The contributions to Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic World reflect upon the problems implied in the received notions of philosophy in the respective scholarly literatures. They ask whether, and for what reasons, a text should be categorized as a philosophical text (or excluded from the canon of philosophy), and what this means for the concept of philosophy. The focus on texts and textual corpora is central because it makes authors expose their claims and arguments in direct relation to specific sources, and discourages generalized reflections on the characteristics of, for example, Japanese culture or the Indian mind. The volume demonstrates that close and historically informed readings are the sine qua non in discussing what philosophy is in Asia and the Islamic world, just as much as with regard to Western literatureContributors are Yoko Arisaka, Wolfgang Behr, Thomas Fröhlich, Lisa Indraccolo, Paulus Kaufmann, Iso Kern, Ralf Müller, Gregor Paul, Lisa Raphals, Fabian Schäfer, Ori Sela, Rafael Suter, Christian Uhl, Viatcheslav Vetrov, Yvonne Schulz Zinda, and Nicholas Zufferey.

What does it mean to be human? We invite the reader to discuss this most fundamental issue in philosophy and to do so in an intercultural framework. The question of the human was the starting point for a legendary discussion between two German philosophers who met in Davos in 1929. We return to this historical event and re-imagine the debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer from a global perspective. Generating twenty papers from elaborate discussions, our authors contribute to the thought experiment by inviting the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarō from Kyoto and other Japanese thinkers into the debate to overcome the challenge of Eurocentrism inherent to these historic days in Davos.

This book posits ‘orientophilia’ as a committed tendency among European Enlightenment philosophers to admire and appropriate the aesthetics of Asiatic religions—especially Indic, Chinese, and Far Eastern iconography—as a kind of art that could be understood with the help of a homegrown, mainly Northern-European spiritualist ontology. The author evinces references from Herder, Hegel, and impassioned orientalists like Schopenhauer and Ernest Fenollosa, to expose how European idealistic hermeneutics of Asiatic iconography suffers from limitations imposed by its own rational aesthetics and how it fails to connect with the deepest and most nuanced mythical ontology that defines these depictions. Yet, European philosophers provoked their Asian counterparts in the Anglophone world to write a neonarrative of pan-Asian hermeneutics. Philosophically astute, historical orientophilia bridges the immense philosophical traditions that Western thinkers have long imagined. In this bold and enlightening book, the author reminds us that the West could strive to truly “know” the East only by uniting ways of knowing.

African Ethics: Gĩkũyũ Traditional Morality by Hannah Kinoti was prompted by the author’s concern about the decline of moral standards among the Gĩkũyũ in modern Kenya. Western education and increased interaction with other cultures had made the society more complex and sophisticated. At the same time, social evils like corruption, robbery, prostitution, broken homes and sexual promiscuity were on the increase. “While this is happening,” says the author, “African culture is often referred to in the past tense as if it is no longer relevant.” She wished to discover what were the virtues that, prior to the introduction of western civilization, held society together and formed the basis of its morality. She decided to examine some of the key virtues (honesty, generosity, justice, courage and temperance) that were highly valued in traditional Gĩkũyũ culture. She then compared the understanding and practice of these virtues by three groups: old people (who had had first-hand experience of traditional life), middle-aged people and young people. The results of this study should appeal to researchers and teachers of African traditions, culture, religion and ethics. Equally, students of comparative ethics should find this a valuable source of information on traditional ways of maintaining behaviour that made for harmony in society. Young Africans wishing to get a deeper understanding of their roots should also find this work of great interest.

Professor Heinz Kimmerle encountered African philosophy at a time when his specialisation in the philosophy of Hegel had attained world recognition. For Hegel, African philosophy did not exist in Sub-Saharan Africa, exactly the area in which Kimmerle made his first contact with African philosophy. Hegel’s philosophy was not a stranger to Sub-Saharan Africa. This was because the Western educational paradigm was imposed upon the conquered, colonized peoples during the period of colonisation. Unlike Hegel, Kimmerle took African philosophy seriously and engaged, initially, in dialogues with African philosophy. Out of the unfolding dialogues grew intercultural philosophy spearheaded by Kimmerle’s penetrating, insightful and incisive critique of some of the fundamental presuppositions of Hegel’s philosophy. The essays contained in this book focus on the evolution of Kimmerle’s conception and meaning of intercultural philosophy. Underlying this are recognition and respect for other modes of doing philosophy as manifestations of intercultural philosophy. To deny dialogues, if you prefer, polylogue among world philosophies, is to reject the very basis of philosophy. Thus a crucial dimension of philosophy would be precluded, which can be found in this book, namely, the critical evaluation of Kimmerle’s conception and meaning of intercultural philosophy.

The contributions to Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic World reflect upon the problems implied in the received notions of philosophy in the respective scholarly literatures. They ask whether, and for what reasons, a text should be categorized as a philosophical text (or excluded from the canon of philosophy), and what this means for the concept of philosophy. The focus on texts and textual corpora is central because it makes authors expose their claims and arguments in direct relation to specific sources, and discourages generalized reflections on the characteristics of, for example, Japanese culture or the Indian mind. The volume demonstrates that close and historically informed readings are the sine qua non in discussing what philosophy is in Asia and the Islamic world, just as much as with regard to Western literatureContributors are Yoko Arisaka, Wolfgang Behr, Thomas Fröhlich, Lisa Indraccolo, Paulus Kaufmann, Iso Kern, Ralf Müller, Gregor Paul, Lisa Raphals, Fabian Schäfer, Ori Sela, Rafael Suter, Christian Uhl, Viatcheslav Vetrov, Yvonne Schulz Zinda, and Nicholas Zufferey.

What does it mean to be human? We invite the reader to discuss this most fundamental issue in philosophy and to do so in an intercultural framework. The question of the human was the starting point for a legendary discussion between two German philosophers who met in Davos in 1929. We return to this historical event and re-imagine the debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer from a global perspective. Generating twenty papers from elaborate discussions, our authors contribute to the thought experiment by inviting the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarō from Kyoto and other Japanese thinkers into the debate to overcome the challenge of Eurocentrism inherent to these historic days in Davos.

This book posits ‘orientophilia’ as a committed tendency among European Enlightenment philosophers to admire and appropriate the aesthetics of Asiatic religions—especially Indic, Chinese, and Far Eastern iconography—as a kind of art that could be understood with the help of a homegrown, mainly Northern-European spiritualist ontology. The author evinces references from Herder, Hegel, and impassioned orientalists like Schopenhauer and Ernest Fenollosa, to expose how European idealistic hermeneutics of Asiatic iconography suffers from limitations imposed by its own rational aesthetics and how it fails to connect with the deepest and most nuanced mythical ontology that defines these depictions. Yet, European philosophers provoked their Asian counterparts in the Anglophone world to write a neonarrative of pan-Asian hermeneutics. Philosophically astute, historical orientophilia bridges the immense philosophical traditions that Western thinkers have long imagined. In this bold and enlightening book, the author reminds us that the West could strive to truly “know” the East only by uniting ways of knowing.

African Ethics: Gĩkũyũ Traditional Morality by Hannah Kinoti was prompted by the author’s concern about the decline of moral standards among the Gĩkũyũ in modern Kenya. Western education and increased interaction with other cultures had made the society more complex and sophisticated. At the same time, social evils like corruption, robbery, prostitution, broken homes and sexual promiscuity were on the increase. “While this is happening,” says the author, “African culture is often referred to in the past tense as if it is no longer relevant.” She wished to discover what were the virtues that, prior to the introduction of western civilization, held society together and formed the basis of its morality. She decided to examine some of the key virtues (honesty, generosity, justice, courage and temperance) that were highly valued in traditional Gĩkũyũ culture. She then compared the understanding and practice of these virtues by three groups: old people (who had had first-hand experience of traditional life), middle-aged people and young people. The results of this study should appeal to researchers and teachers of African traditions, culture, religion and ethics. Equally, students of comparative ethics should find this a valuable source of information on traditional ways of maintaining behaviour that made for harmony in society. Young Africans wishing to get a deeper understanding of their roots should also find this work of great interest.

Professor Heinz Kimmerle encountered African philosophy at a time when his specialisation in the philosophy of Hegel had attained world recognition. For Hegel, African philosophy did not exist in Sub-Saharan Africa, exactly the area in which Kimmerle made his first contact with African philosophy. Hegel’s philosophy was not a stranger to Sub-Saharan Africa. This was because the Western educational paradigm was imposed upon the conquered, colonized peoples during the period of colonisation. Unlike Hegel, Kimmerle took African philosophy seriously and engaged, initially, in dialogues with African philosophy. Out of the unfolding dialogues grew intercultural philosophy spearheaded by Kimmerle’s penetrating, insightful and incisive critique of some of the fundamental presuppositions of Hegel’s philosophy. The essays contained in this book focus on the evolution of Kimmerle’s conception and meaning of intercultural philosophy. Underlying this are recognition and respect for other modes of doing philosophy as manifestations of intercultural philosophy. To deny dialogues, if you prefer, polylogue among world philosophies, is to reject the very basis of philosophy. Thus a crucial dimension of philosophy would be precluded, which can be found in this book, namely, the critical evaluation of Kimmerle’s conception and meaning of intercultural philosophy.