Answering Moral Skepticism

Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. A popular lecturer at Yale, Kagan's lectures on death have been watched online by millions of people around the world, and a book based on the course, Death, has been a national best seller in both S. Korea and Japan. His recent books include How to Count Animals, More or Less (OUP 2019) and The Geometry of Desert (OUP 2012).

Kagan's book was an enjoyable read. It wasn't challenging and made for a good discussion between us-even if that discussion largely consisted of communal vandalism of Kagan's arguments! We think that this would make a good introduction for a course in moral theory, and think undergraduates would enjoy grappling with Kagan's arguments with their peers.

• Acknowledgments A Note to the Reader Introduction 1. What Would Morality Need to Be? 1.1 Job Descriptions1.2 Possible Elements1.3 Satisfying the Job Description 2. Basic Positions in Metaethics 2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism2.2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism2.4 Moral Skepticism 3. Nihilism 3.1 The Nature of Nihilism3.2 The Case for Nihilism3.3 Disregarding the Arguments3.4 Normative Nihilism 4. Noncognitivism 4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism 5. Disagreement 5.1 The Argument from Disagreement5.2 The Implications of Disagreement5.3 Explaining Moral Disagreement5.4 Nonconvergence 6. Relativism 6.1 Moral Relativism6.2 Clarifying Relativism6.3 Arguing for Relativism6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories 7. Knowledge 7.1 The Analogy to Observation7.2 Appearances7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions7.4 Reliability7.5 Intuitionism 8. Evolution 8.1 The Argument from Evolution8.2 A Second Try8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics8.4 Common Ground8.5 The Continuity Problem8.6 Path Dependence 9. Explanation 9.1 A Metaphysical Test9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts9.3 Reduction and Explanation9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts9.5 The Unrestricted Test 10. Motivation 10.1 Motive Internalism10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation10.5 The Direction of Fit 11. Reasons 11.1 Reasons Internalism11.2 Reasons11.3 Refining the Argument11.4 Hypothetical Reasons11.5 Rational Support11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation 12. Reductionism 12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism12.2 The Nature of Reduction12.3 The Open Question Argument12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction12.6 Reducing Reasons 13. Simple Realism 13.1 Simple Normative Realism13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity13.3 Nonnatural Properties13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals 14. Moral Realism 14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic14.2 Systematic Moral Theory NotesReferencesIndex