert explores a number of these less familiar questions, using graphs to illustrate the various possible answers. The result is a more careful investigation into the nature of moral desert than has ever previously been offered, one that reveals desert to have a hidden complexity that most of us have failed to recognize.

Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an act's rightness or wrongness in light of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary moral philoso

Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an acts rightness or wrongness in terms of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary moral philosophers.Intended for upper-level or graduate students of philosophy, this book should also appeal to the general reader looking for a clearly written overview of the basic principles of moral philosophy. }Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an acts rightness or wrongness in light of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers  a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary  moral philosophers. The first half of the book presents a systematic survey of the basic normative factors, focusing on controversial questions concerning the precise content of each factor, its scope and significance, and its relationship to other factors. The second half of the book then examines the competing theories about the foundations of normative ethics, theories that attempt to explain why the basic normative factors have the moral significance that they do.Intended for upper-level or graduate students of philosophy, this book should also appeal to the general reader looking for a clearly written overview of the basic principles of moral philosophy.

Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an acts rightness or wrongness in terms of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary moral philosophers.Intended for upper-level or graduate students of philosophy, this book should also appeal to the general reader looking for a clearly written overview of the basic principles of moral philosophy. }Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an acts rightness or wrongness in light of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers  a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary  moral philosophers. The first half of the book presents a systematic survey of the basic normative factors, focusing on controversial questions concerning the precise content of each factor, its scope and significance, and its relationship to other factors. The second half of the book then examines the competing theories about the foundations of normative ethics, theories that attempt to explain why the basic normative factors have the moral significance that they do.Intended for upper-level or graduate students of philosophy, this book should also appeal to the general reader looking for a clearly written overview of the basic principles of moral philosophy.

Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an act's rightness or wrongness in light of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary moral philosophers.The first half of the book presents a systematic survey of the basic normative factors, focusing on controversial questions concerning the precise content of each factor, its scope and significance, and its relationship to other factors. The second half of the book then examines the competing theories about the foundations of normative ethics, theories that attempt to explain why the basic normative factors have the moral significance that they do.Intended for upper-level or graduate students of philosophy, this book should also appeal to the general reader looking for a clearly written overview of the basic principles of moral philosophy.