Studies in Military History and International Affairs – serie

War in the 18th century war was a complex operation, including popular as well as conventional conflict, between Europeans and with non-Europeans. These conflicts influenced European intellectuals and contributed to the complexity of Enlightenment thought. While Enlightenment writers regarded war as the greatest evil confronting mankind, they had little hope that it could be eliminated; thus, peace proposals of the day were joined by more realistic discussion of the means by which war might be limited or rendered more humane. In this book, the author considers the influence of ideas and values on the actions of Enlightenment military personnel and how the rational spirit of the time influenced military thought, producing a military enlightenment that applied rational analysis to military tactics and to the composition of armies. In the late Enlightenment, military writers explored the psychological foundations of war as a means of stimulating a new military spirit among the troops.The Enlightenment was, however, not the only cultural influence upon war during this century. Religion, the traditional values of the ancien regime, and local values all contributed to the culture of force. When Europeans engaged in military encounters with peoples in other parts of the globe, cultural interchange inevitably occurred as well. Further, there is a revolutionary element that one must consider when defining the military culture. The result of all these factors was a creative tension in 18th century warfare and an extraordinarily complex military culture.

A war of attrition is usually conceptualized as a bloody slogging match, epitomized by imagery of futile frontal assaults on the Western Front of the First World War. As such, many academics, politicians, and military officers currently consider attrition to be a wholly undesirable method of warfare. This first book-length study of wars of attrition challenges this viewpoint. A historical analysis of the strategic thought behind attrition demonstrates that it was often implemented to conserve casualties, not to engage in a bloody senseless assault. Moreover, attrition frequently proved an effective means of attaining a state's political aims in warfare, particularly in serving as a preliminary to decisive warfare, reducing risk of escalation, and coercing an opponent in negotiations.Malkasian analyzes the thought of commanders who implemented policies of attrition from 1789 to the present. His study includes figures central to the study of war, such as the Duke of Wellington, Carl von Clausewitz, B. H. Liddell Hart, General William Slim, General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew Ridgeway, and General William Westmoreland. While special attention is devoted to the Second World War in the Pacific and the Korean War, this study notes the utility of attrition during the Cold War, as the risk of a Third World War rendered more aggressive strategies unattractive. Increasingly, the United States finds itself facing conflicts that are not amenable to a decisive military solution in which opponents seek prolonged war that will inflict as many casualties as possible on American forces.

The Revolutionary War was not a polite conflict between orderly troops and gentlemanly officers. Civilians on the home front suffered considerably. This account depicts the ugly side of the War for Independence, where roving bands of robbers, known as banditti, plagued the countryside in areas not fully under the control of either army.Regardless of their political sympathies, American civilians lived in terror of these well-armed gangs of looters, who frequently engaged in torture, arson, and murder. The players in this sordid tale, chiefly motivated by greed, chose their victims indiscriminately and then returned to sanctuary. Many civilians fled their homes, leaving large sections of New York, Georgia, and the Carolinas as no-man's-land, where near anarchy and the complete disruption of civilian justice only abetted the success of the marauders.Ward details the activities of the most prominent banditti and looks at the horrors and devastation of their actions. His account challenges readers to look beyond the set-piece battles and even past the guerrilla activities, to examine what life was like for those caught between the lines.

This examination of the history of the 20th century and the place of war in its unfolding presents a radical, unorthodox interpretation of both. With provision for seeing 1945 as the proper starting point for the 20th century and 1968 as the year that marked the end of the Age of Reason, this provocative study portrays the First World War as the first war of the 20th century and the Second World War as the last war of the 19th. It also provides a counterview of the Second World War as merely one part of a series of conflicts that lasted between 1931 and 1975 and the Cold War as the time when real hatreds were suspended. Moving through various insurgency campaigns, Willmott subjects the Gulf campaign of 1991 to skeptical analysis that is certain to be contentious.Challenging the view that the 20th century will be viewed by future historians as ranging from approximately 1914 to 1992, Willmott offers this volume as a counter to modern historiography which, he contends, is obsessed with micro-analysis and has lost vital context and perspective. Arguing that war is not the preserve of the intellect, and that it is neither intrinsically rational nor scientific, Willmott depicts war as a manmade phenomenon, complete with all the elements of human failure, misjudgment, and incompetence. He concludes with a consideration of modern doctrine and predictions for the future of war.

When it was discovered in 1976, John Dee's The Limits of the British Empire (1577-78) was quickly recognized as a seminal text in the history of English Atlantic discovery, settlement, and imperial ideology. Writing directly to Queen Elizabeth and drawing on ancient and contemporary history, geography, and law as his supporting evidence, Dee argued for the existence and recovery of a vast British Empire. This included much of the North Atlantic and North America, Ireland and Scotland, and even portions of Scandinavia and the Iberian Peninsula. King Arthur, Geoffrey of Monmouth, Robert the Bruce, Pope Alexander VI, Martin Frobisher, and the Emperor Justinian are just a few of the historical agents who help to make this treatise at once erudite, elegant, and effusive.Offered for the first time in print, this volume uses sources that will be of interest to scholars in history and historical geography, English and British studies, and legal and empire studies. The book shows that Dee was an important propagandist of empire, that English antiquarianism was used to practical purpose, and that the legal foundations of the empire were not based solely on the indigenous, common law. In making these claims, this study contributes directly to several debates about the ideological development of the British Empire, especially the work of David Armitage and Anthony Pagden.