In the last 30 years, embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended (4E) accounts of mind and experience have flourished. A more cosmopolitan and pluralistic approach to the philosophy of mind has also emerged, drawing on analytic, phenomenological, pragmatist, and non-Western sources and traditions. This is the first book to fully engage the 4E approach and Buddhist philosophy, drawing on and integrating the intersection of enactivism and Buddhist thought. This book deepens and extends the dialogue between Buddhist philosophy and 4E philosophy of mind and phenomenology. It engages with core issues in the philosophy of mind broadly construed in and through the dialogue between Buddhism and enactivism. Indian philosophers developed and defended philosophically sophisticated and phenomenologically rich accounts of mind, self, cognition, perception, embodiment, and more. As a work of cross-cultural philosophy, the book investigates the nature of mind and experience in dialogue with Indian and Western thinkers. On the basis of this cross-traditional dialogue, the book articulates and defends a dynamic, non-substantialist, and embodied account of experience, subjectivity, and self.

In the last 30 years, embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended (4E) accounts of mind and experience have flourished. A more cosmopolitan and pluralistic approach to the philosophy of mind has also emerged, drawing on analytic, phenomenological, pragmatist, and non-Western sources and traditions. This is the first book to fully engage the 4E approach and Buddhist philosophy, drawing on and integrating the intersection of enactivism and Buddhist thought. This book deepens and extends the dialogue between Buddhist philosophy and 4E philosophy of mind and phenomenology. It engages with core issues in the philosophy of mind broadly construed in and through the dialogue between Buddhism and enactivism. Indian philosophers developed and defended philosophically sophisticated and phenomenologically rich accounts of mind, self, cognition, perception, embodiment, and more. As a work of cross-cultural philosophy, the book investigates the nature of mind and experience in dialogue with Indian and Western thinkers. On the basis of this cross-traditional dialogue, the book articulates and defends a dynamic, non-substantialist, and embodied account of experience, subjectivity, and self.

Theories of Truth in Chinese Philosophy deals with debates surrounding the concept of truth in early Chinese thought, from the earliest periods through to the Han dynasty. Alexus McLeod focuses first on the question of whether there is a concept of truth in early Chinese thought, giving a critical overview of the positions of contemporary scholars on this issue, outlining their arguments and considering objections and possible problems and alternatives. McLeod then goes on to consider a number of possible theories of truth in early Chinese philosophy, giving an overview of what he takes to be the main contenders for truth concepts in the early material, and surrounding concepts and positions.In addition, the author considers how these theories of truth might be relevant in contemporary debates surrounding truth, as well as in the context of theories of truth in the history of philosophy, both in Western and Indian thought.

Theories of Truth in Chinese Philosophy deals with debates surrounding the concept of truth in early Chinese thought, from the earliest periods through to the Han dynasty. Alexus McLeod focuses first on the question of whether there is a concept of truth in early Chinese thought, giving a critical overview of the positions of contemporary scholars on this issue, outlining their arguments and considering objections and possible problems and alternatives. McLeod then goes on to consider a number of possible theories of truth in early Chinese philosophy, giving an overview of what he takes to be the main contenders for truth concepts in the early material, and surrounding concepts and positions.In addition, the author considers how these theories of truth might be relevant in contemporary debates surrounding truth, as well as in the context of theories of truth in the history of philosophy, both in Western and Indian thought.

Early Confucian philosophers (notably Confucius and Mencius) emphasized moral significance of shame in self-cultivation and learning. In their discussion, shame is not just a painful sense of moral failure or transgression but also a moral disposition and a form of moral excellence (i.e., virtue) that is essential to Confucian self-cultivation. In Moral Psychology of Confucian Shame, Bongrae Seok argues that shame is a genuine moral emotion and moral disposition. Engaging with recent studies of social psychology, cultural psychology, biology, and anthropology, Seok explains that shame is a uniquely evolved form of moral emotion that is comparable to, but not identical with, guilt. The author goes on to develop an interpretation of Confucian shame that reveals the embodied, interactive, and transformative nature of the Confucian moral self.

Early Confucian philosophers (notably Confucius and Mencius) emphasized moral significance of shame in self-cultivation and learning. In their discussion, shame is not just a painful sense of moral failure or transgression but also a moral disposition and a form of moral excellence (i.e., virtue) that is essential to Confucian self-cultivation. In Moral Psychology of Confucian Shame, Bongrae Seok argues that shame is a genuine moral emotion and moral disposition. Engaging with recent studies of social psychology, cultural psychology, biology, and anthropology, Seok explains that shame is a uniquely evolved form of moral emotion that is comparable to, but not identical with, guilt. The author goes on to develop an interpretation of Confucian shame that reveals the embodied, interactive, and transformative nature of the Confucian moral self.

In the last 30 years, embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended (4E) accounts of mind and experience have flourished. A more cosmopolitan and pluralistic approach to the philosophy of mind has also emerged, drawing on analytic, phenomenological, pragmatist, and non-Western sources and traditions. This is the first book to fully engage the 4E approach and Buddhist philosophy, drawing on and integrating the intersection of enactivism and Buddhist thought. This book deepens and extends the dialogue between Buddhist philosophy and 4E philosophy of mind and phenomenology. It engages with core issues in the philosophy of mind broadly construed in and through the dialogue between Buddhism and enactivism. Indian philosophers developed and defended philosophically sophisticated and phenomenologically rich accounts of mind, self, cognition, perception, embodiment, and more. As a work of cross-cultural philosophy, the book investigates the nature of mind and experience in dialogue with Indian and Western thinkers. On the basis of this cross-traditional dialogue, the book articulates and defends a dynamic, non-substantialist, and embodied account of experience, subjectivity, and self.

In the last 30 years, embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended (4E) accounts of mind and experience have flourished. A more cosmopolitan and pluralistic approach to the philosophy of mind has also emerged, drawing on analytic, phenomenological, pragmatist, and non-Western sources and traditions. This is the first book to fully engage the 4E approach and Buddhist philosophy, drawing on and integrating the intersection of enactivism and Buddhist thought. This book deepens and extends the dialogue between Buddhist philosophy and 4E philosophy of mind and phenomenology. It engages with core issues in the philosophy of mind broadly construed in and through the dialogue between Buddhism and enactivism. Indian philosophers developed and defended philosophically sophisticated and phenomenologically rich accounts of mind, self, cognition, perception, embodiment, and more. As a work of cross-cultural philosophy, the book investigates the nature of mind and experience in dialogue with Indian and Western thinkers. On the basis of this cross-traditional dialogue, the book articulates and defends a dynamic, non-substantialist, and embodied account of experience, subjectivity, and self.

Theories of Truth in Chinese Philosophy deals with debates surrounding the concept of truth in early Chinese thought, from the earliest periods through to the Han dynasty. Alexus McLeod focuses first on the question of whether there is a concept of truth in early Chinese thought, giving a critical overview of the positions of contemporary scholars on this issue, outlining their arguments and considering objections and possible problems and alternatives. McLeod then goes on to consider a number of possible theories of truth in early Chinese philosophy, giving an overview of what he takes to be the main contenders for truth concepts in the early material, and surrounding concepts and positions.In addition, the author considers how these theories of truth might be relevant in contemporary debates surrounding truth, as well as in the context of theories of truth in the history of philosophy, both in Western and Indian thought.

Theories of Truth in Chinese Philosophy deals with debates surrounding the concept of truth in early Chinese thought, from the earliest periods through to the Han dynasty. Alexus McLeod focuses first on the question of whether there is a concept of truth in early Chinese thought, giving a critical overview of the positions of contemporary scholars on this issue, outlining their arguments and considering objections and possible problems and alternatives. McLeod then goes on to consider a number of possible theories of truth in early Chinese philosophy, giving an overview of what he takes to be the main contenders for truth concepts in the early material, and surrounding concepts and positions.In addition, the author considers how these theories of truth might be relevant in contemporary debates surrounding truth, as well as in the context of theories of truth in the history of philosophy, both in Western and Indian thought.

Early Confucian philosophers (notably Confucius and Mencius) emphasized moral significance of shame in self-cultivation and learning. In their discussion, shame is not just a painful sense of moral failure or transgression but also a moral disposition and a form of moral excellence (i.e., virtue) that is essential to Confucian self-cultivation. In Moral Psychology of Confucian Shame, Bongrae Seok argues that shame is a genuine moral emotion and moral disposition. Engaging with recent studies of social psychology, cultural psychology, biology, and anthropology, Seok explains that shame is a uniquely evolved form of moral emotion that is comparable to, but not identical with, guilt. The author goes on to develop an interpretation of Confucian shame that reveals the embodied, interactive, and transformative nature of the Confucian moral self.

Early Confucian philosophers (notably Confucius and Mencius) emphasized moral significance of shame in self-cultivation and learning. In their discussion, shame is not just a painful sense of moral failure or transgression but also a moral disposition and a form of moral excellence (i.e., virtue) that is essential to Confucian self-cultivation. In Moral Psychology of Confucian Shame, Bongrae Seok argues that shame is a genuine moral emotion and moral disposition. Engaging with recent studies of social psychology, cultural psychology, biology, and anthropology, Seok explains that shame is a uniquely evolved form of moral emotion that is comparable to, but not identical with, guilt. The author goes on to develop an interpretation of Confucian shame that reveals the embodied, interactive, and transformative nature of the Confucian moral self.