Yaacov Ro'i – författare

The Limits to Power (1979) analyses the spectrum of Soviet interests and policies in the Middle East following the Yom Kippur War of October 1973: how the Soviets handled the oil question, military and economic aid, policy toward Egypt, Syria, Iraq, the Palestinian organisations – and toward Israel itself. The Soviet position in the Middle East in 1970 was as the dominant foreign power in the region, and this book examines the events and actions that resulted, under a decade later, in such a sharp reversal in Soviet fortunes. The ebb-and-flow of Soviet diplomacy, as it emerges from the wealth of official statements and press material, is examined in detail.

The Limits to Power (1979) analyses the spectrum of Soviet interests and policies in the Middle East following the Yom Kippur War of October 1973: how the Soviets handled the oil question, military and economic aid, policy toward Egypt, Syria, Iraq, the Palestinian organisations – and toward Israel itself. The Soviet position in the Middle East in 1970 was as the dominant foreign power in the region, and this book examines the events and actions that resulted, under a decade later, in such a sharp reversal in Soviet fortunes. The ebb-and-flow of Soviet diplomacy, as it emerges from the wealth of official statements and press material, is examined in detail.

Muslim Eurasia (1995) looks at the Muslim states that came into being on the ruins of the Soviet Union, and their complex legacies of Russian colonialism, russification, de-islamicization, centralization and communism – on top of localism, tribalism and Islam. The interaction and contradictions within each category, and between them, form the essence of the struggle to formulation new identities.

Muslim Eurasia (1995) looks at the Muslim states that came into being on the ruins of the Soviet Union, and their complex legacies of Russian colonialism, russification, de-islamicization, centralization and communism – on top of localism, tribalism and Islam. The interaction and contradictions within each category, and between them, form the essence of the struggle to formulation new identities.

This book, spanning the years 1954–1956, is the first in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1957–1961, is the second in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1954–1956, is the first in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.