Boris Morozov – författare

This is the unknown story of how Zionists imprisoned by Soviet authorities were allowed to choose sentences of permanent departure to Palestine, where they helped build Jewish society, the backbone of left-wing parties, and the powerful trade union movement.These leading authors bring to light undiscovered documents from archives opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union and go on to revise fundamental assumptions about these events. They examine the means by which internal power struggles and personal interventions in the uppermost echelons of the Soviet leadership allowed the Zionists to disseminate their message and recruit thousands of members before the massive arrests of the mid-1920s; demonstrate the extent to which personal contacts between Zionists and those who aided them, Soviet leaders and members of the security services, were vital to initiating and sustaining the practice of substitution; and using a broad array of British and Zionist documents, they reveal the crucial role of Anglo-Zionist co-operation in facilitating the immigration of Zionist convicts. This book will of great interest to all students and scholars of Jewish and Israeli, Russian and Soviet and European and British history.

Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on newly available archival sources, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War answers this controversial question more fully than ever before. Directly opposing the thesis of the recently published Foxbats over Dimona by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, the contributors to this volume argue that Moscow had absolutely no intention of starting a war. The Soviet Union's reason for involvement in the region had more to do with enhancing its own status as a Cold War power than any desire for particular outcomes for Syria and Egypt.In addition to assessing Soviet involvement in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, this book covers the USSR's relations with Syria and Egypt, Soviet aims, U.S. and Israeli perceptions of Soviet involvement, Soviet intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition (1969-70), and the impact of the conflicts on Soviet-Jewish attitudes. This book as a whole demonstrates how the Soviet Union's actions gave little consideration to the long- or mid-term consequences of their policy, and how firing the first shot compelled them to react to events.

These volumes bring together key documents detailing Israeli-Soviet relations between 1954 and 1967. A very significant and turbulent period is covered, during which there was a steady deterioration in Soviet-Israeli relations, culminating in their severance following the Six Day War in 1967. They provide insights into the Sinai Campaign of 1956 and the 1967 war and contain materials on Soviet military supplies to Egypt and Syria, the difficult negotiations regarding Russian properties in Israel, cultural and trade connections between the two countries, and fascinating descriptions of the Soviet-Israeli clash on the issue of Soviet Jewry and the possibility of Soviet Jewish emigration.

This book, spanning the years 1954–1956, is the first in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1957–1961, is the second in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1961–1964, is the third in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow's attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel's efforts to normalize relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria—which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security—and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel's formative years, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1965–1967 – the years leading up to and culminating in the June 1967 Six-Day War – is the fourth in a four-volume collection of documents from the Russian Federation and the Israeli State Archive portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staff. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

Despite growing interest in the Baha'is of Iran, research on the history of this often-persecuted minority community has been limited by the availability of sources. 'The Baha'is of Iran, Transcaspia and the Caucasus' will help to fill this gap by assembling for the first time original material from Russian archives. Volume 1 of this set showcases letters from the Rozen collection, including those of diplomats, army officers and scholars, candidly revealing the Russian perspective on developments concerning the Baha'is in Iran and Russia. In addition to the complete texts in their original languages, the authors provide both annotated translations and analytical introductions which supply essential background information, thus making this book an invaluable resource for anyone interested in Babi and Baha'i history, the history of religion and minorities, Russo-Persian relations or Qajar Iran.