Elements in Chinese Economy and Governance – serie

While bribery has been extensively studied, the dynamics of personnel corruption in the public sector, often known as 'buying and selling of government offices,' remain underexplored. This form of corruption involves leaders' accepting or soliciting bribes from subordinates to influence recruitment, appointment, and promotion decisions, significantly impacting political selection and governance quality. This Element employs a dual perspective - corruption and elite mobility - to analyze the distribution of office-selling across the Chinese administrative matrix and its various forms and implications. Using two novel self-compiled datasets, it proposes a tripartite framework of performance, patronage, and purchase to reimagine political selection in China, highlighting the coexistence of multiple governance models: a meritocratic state prioritizing competence, a clientelist state emphasizing loyalty, and an investment state bound by money. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

While bribery has been extensively studied, the dynamics of personnel corruption in the public sector, often known as 'buying and selling of government offices,' remain underexplored. This form of corruption involves leaders' accepting or soliciting bribes from subordinates to influence recruitment, appointment, and promotion decisions, significantly impacting political selection and governance quality. This Element employs a dual perspective - corruption and elite mobility - to analyze the distribution of office-selling across the Chinese administrative matrix and its various forms and implications. Using two novel self-compiled datasets, it proposes a tripartite framework of performance, patronage, and purchase to reimagine political selection in China, highlighting the coexistence of multiple governance models: a meritocratic state prioritizing competence, a clientelist state emphasizing loyalty, and an investment state bound by money. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Political meritocracy, which selects and promotes officials based on their work performance, is an important explanation for China's rapid development. While prior studies focus on territorial leaders (kuai), less attention is given to functional department leaders (tiao), whose performance is harder to measure, attribute, or compare. This Element introduces an attention-based explanation, arguing that in China's complex bureaucratic system, marked by intricate divisions of labor and information asymmetry, capturing superiors' attention is critical for official's career advancement. Through case studies and analyses of original biographical data on functional department leaders, this Element reveals: 1) Promotion likelihood correlates with officials' ability to gain superiors' attention; 2) Not all attention-seeking behaviors align with governance goals, often fostering bureaucratic issues like formalism and over-implementation. This attention-based framework tries to reconcile debates on competence versus connections in Chinese political selection and explains both the bureaucratic system's successes and its governance challenges.

Political meritocracy, which selects and promotes officials based on their work performance, is an important explanation for China's rapid development. While prior studies focus on territorial leaders (kuai), less attention is given to functional department leaders (tiao), whose performance is harder to measure, attribute, or compare. This Element introduces an attention-based explanation, arguing that in China's complex bureaucratic system, marked by intricate divisions of labor and information asymmetry, capturing superiors' attention is critical for official's career advancement. Through case studies and analyses of original biographical data on functional department leaders, this Element reveals: 1) Promotion likelihood correlates with officials' ability to gain superiors' attention; 2) Not all attention-seeking behaviors align with governance goals, often fostering bureaucratic issues like formalism and over-implementation. This attention-based framework tries to reconcile debates on competence versus connections in Chinese political selection and explains both the bureaucratic system's successes and its governance challenges.

This study interrogates the theoretical and empirical validities of two dominant theories about Chinese state in the post-Mao period. The authors argue that the meritocratic view has under-theorized the innate contradiction between officials' personal competence and political loyalty. In order to survive political struggles, political leaders need to rely on patronage networks to recruit followers and solidify trust, often at the expense of official competence. The popular view also misrepresents China's cadre assessment system in several important ways. The authors supplement this theoretical and anecdotal evidence with a systematic study of provincial level officials between 1978 and 2020. Contrary to the meritocratic view, leaders' economic performance does not increase their promotion chances. Work ties with central leaders, on the other hand, have provided provincial officials with advantage in promotion. This study contributes to general theories of autocratic state and inform the debate about autocratic growth in the political economy literature.

This study interrogates the theoretical and empirical validities of two dominant theories about Chinese state in the post-Mao period. The authors argue that the meritocratic view has under-theorized the innate contradiction between officials' personal competence and political loyalty. In order to survive political struggles, political leaders need to rely on patronage networks to recruit followers and solidify trust, often at the expense of official competence. The popular view also misrepresents China's cadre assessment system in several important ways. The authors supplement this theoretical and anecdotal evidence with a systematic study of provincial level officials between 1978 and 2020. Contrary to the meritocratic view, leaders' economic performance does not increase their promotion chances. Work ties with central leaders, on the other hand, have provided provincial officials with advantage in promotion. This study contributes to general theories of autocratic state and inform the debate about autocratic growth in the political economy literature.

In contrast to the drastic shifts in China's political landscape and society since 2012, taxation may appear as a comparatively mundane topic receiving limited attention. However, the relative stability in China's taxation system underscores its delicate role in maintaining a balance in state-society relations. The Element embarks on an exploration of China's intricate taxation system in the contemporary era, illuminating its origins and the profound reverberations on state-society relations. It shows that China's reliance on indirect taxation stems from the legacies of transitioning from a planned economy to a market-driven one as well as elaborate fiscal bargaining between the central and local governments. This strategy inadvertently heightens Chinese citizens' sensitivity to direct taxation and engenders the tragedy of the commons, leading to rising government debts and collusion by local governments and businesses that results in land expropriation, labor disputes, and environmental degradation.

In contrast to the drastic shifts in China's political landscape and society since 2012, taxation may appear as a comparatively mundane topic receiving limited attention. However, the relative stability in China's taxation system underscores its delicate role in maintaining a balance in state-society relations. The Element embarks on an exploration of China's intricate taxation system in the contemporary era, illuminating its origins and the profound reverberations on state-society relations. It shows that China's reliance on indirect taxation stems from the legacies of transitioning from a planned economy to a market-driven one as well as elaborate fiscal bargaining between the central and local governments. This strategy inadvertently heightens Chinese citizens' sensitivity to direct taxation and engenders the tragedy of the commons, leading to rising government debts and collusion by local governments and businesses that results in land expropriation, labor disputes, and environmental degradation.

Why would a politically centralized state embark on the path of economic decentralization? This Element delves into the political origin of the puzzling economic decentralization in mainland China. The authors contend that the intra-elite conflicts between the authoritarian ruler and the ruling elites within the state prompted the ruler to pursue decentralization as a strategy to curb the influence wielded by the ruling elites. By examining the composition of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, they find that the Cultural Revolution, fueled by elite conflicts, shifted the elite selectorate's composition from favoring central agencies to favoring local interests. Subsequent low turnover reinforced this shift, aligning elite incentives with decentralization policies and committing the Chinese leadership to a decentralized path in the 1980s. Additionally, Taiwan's economic liberalization under the Kuomintang's authoritarian rule provides further evidence of the link between ruling party elite composition and economic policy orientation.

Why would a politically centralized state embark on the path of economic decentralization? This Element delves into the political origin of the puzzling economic decentralization in mainland China. The authors contend that the intra-elite conflicts between the authoritarian ruler and the ruling elites within the state prompted the ruler to pursue decentralization as a strategy to curb the influence wielded by the ruling elites. By examining the composition of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, they find that the Cultural Revolution, fueled by elite conflicts, shifted the elite selectorate's composition from favoring central agencies to favoring local interests. Subsequent low turnover reinforced this shift, aligning elite incentives with decentralization policies and committing the Chinese leadership to a decentralized path in the 1980s. Additionally, Taiwan's economic liberalization under the Kuomintang's authoritarian rule provides further evidence of the link between ruling party elite composition and economic policy orientation.

This element proposes the theory of disinterested governments to explain China's economic ascent. A disinterested government is a government that neither represents, nor is captured by the interests of any social groups. It is more likely than a biased government to avoid allocative inefficiency and increase output. A theoretical model of coalition formation finds that a more politically equal society is more likely to produce a disinterested government. Empirical evidence shows that the Chinese government has behaved in a disinterested fashion in the reform era. Social equality established by a series of social transformations has been identified as the cause for Chinese government's acting in a disinterested fashion in the reform era. Cross-country case studies and regression analysis have established a chain of causality running from political equality to the inclusive (disinterested) state, and then to faster economic growth. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.