Véronique Decaix - Böcker

Theories of Colour from Democritus to Descartes investigates issues of the ontological status and perception of colours, such as: What is the nature of colours? Do they exist independently of the subjects who perceive them? And if so, how are they generated and how do they differ from one another? These are some of the questions raised by philosophers, but what has been lacking is an account of the various theories about colours through different periods of the history of philosophy.Exploring philosophical debates on the nature and perception of colours from a historical perspective, this book presents how different theories from Antiquity through the Middle Ages to the early modern era explain the nature of colours, their generation, and the way they are perceived. Twelve eminent historians of philosophy analyse the theories of colours prevailing at critical points in the history of Western philosophy, from its beginnings with Democritus to Descartes and the early modern period.This book will appeal to students and scholars working on the history of philosophy (ancient, medieval, Arabic and Latin, and early modern) as well as those interested in contemporary philosophy: philosophy of the mind, philosophy of perception, phenomenology, metaphysics, and neurosciences. A broader audience may also include researchers in psychology, cultural history, and the history of art.

This edited work draws on a range of contributed expertise to trace the fortune of an Aristotelian thesis over different periods in the history of philosophy. It presents eight cases of direct or indirect challenges to the Aristotelian passive account of human cognition, taking the reader from late antiquity to the 20th century. Chapters analyse the (often indirect) effect of Aristotle’s account of cognition on later periods. In his influential De anima, Aristotle describes human cognition, both sensitive and intellectual, as the reception of a form in the cognitive subject. Aristotle’s account has been commonly interpreted as fundamentally passive – the cognitive subject is a passive actor upon which a cognitive process is acted by the object. However, at least from the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias onwards, this interpretationhas been challenged by authors who posit a fundamental active aspect of cognition. Readers will discover how one or more of three concerns – ontological superiority, direct realism and moral responsibility – drive the active accounts of cognition. Contributed chapters from top scholars examine how these three concerns lead thinkers to take issue with the idea that cognition is a passive process. The authors consider Jesuit accounts of cognition, Malebranche on judgment, and Wittgenstein on perception, as well as Stumpf on active cognition, among other relevant works.This book is ideally suited to scholars of philosophy, especially those with an interest in medieval epistemology, the influence of Aristotle, philosophy of mind and theories of cognition.