Stefan Hedlund – författare

Rysslands brutala krigföring i Ukraina visar att kriget är existentiellt för båda länderna. Ryssland drivs av en vision om ett ryskt tusenårsrike, grundat i Kyiv och uppburet av det ryska språket och den ryska kulturen. Om Ukraina överlever, innebär det slutet för denna vision. Ryssland krymper då tillbaka till 1500-talets Moskvastat.

Ju längre kriget drar ut på tiden, desto större blir sannolikheten för att det kommer att sluta med ett ryskt sammanbrott, med en fragmentering av Ryska federationen i många mindre delar och kanske även med en statskollaps för Moskvastaten.

Kanske är detta den enda utgång som kan erbjuda Ukraina verkliga säkerhetsgarantier, mot förnyade moskovitiska angrepp. Alternativet är att Ryssland överlever som ett uppförstorat Nordkorea: utfattigt, efterblivet, internationellt isolerat, hatiskt och beväpnat till tänderna. Det är inte bara Ukraina som har anledning att frukta en sådan utgång.

Stefan Hedlund är professor emeritus i öststatsforskning vid Uppsala universitet. Han har ägnat sig åt Ryssland sedan Leonid Brezjnevs dagar och har under tiden publicerat mer än två dussin vetenskapliga verk, främst men inte uteslutande om olika aspekter av rysk utveckling. Hans publikationer har översatts till ryska, kinesiska och estniska. Han har också varit en flitigt förekommande gäst i olika medier, svenska och internationella, och han har publicerat ett betydande antalpopulärvetenskapliga artiklar och debattinlägg.

Russia Reverts to Muscovy explores the implications of removing the notion of “Russia” from political and scholarly discourse.

The book posits the following questions: Should the state ruled from Moscow be termed “Russia”? Might not “Muscovy” be more appropriate? It reflects on how academia has conceptualized developments among the Eastern Slavs over the centuries from the early days of Muscovy up until the present-day Russian Federation with the result that by consistently viewing events through a Moscow lens the West has been instrumental in supporting Muscovite claims to hegemony and thus in allowing Moscow to play an outsized role not only in the region but also in global geopolitics. This book highlights the more recent developments of the Muscovite state, and the increasingly hollow nature of the claims of the Russian Federation to represent all of Russia.

Exploring how the Eastern Slav world could be conceptualized differently and how this world might develop in reality, this book will be of interest to researchers in International Relations, Ethnic Studies, Political Science, and Central Asian, Russian and Soviet Politics.

First published in 1987, Incentives and Economic Systems is a selection of papers presented at the Eighth Arne Ryde Symposium at Frostavallen, Sweden on how institutions attempt to guide individual behaviour by manipulating the social and economic incentive system. These economic and social aspects of incentives determine ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ behaviour by individuals and organizations across various economic systems. The essays in the volume deal with various aspects of the incentive problems and the various manifestations of such problems, along with moral and ethical issues. The essays will be an enlightening read for students of economics, policymaking and international politics.

First published in 1987, Incentives and Economic Systems is a selection of papers presented at the Eighth Arne Ryde Symposium at Frostavallen, Sweden on how institutions attempt to guide individual behaviour by manipulating the social and economic incentive system. These economic and social aspects of incentives determine ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ behaviour by individuals and organizations across various economic systems. The essays in the volume deal with various aspects of the incentive problems and the various manifestations of such problems, along with moral and ethical issues. The essays will be an enlightening read for students of economics, policymaking and international politics.

First published in 1989, Ideology and Rationality in the Soviet Model assumes that since the October Revolution the development of the Soviet Union has essentially been a process of trial and error. Economic rationality has been sacrificed to political expedients, and the cultural sphere has been put to use as a legitimating and rationalizing device. This book analyses the internal logic of this process from the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution to Gorbachev’s ‘revolution from above’, including coverage of the Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. The book focuses on the structural determinants of the Soviet Model, thus seeking to reveal the specific rationalities that characterizes ‘Soviet man’. Its conclusion casts serious doubt on the likelihood of new policies defeating seven decades of Bolshevik rule and social indoctrination. It will be of interest to students of economics, political science and history.

First published in 1989, Ideology and Rationality in the Soviet Model assumes that since the October Revolution the development of the Soviet Union has essentially been a process of trial and error. Economic rationality has been sacrificed to political expedients, and the cultural sphere has been put to use as a legitimating and rationalizing device. This book analyses the internal logic of this process from the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution to Gorbachev’s ‘revolution from above’, including coverage of the Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. The book focuses on the structural determinants of the Soviet Model, thus seeking to reveal the specific rationalities that characterizes ‘Soviet man’. Its conclusion casts serious doubt on the likelihood of new policies defeating seven decades of Bolshevik rule and social indoctrination. It will be of interest to students of economics, political science and history.

First published in 1989. Perestroika, it was widely believed, must succeed in agriculture before permanent change could be affected elsewhere in the Soviet economy. But Soviet agriculture had so far remained stubbornly inefficient and resistant to change. In this book Stefan Hedlund investigates the reasons for this state of affairs.

The author gives an account of the emergence, development and performance of private agriculture in the Soviet Union. In particular he describes the essentials of the peculiarly Soviet hybrid of private and socialized agriculture. He places the private sector within the broader framework of Soviet agriculture. He saw Soviet agriculture as a ‘Black Hole’, ready to absorb any resources that came near, be they private plots, urban gardens, factory workshops or military units.

Hedlund also examines the impact on the peasants as producers of decades of negative ideological pronouncements in Party propaganda, and of discrimination and at times outright harassment by local officials. He points out that this background makes the prospect of any positive response from the peasants to Gorbachev’s call for perestroika in agriculture extremely unlikely.

This book, first published in 1984, analyses the institutions and decision-making processes that determined agricultural production in the Soviet Union. It addresses the crisis in Soviet agriculture of the early 1980s, examining the problems of low productivity, adverse natural conditions and an underdeveloped infrastructure. The book’s analysis of the ‘crisis’ focuses on the growing gap between demand and supply of agricultural produce, and the pressures on the government to alleviate the food shortages.

First published in 1989. Perestroika, it was widely believed, must succeed in agriculture before permanent change could be affected elsewhere in the Soviet economy. But Soviet agriculture had so far remained stubbornly inefficient and resistant to change. In this book Stefan Hedlund investigates the reasons for this state of affairs.

The author gives an account of the emergence, development and performance of private agriculture in the Soviet Union. In particular he describes the essentials of the peculiarly Soviet hybrid of private and socialized agriculture. He places the private sector within the broader framework of Soviet agriculture. He saw Soviet agriculture as a ‘Black Hole’, ready to absorb any resources that came near, be they private plots, urban gardens, factory workshops or military units.

Hedlund also examines the impact on the peasants as producers of decades of negative ideological pronouncements in Party propaganda, and of discrimination and at times outright harassment by local officials. He points out that this background makes the prospect of any positive response from the peasants to Gorbachev’s call for perestroika in agriculture extremely unlikely.

This book, first published in 1984, analyses the institutions and decision-making processes that determined agricultural production in the Soviet Union. It addresses the crisis in Soviet agriculture of the early 1980s, examining the problems of low productivity, adverse natural conditions and an underdeveloped infrastructure. The book’s analysis of the ‘crisis’ focuses on the growing gap between demand and supply of agricultural produce, and the pressures on the government to alleviate the food shortages.