Elements in Comparative Political Behavior – serie

Mass polarization is one of the defining features of politics in the twenty-first century, but efforts to understand its causes and effects are often hindered by empirical challenges related to measurement and data availability. To address these challenges and provide a common standard of analysis for researchers, this Element presents the Polarization in Comparative Attitudes Project (PolarCAP). PolarCAP clearly defines polarization as a property of group relations and uses a Bayesian measurement model to estimate smooth panels of ideological and affective polarization across ninety-two countries and forty-nine years. The author uses these data to provide a descriptive account of mass polarization across time and space. They further show how PolarCAP facilitates substantive inference by applying it to three sets of variables often hypothesized as causes or consequences of polarization: institutional design, economic crisis, and democracy. Open-source software makes PolarCAP easily accessible to scholars and practitioners.

In order to cast a satisfying vote, understand politics, or otherwise participate in political discourse or processes, voters must have some idea of what policies parties are pursuing and, more generally, 'who goes with whom.' This Element aims to both advance the study of how voters formulate and update their perceptions of party brands and persuade our colleagues to join us in studying these processes. To make this endeavor more enticing, but no less rigorous, the authors make three contributions to this emerging field of study: presenting a framework for building and interrogating theoretical arguments, aggregating a large, comprehensive data archive, and recommending a parsimonious strategy for statistical analysis. In the process, they provide a definition for voters' perceptions of party brands and an analytical schema to study them, attempt to contextualize and rationalize some competing findings in the existing literature, and derive and test several new hypotheses.

While the politicization of ethnic identities is readily observed around the world, a generalized understanding of what makes members of a particular group more likely to coordinate their votes towards a single party or candidate remains elusive. This Element scrutinizes voting patterns at the social group level based on individual-level survey data and controlling for country-level variables across 115 countries. The findings highlight how the characteristics of ethnic groups, especially size and crosscutting patterns, interact within political institutions. Three group-level characteristics are especially influential to bloc voting - stronger geographic concentration, greater internal alignment of group members across other identity dimensions, and groups whose members are more distinctive across identity dimensions compared to the broader population. When analyzed across political institutions, the highest rates of bloc voting occur among small groups with low crosscutting in permissive settings and medium groups with low crosscutting in restrictive settings.

While the politicization of ethnic identities is readily observed around the world, a generalized understanding of what makes members of a particular group more likely to coordinate their votes towards a single party or candidate remains elusive. This Element scrutinizes voting patterns at the social group level based on individual-level survey data and controlling for country-level variables across 115 countries. The findings highlight how the characteristics of ethnic groups, especially size and crosscutting patterns, interact within political institutions. Three group-level characteristics are especially influential to bloc voting - stronger geographic concentration, greater internal alignment of group members across other identity dimensions, and groups whose members are more distinctive across identity dimensions compared to the broader population. When analyzed across political institutions, the highest rates of bloc voting occur among small groups with low crosscutting in permissive settings and medium groups with low crosscutting in restrictive settings.

This Element leverages a comparative approach to understand how conspiracy theories and their believers differ within and across countries. Using original survey data from eight varied cases (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Lebanon, Morocco, South Africa, and the United States) the authors present specific contemporary conspiracy theories, illustrate how these theories appeal in their national context, and determine whether the characteristics of the typical conspiracy theory believer vary across setting. They first demonstrate that there is a wide range of conspiracy theories, some of which have worldwide reach, whereas others are more context specific. Then, they show that the determinants of individual conspiracism are very similar in the Western world and Brazil, but do not necessarily travel to Lebanon, Morocco and South Africa. Lastly, they summarize the main conclusions of this Element and discuss the need for greater comparative research on conspiracy theories and propose clear areas for future research.

This Element leverages a comparative approach to understand how conspiracy theories and their believers differ within and across countries. Using original survey data from eight varied cases (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Lebanon, Morocco, South Africa, and the United States) the authors present specific contemporary conspiracy theories, illustrate how these theories appeal in their national context, and determine whether the characteristics of the typical conspiracy theory believer vary across setting. They first demonstrate that there is a wide range of conspiracy theories, some of which have worldwide reach, whereas others are more context specific. Then, they show that the determinants of individual conspiracism are very similar in the Western world and Brazil, but do not necessarily travel to Lebanon, Morocco and South Africa. Lastly, they summarize the main conclusions of this Element and discuss the need for greater comparative research on conspiracy theories and propose clear areas for future research.

Mass polarization is one of the defining features of politics in the twenty-first century, but efforts to understand its causes and effects are often hindered by empirical challenges related to measurement and data availability. To address these challenges and provide a common standard of analysis for researchers, this Element presents the Polarization in Comparative Attitudes Project (PolarCAP). PolarCAP clearly defines polarization as a property of group relations and uses a Bayesian measurement model to estimate smooth panels of ideological and affective polarization across ninety-two countries and forty-nine years. The author uses these data to provide a descriptive account of mass polarization across time and space. They further show how PolarCAP facilitates substantive inference by applying it to three sets of variables often hypothesized as causes or consequences of polarization: institutional design, economic crisis, and democracy. Open-source software makes PolarCAP easily accessible to scholars and practitioners.

Why are some constitutions amended more frequently than others? Studies of amendment rates have been plentiful but have not generated much theoretical or empirical consensus because the extant literature rests rest on a strong and unwarranted assumption that social capacity to navigate amendment rules is constant across space and time. By contrast, the authors of this Element argue that this social capacity varies by civic connectedness. Drawing upon previous studies that find social capital mitigates transaction costs, this Element outlines the myriad ways in which social capital helps elites, social movements, and ordinary citizens solve the collective action problems associated with constitutional reform. The authors find evidence for their theory using a variety of measures, methods, and units of analysis.

Why are some constitutions amended more frequently than others? Studies of amendment rates have been plentiful but have not generated much theoretical or empirical consensus because the extant literature rests rest on a strong and unwarranted assumption that social capacity to navigate amendment rules is constant across space and time. By contrast, the authors of this Element argue that this social capacity varies by civic connectedness. Drawing upon previous studies that find social capital mitigates transaction costs, this Element outlines the myriad ways in which social capital helps elites, social movements, and ordinary citizens solve the collective action problems associated with constitutional reform. The authors find evidence for their theory using a variety of measures, methods, and units of analysis.

In order to cast a satisfying vote, understand politics, or otherwise participate in political discourse or processes, voters must have some idea of what policies parties are pursuing and, more generally, 'who goes with whom.' This Element aims to both advance the study of how voters formulate and update their perceptions of party brands and persuade our colleagues to join us in studying these processes. To make this endeavor more enticing, but no less rigorous, the authors make three contributions to this emerging field of study: presenting a framework for building and interrogating theoretical arguments, aggregating a large, comprehensive data archive, and recommending a parsimonious strategy for statistical analysis. In the process, they provide a definition for voters' perceptions of party brands and an analytical schema to study them, attempt to contextualize and rationalize some competing findings in the existing literature, and derive and test several new hypotheses.

In recent decades, US voting has not only polarized but also nationalized: state-level voting choices increasingly reflect national allegiances. Such cross-level nationalization can undermine accountability. Yet understanding its sources – and whether it is distinctively American – requires comparative data. The authors assemble a novel data set linking 146,934 subnational and national election returns across 14 European and American democracies over several decades, supplemented with surveys. They find that nationalization has been steady and high for decades in most countries; the US is an outlier only in having nationalized recently. Their findings challenge monocausal explanations emphasizing media or public opinion. Instead, greater subnational authority and stronger subnational attachments predict lower nationalization. They also uncover ties between nationalization and affective polarization. More polarized voters are more likely to cast congruent ballots, though at the country level this link is driven by the US. This title is available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

In recent decades, US voting has not only polarized but also nationalized: state-level voting choices increasingly reflect national allegiances. Such cross-level nationalization can undermine accountability. Yet understanding its sources – and whether it is distinctively American – requires comparative data. The authors assemble a novel data set linking 146,934 subnational and national election returns across 14 European and American democracies over several decades, supplemented with surveys. They find that nationalization has been steady and high for decades in most countries; the US is an outlier only in having nationalized recently. Their findings challenge monocausal explanations emphasizing media or public opinion. Instead, greater subnational authority and stronger subnational attachments predict lower nationalization. They also uncover ties between nationalization and affective polarization. More polarized voters are more likely to cast congruent ballots, though at the country level this link is driven by the US. This title is available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This work challenges the conventional understanding of social arenas as merely gateways to traditional political participation, arguing that they function as independent political arenas where citizens exercise political agency. Using LAPOP data from 18 Latin American countries, the authors show that participation in social arenas has distinct demographic correlates relative to electoral participation, with higher levels of engagement among women, indigenous peoples, and individuals with lower levels of formal education. They also identify an "inclusion paradox": social arenas incorporate groups that face barriers in traditional political spaces. Yet, because this inclusion comes partly from exclusion, participation in some of these social arenas correlates with lower support for democracy. Case studies from Guatemala, Peru, and Chile illustrate how participation in social arenas has led to significant political changes. Our findings contribute to political participation theory by illustrating how citizens engage politically across diverse arenas.

This work challenges the conventional understanding of social arenas as merely gateways to traditional political participation, arguing that they function as independent political arenas where citizens exercise political agency. Using LAPOP data from 18 Latin American countries, the authors show that participation in social arenas has distinct demographic correlates relative to electoral participation, with higher levels of engagement among women, indigenous peoples, and individuals with lower levels of formal education. They also identify an "inclusion paradox": social arenas incorporate groups that face barriers in traditional political spaces. Yet, because this inclusion comes partly from exclusion, participation in some of these social arenas correlates with lower support for democracy. Case studies from Guatemala, Peru, and Chile illustrate how participation in social arenas has led to significant political changes. Our findings contribute to political participation theory by illustrating how citizens engage politically across diverse arenas.

Political consumerism is an important form of political participation in which citizens use market choices - boycotting and buycotting - to express political concerns and influence global economic and political institutions. Adopting a comparative perspective, the Element integrates evidence from a meta-analysis (109 studies and 1,300 tests), global survey data (66 countries and 97,000 respondents), and original cross-national research (5 countries and 7,500 respondents). Using each data source, the authors examine the roles of resources (education, income, and information/news), engagement (political interest, ideology, and environmental concern), and mobilization (online group ties and offline organization membership) in political consumerism and how these factors vary across countries in explaining political consumerism. The authors find that organizational membership, group ties on social media, political interest, and political ideology are consistent covariates of boycotting and buycotting, whereas education, information/news, and environmental concern depend on the country, political context, campaign, and activity (boycotting or buycotting).

Political consumerism is an important form of political participation in which citizens use market choices - boycotting and buycotting - to express political concerns and influence global economic and political institutions. Adopting a comparative perspective, the Element integrates evidence from a meta-analysis (109 studies and 1,300 tests), global survey data (66 countries and 97,000 respondents), and original cross-national research (5 countries and 7,500 respondents). Using each data source, the authors examine the roles of resources (education, income, and information/news), engagement (political interest, ideology, and environmental concern), and mobilization (online group ties and offline organization membership) in political consumerism and how these factors vary across countries in explaining political consumerism. The authors find that organizational membership, group ties on social media, political interest, and political ideology are consistent covariates of boycotting and buycotting, whereas education, information/news, and environmental concern depend on the country, political context, campaign, and activity (boycotting or buycotting).

Many authoritarian regimes, including some of the world's most populous autocracies, such as China and Egypt, often do not make it clear what views, attitudes, and behaviors people may express openly without being sanctioned. This Element investigates how the uncertainty that this style of rule instills among people impacts the effectiveness of repression in deterring dissent. The authors develop a novel argument about how it can magnify the effect of repression by affecting how people understand what repression signals about a regime's resolve to sanction dissent. Their analysis, based on two laboratory experiments conducted in Egypt, confirms their argument and, in the process, challenges aspects of prominent behavioral arguments linking negative emotions to uncertainty. The authors' results imply that repression is least effective against acts of dissent regimes are opposed to the most and are very clear about their resolve to repress them as a result.