Boris Morozov – författare

This book, spanning the years 1954–1956, is the first in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1957–1961, is the second in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1954–1956, is the first in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1957–1961, is the second in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1961–1964, is the third in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation''s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow''s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel''s efforts to normalize relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria—which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security—and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel''s formative years, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1961–1964, is the third in a four-part collection of documents from the archives of the Russian Federation''s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel State Archives portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staffs. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow''s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel''s efforts to normalize relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria—which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security—and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel''s formative years, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1965–1967 – the years leading up to and culminating in the June 1967 Six-Day War – is the fourth in a four-volume collection of documents from the Russian Federation and the Israeli State Archive portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staff. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This book, spanning the years 1965–1967 – the years leading up to and culminating in the June 1967 Six-Day War – is the fourth in a four-volume collection of documents from the Russian Federation and the Israeli State Archive portraying relations between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel.

Most of the documents are communications composed by successive Soviet ambassadors in Israel and Israeli ambassadors in Moscow and their respective staff. They illustrate the way Soviet ideology placed Israel irreparably in the enemy, western camp in the Cold War. Moscow’s attempt to manipulate Israel into a seemingly neutral position in the international arena was therefore a ploy, the failure of which was a foregone conclusion. Israel’s efforts to normalise relations between the two states were by turns genuine and unserious and similarly doomed to fail, both because of ongoing Soviet arms supplies to Egypt and Syria – which Israel perceived as a major threat to its security – and because the Israeli government and public felt a commitment to the well-being of the Soviet Jewish minority that they saw as deprived of basic rights.

The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Soviet foreign policy, Israel’s formative years, the Arab–Israeli conflict and Soviet Jewry, and it will be a must for university libraries.

This is the unknown story of how Zionists imprisoned by Soviet authorities were allowed to choose sentences of permanent departure to Palestine, where they helped build Jewish society, the backbone of left-wing parties, and the powerful trade union movement.

These leading authors bring to light undiscovered documents from archives opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union and go on to revise fundamental assumptions about these events. They examine the means by which internal power struggles and personal interventions in the uppermost echelons of the Soviet leadership allowed the Zionists to disseminate their message and recruit thousands of members before the massive arrests of the mid-1920s; demonstrate the extent to which personal contacts between Zionists and those who aided them, Soviet leaders and members of the security services, were vital to initiating and sustaining the practice of substitution; and using a broad array of British and Zionist documents, they reveal the crucial role of Anglo-Zionist co-operation in facilitating the immigration of Zionist convicts.

This book will of great interest to all students and scholars of Jewish and Israeli, Russian and Soviet and European and British history.

This is the unknown story of how Zionists imprisoned by Soviet authorities were allowed to choose sentences of permanent departure to Palestine, where they helped build Jewish society, the backbone of left-wing parties, and the powerful trade union movement.

These leading authors bring to light undiscovered documents from archives opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union and go on to revise fundamental assumptions about these events. They examine the means by which internal power struggles and personal interventions in the uppermost echelons of the Soviet leadership allowed the Zionists to disseminate their message and recruit thousands of members before the massive arrests of the mid-1920s; demonstrate the extent to which personal contacts between Zionists and those who aided them, Soviet leaders and members of the security services, were vital to initiating and sustaining the practice of substitution; and using a broad array of British and Zionist documents, they reveal the crucial role of Anglo-Zionist co-operation in facilitating the immigration of Zionist convicts.

This book will of great interest to all students and scholars of Jewish and Israeli, Russian and Soviet and European and British history.