Philosophy of Memory and Imagination – serie
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2 produkter
2 produkter
Inbunden, Engelska, 2019
1 364 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
Jordi Fernández here offers a philosophical investigation of memory, one which engages with memory's philosophically puzzling characteristics in order to clarify what memory is. Memories interact with mental states of other types in a particular way, and they also have associated feelings that these other mental states lack. They are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since one can have memories of objective events as well as memories of one's own past experiences. Finally, memories are epistemically unique, in that beliefs formed on the basis of memories are protected from certain errors of misidentification, and are justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive capacity other than memory. To explain these unique features, Fernández proposes that memories have a particular functional role which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the past. He suggests that memories have a particular content as well, namely that they represent themselves as having a certain causal origin. Fernández then explains the feelings associated with our memories as the experience of some of the things that our memories represent, things such as our own past experiences, or the fact that memories originate in those experiences. He also accounts for the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in terms of the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a unified account of several philosophically interesting aspects of memory, one that will appeal to philosophers of mind, metaphysicians, and epistemologists alike.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2026
946 kr
Kommande
Is it rational to be moral? Is it irrational to not care at all about anybody but yourself? In Empathic Reason, Luke Roelofs defends Empathic Rationalism, a new account of the relationship between morality and rationality. They vindicate the idea that we rationally have to care about other people because failing to do so involves treating them as less real than ourselves, explaining this in terms of the indispensable role of imagination in understanding other minds. Traditional approaches to moral philosophy have often treated empathy--imaginatively taking on another's perspective--as contrasting with or even opposed to rationality, but Empathic Rationalism views it as an integral part of rationality. This provides a secular, naturalistic foundation for belief in objective morality: to act morally is simply to act rationally, which requires acting as our estimate of perfect empathy would tell us to act. Someone who consistently shows no desire to act in this way reveals themselves to be a solipsist in denial: they treat other minds as useful fictions and other people as props in a game of make-believe. This means that a fully consistent egoist thus holds irrational beliefs about other minds, while someone who only sometimes recognizes obligations to others is inconsistent, and thus also irrational. Morality, Roelofs argues, is the only rational course.