Elements in the Philosophy of S?ren Kierkegaard – serie

This Element explores Kierkegaard's Two Ages, his literary review of a contemporary novella, situating it in the context of his other writings from the same period of his life and his cultural/political context. It investigates his review's analysis of the vices and virtues of romance and political associations, which he treats in parallel fashion. It traces a theme that certain types of both romance and political association can foster virtues that are necessary for the religious life, although the political ethos of his contemporary age mostly encouraged vices.

This Element explores Kierkegaard's Two Ages, his literary review of a contemporary novella, situating it in the context of his other writings from the same period of his life and his cultural/political context. It investigates his review's analysis of the vices and virtues of romance and political associations, which he treats in parallel fashion. It traces a theme that certain types of both romance and political association can foster virtues that are necessary for the religious life, although the political ethos of his contemporary age mostly encouraged vices.

This Element discusses the relation between the ethical and religious as key concepts in Kierkegaard's works. Instead of viewing the ethical and religious mainly as different stages on life's way, it identifies different connections between ethical and religious considerations, reasons, and values. By discussing Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac in Fear and Trembling, it argues that - despite appearances - religion does not undermine but rather supports moral constraints. However, Kierkegaard is clear that our moral requirements exceed our natural capabilities, something that makes divine assistance morally necessary. Thus, religious belief seems supported by moral reasons. Still, we often recognize moral truth without seeing the metaphysical and theological implications of morality. Therefore, moral agents need not be religious believers, although morality nevertheless has metaphysical and theological implications if Kierkegaard is correct. Specifically, Kierkegaard seems to combine realism regarding value with the view that some moral requirements are divinely commanded.

This Element discusses the relation between the ethical and religious as key concepts in Kierkegaard's works. Instead of viewing the ethical and religious mainly as different stages on life's way, it identifies different connections between ethical and religious considerations, reasons, and values. By discussing Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac in Fear and Trembling, it argues that - despite appearances - religion does not undermine but rather supports moral constraints. However, Kierkegaard is clear that our moral requirements exceed our natural capabilities, something that makes divine assistance morally necessary. Thus, religious belief seems supported by moral reasons. Still, we often recognize moral truth without seeing the metaphysical and theological implications of morality. Therefore, moral agents need not be religious believers, although morality nevertheless has metaphysical and theological implications if Kierkegaard is correct. Specifically, Kierkegaard seems to combine realism regarding value with the view that some moral requirements are divinely commanded.

This Element is a critical analysis of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments, attributed to the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus. The philosophical content of Kierkegaard's work is developed in the form of an ironical, humorous jest in which Climacus pretends to invent a philosophical view that he claims cannot be humanly invented, and which bears a strong resemblance to Christian faith. The invention is proposed as an alternative to "the Socratic view" of the Truth that, if possessed, leads to eternal life. The crucial underlying issue is whether eternal life could be linked to history. This Element explores the purpose of this literary form, and its relation to the philosophical content, highlighting the importance of Fragments for philosophy of religion, theology, and even the contemporary relation of religion to politics and culture, and arguing that Kierkegaard's view is not a form of irrational fideism.

This Element is a critical analysis of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments, attributed to the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus. The philosophical content of Kierkegaard's work is developed in the form of an ironical, humorous jest in which Climacus pretends to invent a philosophical view that he claims cannot be humanly invented, and which bears a strong resemblance to Christian faith. The invention is proposed as an alternative to "the Socratic view" of the Truth that, if possessed, leads to eternal life. The crucial underlying issue is whether eternal life could be linked to history. This Element explores the purpose of this literary form, and its relation to the philosophical content, highlighting the importance of Fragments for philosophy of religion, theology, and even the contemporary relation of religion to politics and culture, and arguing that Kierkegaard's view is not a form of irrational fideism.

Kierkegaard's Stages on Life's Way belongs to what by 1845 can be understood as the romantic tradition, itself containing members related by both blood and adoption to those in the Christian tradition. By far the greatest portion of this Element is devoted to the portrait of an ethically enervated, anonymous troubadour turned troglodyte whose peculiar diary is accidentally found locked in a box with the key inside at the bottom of a pond. To bring up and out what animates this central character, the initial portions of stages on the despairing ambivalence of a group of tipsy bachelors and the pedantic moralizing of an anonymous husband unfold the interpersonal ideals at play in pursuit of a meaningful life all told. Following suit, the diary recounts a troubled love affair, which is, as Kierkegaard says elsewhere, 'always a usable theme in relation to what it means to exist.'

Kierkegaard's Stages on Life's Way belongs to what by 1845 can be understood as the romantic tradition, itself containing members related by both blood and adoption to those in the Christian tradition. By far the greatest portion of this Element is devoted to the portrait of an ethically enervated, anonymous troubadour turned troglodyte whose peculiar diary is accidentally found locked in a box with the key inside at the bottom of a pond. To bring up and out what animates this central character, the initial portions of stages on the despairing ambivalence of a group of tipsy bachelors and the pedantic moralizing of an anonymous husband unfold the interpersonal ideals at play in pursuit of a meaningful life all told. Following suit, the diary recounts a troubled love affair, which is, as Kierkegaard says elsewhere, 'always a usable theme in relation to what it means to exist.'

The themes of love and loving are often, albeit not always explicitly, present in Kierkegaard's works. It is only his 1847 Works of Love, however, in which the topic serves as a central focus of inquiry. And while at first glance, this text may seem alien to Kierkegaard's poetic existentialism, revolving as it does around the commandment 'You Shall Love Your Neighbour as Yourself' rather than the drama of human existence and the mysteries of the human heart, the thesis that emerges is entirely existential: the capacity for loving is inherent to our very existence as humans. Focussing on Works of Love supported by a few short detours through other texts of Kierkegaard, this Element explores Kierkegaard's view of love as ultimately construing loving as a way of life.

The themes of love and loving are often, albeit not always explicitly, present in Kierkegaard's works. It is only his 1847 Works of Love, however, in which the topic serves as a central focus of inquiry. And while at first glance, this text may seem alien to Kierkegaard's poetic existentialism, revolving as it does around the commandment 'You Shall Love Your Neighbour as Yourself' rather than the drama of human existence and the mysteries of the human heart, the thesis that emerges is entirely existential: the capacity for loving is inherent to our very existence as humans. Focussing on Works of Love supported by a few short detours through other texts of Kierkegaard, this Element explores Kierkegaard's view of love as ultimately construing loving as a way of life.

'Is reason then alone baptized, are the passions pagans?' By placing Edward Young's question on the frontispiece of Either/Or, Søren Kierkegaard announces a problem that runs throughout his authorship: what role do the affects play in human existence? His answer helps explain his enduring importance for modern philosophy. Across works such as Either/Or, The Concept of Anxiety, and The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard develops powerful accounts of affects such as irony, melancholy, anxiety, and despair, while also exploring the affective dimensions of philosophical writing itself. This Element examines Kierkegaard's treatment of affectivity across his writings and across individual affects. It argues that his account is organised around a tension between two forms of affective life: baptisable affects that can be transformed and integrated into the project of becoming a self, and non-baptisable affects that resist such transformation and threaten to derail it.

'Is reason then alone baptized, are the passions pagans?' By placing Edward Young's question on the frontispiece of Either/Or, Søren Kierkegaard announces a problem that runs throughout his authorship: what role do the affects play in human existence? His answer helps explain his enduring importance for modern philosophy. Across works such as Either/Or, The Concept of Anxiety, and The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard develops powerful accounts of affects such as irony, melancholy, anxiety, and despair, while also exploring the affective dimensions of philosophical writing itself. This Element examines Kierkegaard's treatment of affectivity across his writings and across individual affects. It argues that his account is organised around a tension between two forms of affective life: baptisable affects that can be transformed and integrated into the project of becoming a self, and non-baptisable affects that resist such transformation and threaten to derail it.

With reference to Kierkegaard's religious writings and other pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard's concept of anxiety is explored with a primary focus on the book The Concept of Anxiety. Anxiety itself is shown to be the eminent term for a moment in the human being's psychological development that Kierkegaard also discusses in other terms. In particular, it is the mode in which human being's apprehension of their possible freedom first appears in consciousness and, as such, is not to be confused with pathological anxiety, melancholy, or other negative states. At the same time, Kierkegaard regards human beings as typically failing to realize the possibility of freedom and when this happens anxiety becomes the trigger for despair or sin. The Element concludes by considering the influence of Kierkegaard on discussions of anxiety in Heidegger, Sartre, and Tillich and the relevance of his analysis to the contemporary crisis of social anxiety.

With reference to Kierkegaard's religious writings and other pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard's concept of anxiety is explored with a primary focus on the book The Concept of Anxiety. Anxiety itself is shown to be the eminent term for a moment in the human being's psychological development that Kierkegaard also discusses in other terms. In particular, it is the mode in which human being's apprehension of their possible freedom first appears in consciousness and, as such, is not to be confused with pathological anxiety, melancholy, or other negative states. At the same time, Kierkegaard regards human beings as typically failing to realize the possibility of freedom and when this happens anxiety becomes the trigger for despair or sin. The Element concludes by considering the influence of Kierkegaard on discussions of anxiety in Heidegger, Sartre, and Tillich and the relevance of his analysis to the contemporary crisis of social anxiety.

Is Kierkegaard a phenomenologist? Much depends on what we take 'phenomenology' to mean, since the word has been stretched in all possible directions since Edmund Husserl wrote his major works. What have phenomenologists made of his writings? This question is easier to answer: he has been a constant reference point for many of them, although there is little agreement about his significance. This short book argues that he is a phenomenologist in the context of discovery, not justification. One finds attention to attunements in Kierkegaard, and one also finds modes of bracketing and reduction. Even so, his styles of thinking phenomenologically differ from those of most writers in this philosophical school. His phenomenology takes a theological path, one that leads from 'world' to 'kingdom,' and one that often turns on what he calls 'the moment.'

Is Kierkegaard a phenomenologist? Much depends on what we take 'phenomenology' to mean, since the word has been stretched in all possible directions since Edmund Husserl wrote his major works. What have phenomenologists made of his writings? This question is easier to answer: he has been a constant reference point for many of them, although there is little agreement about his significance. This short book argues that he is a phenomenologist in the context of discovery, not justification. One finds attention to attunements in Kierkegaard, and one also finds modes of bracketing and reduction. Even so, his styles of thinking phenomenologically differ from those of most writers in this philosophical school. His phenomenology takes a theological path, one that leads from 'world' to 'kingdom,' and one that often turns on what he calls 'the moment.'

Kierkegaard's lifelong fascination with the figure of Socrates has many aspects, but prominent among them is his admiration for the way Socrates was devoted to his divinely ordained mission as a philosopher. To have such a destiny, revealed through what one loves and is passionate about as well as through a feeling of vocation, is a necessary condition of leading a meaningful life, according to Kierkegaard. Examining what Kierkegaard has to say about the meaning of life requires looking at his conception of 'subjective truth,' as well as how he understands the ancient ideal of 'amor fati,' a notion that Nietzsche would subsequently take up, but that Kierkegaard understands in a manner that is distinctly his own, and that he sought to put into practice in his own existence. Our life is a work of art, but we are not the artist.

Kierkegaard's lifelong fascination with the figure of Socrates has many aspects, but prominent among them is his admiration for the way Socrates was devoted to his divinely ordained mission as a philosopher. To have such a destiny, revealed through what one loves and is passionate about as well as through a feeling of vocation, is a necessary condition of leading a meaningful life, according to Kierkegaard. Examining what Kierkegaard has to say about the meaning of life requires looking at his conception of 'subjective truth,' as well as how he understands the ancient ideal of 'amor fati,' a notion that Nietzsche would subsequently take up, but that Kierkegaard understands in a manner that is distinctly his own, and that he sought to put into practice in his own existence. Our life is a work of art, but we are not the artist.

This Element traces the emergence, development, and eventual sublation of the concept of life-view in Kierkegaard's authorship. It begins with Kierkegaard's review of Hans Christian Andersen, From the Papers of One Still Living (1838), examining the influence of Heibergian-Hegelian aesthetics, the bildungsroman tradition, and Poul Martin Møller's critique of 'nihilistic' European literature on Kierkegaard's early understanding of the concept. The analysis then considers how, inspired by Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard employs 'life-view' to develop his pseudonymous authorship, leading to the stages of existence in Either/Or (1843) and Stages on Life's Way (1845). Life-view also becomes a crucial term in Kierkegaard's criticism of the daily press and defines good authorship, as Kierkegaard's Literary Review of Gyllembourg's Two Ages and Book on Adler show (1846). In his late authorship, however, Kierkegaard's critique of institutionalised Christianity, his reversal of bildung, and the revision of human agency culminate in a sublation of the concept of life-view.

This Element traces the emergence, development, and eventual sublation of the concept of life-view in Kierkegaard's authorship. It begins with Kierkegaard's review of Hans Christian Andersen, From the Papers of One Still Living (1838), examining the influence of Heibergian-Hegelian aesthetics, the bildungsroman tradition, and Poul Martin Møller's critique of 'nihilistic' European literature on Kierkegaard's early understanding of the concept. The analysis then considers how, inspired by Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard employs 'life-view' to develop his pseudonymous authorship, leading to the stages of existence in Either/Or (1843) and Stages on Life's Way (1845). Life-view also becomes a crucial term in Kierkegaard's criticism of the daily press and defines good authorship, as Kierkegaard's Literary Review of Gyllembourg's Two Ages and Book on Adler show (1846). In his late authorship, however, Kierkegaard's critique of institutionalised Christianity, his reversal of bildung, and the revision of human agency culminate in a sublation of the concept of life-view.

The nature and importance of the Nachlass from Kierkegaard's hand is not well known, especially to researchers outside Denmark. At his death, Kierkegaard left behind an enormous amount of unpublished material in various folders, journals, and notebooks, and on loose pieces of paper. This material includes observations and analyses on various topics, sketches and outlines for possible works, reading and lecture notes, as well as autobiographical reflections. This Element is an attempt to make this rich and interesting material better known to international Kierkegaard readers. It shows how Kierkegaard's posthumous writings are interesting and valuable on their own and serve to illuminate his well-known published works.