The authors present a basic model of the Bayesian implementation problem and then consider its application in areas including classical pure exchange economies, public goods provision, auctions and bargaining.
1. Introduction; 2. A General Model; A. Environments; B. Mechanisms and Equilibrium; C. The Revelation Principle and Incentive Compatibility; D. Efficiency; E. Implementation; F. Examples; 3. Characterizing Implementable Allocation Rules; A. Diffuse Information Structures; B. Non-diffuse Information Structures; C. Bibliographic Note: Implementation with Complete Information; 4. Applications; A. Pure Exchange Environments; B. Efficient Allocation Rules; C. Bilateral Monopoly; D. Incentive Contracting with Multiple Agents; E. Public Goods; 5. Preplay Communication and Renegotiation; A. Issues of Commitment and Control; B. Implementation with Preplay Communication; C. Renegotiation-proof Implementation; 6. Other Topics; A. Implementation with Refinements; B. Virtual Implementation; References; Index;
