Verónica Rodríguez-Blanco – författare

Negligent or inadvertent action in both law and ethics is a matter of agency. The pre-theoretical and philosophical views agree that we are responsible for things that we do intentionally, but it is less clear whether we are responsible for inadvertent or negligent actions. The law of negligence in tort law attributes responsibility for inadvertent acts, while in ethics there is deep and serious scepticism about the responsibility for negligent or inadvertent action. How can we be responsible for things that happen beyond the realm of our knowledge or control?Positioned at the intersection of law and ethics, Responsibility for Negligence in Ethics and Law: Aspiration, Perspective and Civic Maturity responds to these fundamental questions by advancing the idea that the underpinning feature of negligent or inadvertent acts is the phenomenon of akrasia - the lack of integration of character and intelligent thinking. When we act akratically, we are acting contrary to our deliberated intention, due to an uneven development of character and thoughts about what is right, dutiful, and good. Using an Aristotelian-inspired model of deliberation, the book illustrates how legal decisions in negligence invite citizens to adopt a deliberative-aspirational perspective. This perspective encourages them to reshape, redescribe, and rethink their duties of care to meet the aspirational standard of the reasonable person. Consequently, the book argues that the purpose of negligence law is to promote values of citizen engagement and civic maturity.Combining tort law theory, Aristotelian conceptions of deliberation, and theories of practical rationality, responsibility, and action, this book invites us to rethink private law's purpose and methodology.

Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013), an American legal philosopher, jurist, and scholar, was a stalwart advocate of human rights and dignity who developed a formidable scholarly combination of law and moral integrity. He propounded some of the most influential theories of law and morality in modern jurisprudence. This volume explores his thoughts on dignity where self-respect and authenticity play a key role. It also sheds light on contemporary judicial and moral conundrums, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the complex relationship between dignity, human will, and responsibility. The book, with contributions from eminent philosophers and thinkers from across the world, provides a detailed analysis of Dworkin's work on dignity. Each essay in the volume interprets his rich jurisprudential work, and motivates legal philosophers, practitioners, and judges to understand, practise, and disseminate Dworkin's jurisprudential thoughts.

This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them, and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link. Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal interpretation, the paradox of intention, the relation between moral and legal obligation, and legal realism. The volume will appeal to scholars and students of legal philosophy, moral philosophy, law, social science, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of action.

This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them, and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link. Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal interpretation, the paradox of intention, the relation between moral and legal obligation, and legal realism. The volume will appeal to scholars and students of legal philosophy, moral philosophy, law, social science, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of action.

This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the reader to rethink substantive law and practical ethical reflection.

This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the reader to rethink substantive law and practical ethical reflection.

This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the reader to rethink substantive law and practical ethical reflection.

This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the reader to rethink substantive law and practical ethical reflection.

The received view on the nature of legal authority contains the idea that a sound account of legitimate authority will explain how a legal authority has a right to command and the addressee a duty to obey. The received view fails to explain, however, how legal authority truly operates upon human beings as rational creatures with specific psychological makeups. This book takes a bottom-up approach, beginning at the microscopic level of agency and practical reason and leading to the justificatory framework of authority. The book argues that an understanding of the nature of legal normativity involves an understanding of the nature and structure of practical reason in the context of the law, and advances the idea that legal authority and normativity are intertwined. This point can be summarised thus: if we are able to understand both how the agent exercises his or her practical reason under legal directives and commands and how the agent engages his or her practical reason by following legal rules grounded on reasons for actions as good-making characteristics, then we can fully grasp the nature of legal authority and legal normativity. Using the philosophies of action enshrined in the works of Elisabeth Anscombe, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the study explains practical reason as diachronic future-directed intention in action and argues that this conception illuminates the structure of practical reason of the legal rules' addressees. The account is comprehensive and enables us to distinguish authoritative and normative legal rules in just and good legal systems from 'apparent' authoritative and normative legal rules of evil legal systems. At the heart of the book is the methodological view of a 'practical turn' to elucidate the nature of legal normativity and authority.

This book is the first collection of essays on Bernard Williams’ moral and political philosophy to shed light on the nature of law, and key legal concepts. By the time of his death in 2003, Williams was widely regarded as the most important moral philosopher of his generation. Surprisingly, his work is still largely under-discussed in legal theory. This book aims to fill this gap with brand new discussions from scholars both from law and philosophy.The first part of the book focuses on Williams’ work on responsibility and regret and its implications for law. Drawing from Ancient Greek authors, Williams maintained that luck might play a key role in our practices of responsibility and that some dimensions of responsibility are tied to the notion of having a character. What we do – intentionally or not – might affect our understanding of ourselves and of our place in the world. How do those ideas help us in making sense of legal responsibility? How broader concerns about our practices of responsibility impact the law? Those are some of the questions addressed by the authors in this part.The second part looks at how Williams’ understanding of philosophy can shape the way we do jurisprudence. Williams’ work on the methodology of philosophy combines resources from analytical philosophy, continental authors, history, and literature. He understood philosophy as a humanistic discipline. The authors in the second part of the book draw from Williams' work, notably his innovative take on the genealogical method, to discuss how we could practice legal philosophy in this same spirit.

This book is the first collection of essays on Bernard Williams' moral and political philosophy to shed light on the nature of law, and key legal concepts. By the time of his death in 2003, Williams was widely regarded as the most important moral philosopher of his generation. Surprisingly, his work is still largely under-discussed in legal theory. This book aims to fill this gap with brand new discussions from scholars both from law and philosophy.The first part of the book focuses on Williams' work on responsibility and regret and its implications for law. Drawing from Ancient Greek authors, Williams maintained that luck might play a key role in our practices of responsibility and that some dimensions of responsibility are tied to the notion of having a character. What we do intentionally or not might affect our understanding of ourselves and of our place in the world. How do those ideas help us in making sense of legal responsibility? How broader concerns about our practices of responsibility impact the law? Those are some of the questions addressed by the authors in this part.The second part looks at how Williams' understanding of philosophy can shape the way we do jurisprudence. Williams' work on the methodology of philosophy combines resources from analytical philosophy, continental authors, history, and literature. He understood philosophy as a humanistic discipline. The authors in the second part of the book draw from Williams' work, notably his innovative take on the genealogical method, to discuss how we could practice legal philosophy in this same spirit.

This book is the first collection of essays on Bernard Williams' moral and political philosophy to shed light on the nature of law, and key legal concepts. By the time of his death in 2003, Williams was widely regarded as the most important moral philosopher of his generation. Surprisingly, his work is still largely under-discussed in legal theory. This book aims to fill this gap with brand new discussions from scholars both from law and philosophy.The first part of the book focuses on Williams' work on responsibility and regret and its implications for law. Drawing from Ancient Greek authors, Williams maintained that luck might play a key role in our practices of responsibility and that some dimensions of responsibility are tied to the notion of having a character. What we do intentionally or not might affect our understanding of ourselves and of our place in the world. How do those ideas help us in making sense of legal responsibility? How broader concerns about our practices of responsibility impact the law? Those are some of the questions addressed by the authors in this part.The second part looks at how Williams' understanding of philosophy can shape the way we do jurisprudence. Williams' work on the methodology of philosophy combines resources from analytical philosophy, continental authors, history, and literature. He understood philosophy as a humanistic discipline. The authors in the second part of the book draw from Williams' work, notably his innovative take on the genealogical method, to discuss how we could practice legal philosophy in this same spirit.

The received view on the nature of legal authority contains the idea that a sound account of legitimate authority will explain how a legal authority has a right to command and the addressee a duty to obey. The received view fails to explain, however, how legal authority truly operates upon human beings as rational creatures with specific psychological makeups. This book takes a bottom-up approach, beginning at the microscopic level of agency and practical reason and leading to the justificatory framework of authority. The book argues that an understanding of the nature of legal normativity involves an understanding of the nature and structure of practical reason in the context of the law, and advances the idea that legal authority and normativity are intertwined. This point can be summarised thus: if we are able to understand both how the agent exercises his or her practical reason under legal directives and commands and how the agent engages his or her practical reason by following legal rules grounded on reasons for actions as good-making characteristics, then we can fully grasp the nature of legal authority and legal normativity. Using the philosophies of action enshrined in the works of Elisabeth Anscombe, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the study explains practical reason as diachronic future-directed intention in action and argues that this conception illuminates the structure of practical reason of the legal rules'' addressees. The account is comprehensive and enables us to distinguish authoritative and normative legal rules in just and good legal systems from ''apparent'' authoritative and normative legal rules of evil legal systems. At the heart of the book is the methodological view of a ''practical turn'' to elucidate the nature of legal normativity and authority.

The received view on the nature of legal authority contains the idea that a sound account of legitimate authority will explain how a legal authority has a right to command and the addressee a duty to obey. The received view fails to explain, however, how legal authority truly operates upon human beings as rational creatures with specific psychological makeups. This book takes a bottom-up approach, beginning at the microscopic level of agency and practical reason and leading to the justificatory framework of authority. The book argues that an understanding of the nature of legal normativity involves an understanding of the nature and structure of practical reason in the context of the law, and advances the idea that legal authority and normativity are intertwined. This point can be summarised thus: if we are able to understand both how the agent exercises his or her practical reason under legal directives and commands and how the agent engages his or her practical reason by following legal rules grounded on reasons for actions as good-making characteristics, then we can fully grasp the nature of legal authority and legal normativity. Using the philosophies of action enshrined in the works of Elisabeth Anscombe, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the study explains practical reason as diachronic future-directed intention in action and argues that this conception illuminates the structure of practical reason of the legal rules'' addressees. The account is comprehensive and enables us to distinguish authoritative and normative legal rules in just and good legal systems from ''apparent'' authoritative and normative legal rules of evil legal systems. At the heart of the book is the methodological view of a ''practical turn'' to elucidate the nature of legal normativity and authority.