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This edited work presents contemporary mathematical practice in the foundational mathematical theories, in particular set theory and the univalent foundations.

This edited work presents contemporary mathematical practice in the foundational mathematical theories, in particular set theory and the univalent foundations.

In a fragment entitled Elementa Nova Matheseos Universalis (1683?) Leibniz writes “the mathesis […] shall deliver the method through which things that are conceivable can be exactly determined”; in another fragment he takes the mathesis to be “the science of all things that are conceivable.” Leibniz considers all mathematical disciplines as branches of the mathesis and conceives the mathesis as a general science of forms applicable not only to magnitudes but to every object that exists in our imagination, i.e. that is possible at least in principle. As a general science of forms the mathesis investigates possible relations between “arbitrary objects” (“objets quelconques”). It is an abstract theory of combinations and relations among objects whatsoever.In 1810 the mathematician and philosopher Bernard Bolzano published a booklet entitled Contributions to a Better-Grounded Presentation of Mathematics. There is, according to him, a certain objective connection among the truths that are germane to a certain homogeneous field of objects: some truths are the “reasons” (“Gründe”) of others, and the latter are “consequences” (“Folgen”) of the former. The reason-consequence relation seems to be the counterpart of causality at the level of a relation between true propositions. Arigorous proof is characterized in this context as a proof that shows the reason of the proposition that is to be proven. Requirements imposed on rigorous proofs seem to anticipate normalization results in current proof theory.The contributors of Mathesis Universalis, Computability and Proof,  leading experts in the fields of computer science, mathematics, logic and philosophy, show the evolution of these and related ideas exploring topics in proof theory, computability theory, intuitionisticlogic, constructivism and reverse mathematics, delving deeply into a contextual examination of the relationship between mathematical rigor and demands for simplification.

In a fragment entitled Elementa Nova Matheseos Universalis (1683?) Leibniz writes “the mathesis […] shall deliver the method through which things that are conceivable can be exactly determined”; in another fragment he takes the mathesis to be “the science of all things that are conceivable.” Leibniz considers all mathematical disciplines as branches of the mathesis and conceives the mathesis as a general science of forms applicable not only to magnitudes but to every object that exists in our imagination, i.e. that is possible at least in principle. As a general science of forms the mathesis investigates possible relations between “arbitrary objects” (“objets quelconques”). It is an abstract theory of combinations and relations among objects whatsoever.In 1810 the mathematician and philosopher Bernard Bolzano published a booklet entitled Contributions to a Better-Grounded Presentation of Mathematics. There is, according to him, a certain objective connection among the truths that are germane to a certain homogeneous field of objects: some truths are the “reasons” (“Gründe”) of others, and the latter are “consequences” (“Folgen”) of the former. The reason-consequence relation seems to be the counterpart of causality at the level of a relation between true propositions. Arigorous proof is characterized in this context as a proof that shows the reason of the proposition that is to be proven. Requirements imposed on rigorous proofs seem to anticipate normalization results in current proof theory.The contributors of Mathesis Universalis, Computability and Proof,  leading experts in the fields of computer science, mathematics, logic and philosophy, show the evolution of these and related ideas exploring topics in proof theory, computability theory, intuitionisticlogic, constructivism and reverse mathematics, delving deeply into a contextual examination of the relationship between mathematical rigor and demands for simplification.

This book offers the first-ever English translation of Oskar Becker’s Zur Logik der Modalitäten. This essay, published in 1930, is a pioneering yet often neglected contribution in the context of prewar modal logic research in Europe. Becker’s text is complemented by an extended commentary that explains, analyzes and highlights Becker’s accomplishments and the philosophical background of his investigations.The commentary provides an in-depth analysis of all of Becker's important contributions, both from a philosophical and logical perspective, making it a very useful book for scholars in both philosophy and logic.

This book offers the first-ever English translation of Oskar Becker’s Zur Logik der Modalitäten. This essay, published in 1930, is a pioneering yet often neglected contribution in the context of prewar modal logic research in Europe. Becker’s text is complemented by an extended commentary that explains, analyzes and highlights Becker’s accomplishments and the philosophical background of his investigations.The commentary provides an in-depth analysis of all of Becker's important contributions, both from a philosophical and logical perspective, making it a very useful book for scholars in both philosophy and logic.

Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl focuses on the first ten years of Edmund Husserl’s work, from the publication of his Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) to that of his Logical Investigations (1900/01), and aims to precisely locate his early work in the fields of logic, philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. Unlike most phenomenologists, the author refrains from reading Husserl’s early work as a more or less immature sketch of claims consolidated only in his later phenomenology, and unlike the majority of historians of logic she emphasizes the systematic strength and the originality of Husserl’s logico-mathematical work.The book attempts to reconstruct the discussion between Husserl and those philosophers and mathematicians who contributed to new developments in logic, such as Leibniz, Bolzano, the logical algebraists (especially Boole and Schröder), Frege, and Hilbert and his school. It presents both a comprehensive critical examination of some of the major works produced by Husserl and his antagonists in the last decade of the 19th century and a formal reconstruction of many texts from Husserl’s Nachlaß that have not yet been the object of systematical scrutiny.This volume will be of particular interest to researchers working in the history, and in the philosophy, of logic and mathematics, and more generally, to analytical philosophers and phenomenologists with a background in standard logic.

Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl focuses on the first ten years of Edmund Husserl’s work, from the publication of his Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) to that of his Logical Investigations (1900/01), and aims to precisely locate his early work in the fields of logic, philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. Unlike most phenomenologists, the author refrains from reading Husserl’s early work as a more or less immature sketch of claims consolidated only in his later phenomenology, and unlike the majority of historians of logic she emphasizes the systematic strength and the originality of Husserl’s logico-mathematical work.The book attempts to reconstruct the discussion between Husserl and those philosophers and mathematicians who contributed to new developments in logic, such as Leibniz, Bolzano, the logical algebraists (especially Boole and Schröder), Frege, and Hilbert and his school. It presents both a comprehensive critical examination of some of the major works produced by Husserl and his antagonists in the last decade of the 19th century and a formal reconstruction of many texts from Husserl’s Nachlaß that have not yet been the object of systematical scrutiny.This volume will be of particular interest to researchers working in the history, and in the philosophy, of logic and mathematics, and more generally, to analytical philosophers and phenomenologists with a background in standard logic.

Essays on Husserl’s Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics sets out to fill up a lacuna in the present research on Husserl by presenting a precise account of Husserl’s work in the field of logic, of the philosophy of logic and of the philosophy of mathematics. The aim is to provide an in-depth reconstruction and analysis of the discussion between Husserl and his most important interlocutors, and to clarify pivotal ideas of Husserl’s by considering their reception and elaboration by some of his disciples and followers, such as Oskar Becker and Jacob Klein, as well as their influence on some of the most significant logicians and mathematicians of the past century, such as Luitzen E. J. Brouwer, Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Gödel and Hermann Weyl. Most of the papers consider Husserl and another scholar – e.g. Leibniz, Kant, Bolzano, Brentano, Cantor, Frege – and trace out and contextualize lines of influence, points of contact, and points of disagreement. Each essay is written by an expertof the field, and the volume includes contributions both from the analytical tradition and from the phenomenological one.

Essays on Husserl’s Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics sets out to fill up a lacuna in the present research on Husserl by presenting a precise account of Husserl’s work in the field of logic, of the philosophy of logic and of the philosophy of mathematics.