Studies in Penal Theory and Ethics – serie

This book proposes an explicit recognition of criminology as a moral science: a philosophically textured appreciation of the presence and role of values in people’s reasoning and motivation, set within an empirically rigorous social-scientific account. This endeavour requires input from both criminologists and philosophers, and careful dialogue between them. Criminology as a Moral Science provides such a dialogue, not least about the so-called ‘fact-value distinction’, but also about substantive topics such as guilt and shame. The book also provides philosophically-informed accounts of morality in practice in several criminological contexts: these include whistleblowing practices within a police service; the dilemmas of mothers about who and what to tell about a partner’s imprisonment; and how persistent offenders begin to try to ‘turn their lives around’ to desist from crime. The issues raised go to the heart of some currently pressing topics within criminology, notably the development of ‘evidence-based practice’, which requires some kind of stable bridge to be built between research evidence (‘facts’) and proposals for policy (‘evaluative recommendations’).

This book proposes an explicit recognition of criminology as a moral science: a philosophically textured appreciation of the presence and role of values in people''s reasoning and motivation, set within an empirically rigorous social-scientific account. This endeavour requires input from both criminologists and philosophers, and careful dialogue between them. Criminology as a Moral Science provides such a dialogue, not least about the so-called ''fact-value distinction'', but also about substantive topics such as guilt and shame. The book also provides philosophically-informed accounts of morality in practice in several criminological contexts: these include whistleblowing practices within a police service; the dilemmas of mothers about who and what to tell about a partner''s imprisonment; and how persistent offenders begin to try to ''turn their lives around'' to desist from crime. The issues raised go to the heart of some currently pressing topics within criminology, notably the development of ''evidence-based practice'', which requires some kind of stable bridge to be built between research evidence (''facts'') and proposals for policy (''evaluative recommendations'').

This book proposes an explicit recognition of criminology as a moral science: a philosophically textured appreciation of the presence and role of values in people''s reasoning and motivation, set within an empirically rigorous social-scientific account. This endeavour requires input from both criminologists and philosophers, and careful dialogue between them. Criminology as a Moral Science provides such a dialogue, not least about the so-called ''fact-value distinction'', but also about substantive topics such as guilt and shame. The book also provides philosophically-informed accounts of morality in practice in several criminological contexts: these include whistleblowing practices within a police service; the dilemmas of mothers about who and what to tell about a partner''s imprisonment; and how persistent offenders begin to try to ''turn their lives around'' to desist from crime. The issues raised go to the heart of some currently pressing topics within criminology, notably the development of ''evidence-based practice'', which requires some kind of stable bridge to be built between research evidence (''facts'') and proposals for policy (''evaluative recommendations'').

This book proposes an explicit recognition of criminology as a moral science: a philosophically textured appreciation of the presence and role of values in people’s reasoning and motivation, set within an empirically rigorous social-scientific account. This endeavour requires input from both criminologists and philosophers, and careful dialogue between them. Criminology as a Moral Science provides such a dialogue, not least about the so-called ‘fact-value distinction’, but also about substantive topics such as guilt and shame. The book also provides philosophically-informed accounts of morality in practice in several criminological contexts: these include whistleblowing practices within a police service; the dilemmas of mothers about who and what to tell about a partner’s imprisonment; and how persistent offenders begin to try to ‘turn their lives around’ to desist from crime. The issues raised go to the heart of some currently pressing topics within criminology, notably the development of ‘evidence-based practice’, which requires some kind of stable bridge to be built between research evidence (‘facts’) and proposals for policy (‘evaluative recommendations’).

This volume explores ethical aspects relating to claims for mitigation arising from culpable state action (or inaction). It answers the important and controversial question: to what extent should the state mitigate sentencing for defendants who have been victims of state misconduct?The volume explores the normative justifications for mitigation and answers many intriguing questions. For example, in terms of the procedural challenges, should the offender have to prove a causal link between state wrongdoing or neglect and the offending? Can a court take judicial notice of state-induced social adversity and apply this consideration to all affected offenders? Other questions relate to the implications for courts and sentencing commissions which issue guidance to courts regarding mitigation at sentencing. To what extent is the offender less culpable as a result of state misconduct, and what are the limits of any resulting sentence reductions? Do sentence reductions for state misconduct undermine proportionality, or deprecate the seriousness of the impact on the victim of crime? Should this factor be included in any sentencing guidelines or possibly even as a statutory mitigating factor? Each contribution explores a distinct, cross-jurisdictional claim for mitigation on the basis of State negligence or misconduct towards the offender. The chapters all address the appropriate response of courts at sentencing.

This volume explores ethical aspects relating to claims for mitigation arising from culpable state action (or inaction). It answers the important and controversial question: to what extent should the state mitigate sentencing for defendants who have been victims of state misconduct?The volume explores the normative justifications for mitigation and answers many intriguing questions. For example, in terms of the procedural challenges, should the offender have to prove a causal link between state wrongdoing or neglect and the offending? Can a court take judicial notice of state-induced social adversity and apply this consideration to all affected offenders? Other questions relate to the implications for courts and sentencing commissions which issue guidance to courts regarding mitigation at sentencing. To what extent is the offender less culpable as a result of state misconduct, and what are the limits of any resulting sentence reductions? Do sentence reductions for state misconduct undermine proportionality, or deprecate the seriousness of the impact on the victim of crime? Should this factor be included in any sentencing guidelines or possibly even as a statutory mitigating factor? Each contribution explores a distinct, cross-jurisdictional claim for mitigation on the basis of State negligence or misconduct towards the offender. The chapters all address the appropriate response of courts at sentencing.

This volume explores ethical aspects relating to claims for mitigation arising from culpable state action (or inaction). It answers the important and controversial question: to what extent should the state mitigate sentencing for defendants who have been victims of state misconduct? The volume explores the normative justifications for mitigation and answers many intriguing questions. For example, in terms of the procedural challenges, should the offender have to prove a causal link between state wrongdoing or neglect and the offending? Can a court take judicial notice of state-induced social adversity and apply this consideration to all affected offenders? Other questions relate to the implications for courts and sentencing commissions which issue guidance to courts regarding mitigation at sentencing. To what extent is the offender less culpable as a result of state misconduct, and what are the limits of any resulting sentence reductions? Do sentence reductions for state misconduct undermine proportionality, or deprecate the seriousness of the impact on the victim of crime? Should this factor be included in any sentencing guidelines or possibly even as a statutory mitigating factor? Each contribution explores a distinct, cross-jurisdictional claim for mitigation on the basis of State negligence or misconduct towards the offender. The chapters all address the appropriate response of courts at sentencing.

This volume explores ethical aspects relating to claims for mitigation arising from culpable state action (or inaction). It answers the important and controversial question: to what extent should the state mitigate sentencing for defendants who have been victims of state misconduct? The volume explores the normative justifications for mitigation and answers many intriguing questions. For example, in terms of the procedural challenges, should the offender have to prove a causal link between state wrongdoing or neglect and the offending? Can a court take judicial notice of state-induced social adversity and apply this consideration to all affected offenders? Other questions relate to the implications for courts and sentencing commissions which issue guidance to courts regarding mitigation at sentencing. To what extent is the offender less culpable as a result of state misconduct, and what are the limits of any resulting sentence reductions? Do sentence reductions for state misconduct undermine proportionality, or deprecate the seriousness of the impact on the victim of crime? Should this factor be included in any sentencing guidelines or possibly even as a statutory mitigating factor? Each contribution explores a distinct, cross-jurisdictional claim for mitigation on the basis of State negligence or misconduct towards the offender. The chapters all address the appropriate response of courts at sentencing.