Thomas A.C. Reydon – författare

This volume explores connections between two growing and complementary fields of research: cultural evolutionary theory and social ontology. It sheds light on the ontological aspects of cultural evolution that so far have been largely neglected and raises questions for social ontology regarding the relevance of evolutionary aspects of social phenomena.This volume shows that cultural evolutionary theory and social ontology are complementary disciplines that, while having their own subject matter and their own research questions, illuminate each other in interesting ways. While the contributors vary in their approach to the relationship between social ontology and cultural evolution, they explore their many common themes, including power, language, agency, interaction, and social institutions and roles. The chapters are divided into thematic sections organized around meta-perspectives on cultural evolution and social ontology, the power concept in cultural evolution and social ontology, and themes of interactions and collectives in cultural and social evolution. Together, the chapters demonstrate how social ontology can provide critical tests of central assumptions in cultural evolutionary theory, and how cultural evolution can provide accounts of the origins of social entities.Cultural Evolution and Social Ontology will appeal to researchers and graduate students working in cultural evolution, social ontology, metaphysics, social philosophy, philosophy of the social sciences, philosophy of biology, and philosophy of science, as well as those working in disciplines outside philosophy, such as anthropology and sociology.

The present volume originated in 2001 when we, together with our publishing editors at (then) Kluwer Academic Publishers, realized that the th following year the 50 volume of our journal Acta Biotheoretica would see the light. We felt that this milestone should not pass unnoticed and that the appropriate way to mark it would be the publication of a special volume of papers on theoretical biology. While editing this book during 2003 and early 2004, we realized that another milestone was not far off: in 2005 it will be 70 years ago that the journal was founded. We hope that the book lying before you will serve well to mark both events. The papers collected here have been written on invitation by representatives of the theoretical biology community in The Netherlands. They are intended to reflect the entire spectrum of topics on which Acta Biotheoretica publishes, ranging from philosophy of biology on one end to mathematical biology on the other. All chapters (except our own introductory one) have been peer reviewed according to the standards that are maintained with respect to regular submissions to Acta Biotheoretica.

This book is concerned with two intimately related topics of metaphysics: the identity of entities and the foundations of classification. What it adds to previous discussions of these topics is that it addresses them with respect to human-made entities, that is, artefacts. As the chapters in the book show, questions of identity and classification require other treatments and lead to other answers for artefacts than for natural entities. These answers are of interest to philosophers not only for their clarification of artefacts as a category of things but also for the new light they may shed on these issue with respect to to natural entities.     This volume is structured in three parts.  The contributions in Part I address basic ontological and metaphysical questions in relation to artefact kinds: How should we conceive of artefact kinds? Are they real kinds? How are identity conditions for artefacts and artefact kinds related? The contributions in Part II address meta-ontological questions: What, exactly, should an ontological account of artefact kinds provide us with? What scope can it aim for? Which ways of approaching the ontology of artefact kinds are there, how promising are they, and how should we assess this? In Part III, the essays offer engineering practice rather than theoretical philosophy as a point of reference. The issues addressed here include: How do engineers classify technical artefacts and on what grounds? What makes specific classes of technical artefacts candidates for ontologically real kinds, and by which criteria?​

This book is concerned with two intimately related topics of metaphysics: the identity of entities and the foundations of classification. What it adds to previous discussions of these topics is that it addresses them with respect to human-made entities, that is, artefacts. As the chapters in the book show, questions of identity and classification require other treatments and lead to other answers for artefacts than for natural entities. These answers are of interest to philosophers not only for their clarification of artefacts as a category of things but also for the new light they may shed on these issue with respect to to natural entities.     This volume is structured in three parts.  The contributions in Part I address basic ontological and metaphysical questions in relation to artefact kinds: How should we conceive of artefact kinds? Are they real kinds? How are identity conditions for artefacts and artefact kinds related? The contributions in Part II address meta-ontological questions: What, exactly, should an ontological account of artefact kinds provide us with? What scope can it aim for? Which ways of approaching the ontology of artefact kinds are there, how promising are they, and how should we assess this? In Part III, the essays offer engineering practice rather than theoretical philosophy as a point of reference. The issues addressed here include: How do engineers classify technical artefacts and on what grounds? What makes specific classes of technical artefacts candidates for ontologically real kinds, and by which criteria?​

This volume provides a broad overview of issues in the philosophy of behavioral biology, covering four main themes: genetic, developmental, evolutionary, and neurobiological explanations of behavior. It is both interdisciplinary and empirically informed in its approach, addressing philosophical issues that arise from recent scientific findings in biological research on human and non-human animal behavior. Accordingly, it includes papers by professional philosophers and philosophers of science, as well as practicing scientists. Much of the work in this volume builds on presentations given at the international conference, “Biological Explanations of Behavior: Philosophical Perspectives”, held in 2008 at the Leibniz Universität Hannover in Germany. The volume is intended to be of interest to a broad range of audiences, which includes philosophers (e.g., philosophers of mind, philosophers of biology, and metaethicists), as well as practicing scientists, such as biologists or psychologists whose interests relate to biological explanations of behavior.