Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis

Inbunden, Engelska, 1994

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Beskrivning

This text presents a systematic exposition of the use of game-theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Rather than focusing on single concepts, it covers all basic equivalence theorems - core, bargaining set, Shapley and Harsanyi value, Nash equilibria - including an axiomatic approach to them. It examines the value of large games and the new tools used in the strategic approach to general equilibrium. The book is primarily addressed to researchers and advanced graduate students but, being largely self-contained, it can also be used as a text for a course.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1994-07-31
Mått:210 x 297 x 20 mm
Vikt:582 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:NATO Science Series D:
Antal sidor:268
Upplaga:1994
Förlag:Kluwer Academic Publishers
ISBN:9780792330110

Utforska kategorier

Mikroekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Innehållsförteckning

A The Core and the Bargaining Set.- I General Equilibrium and Cooperative Games: Basic Results.- II Core Convergence in Perfectly Competitive Economies.- III Economies with Atoms.- IV Bargaining Sets.- B The Value.- V The Shapley Value.- VI Value of Games with a Continuum of Players.- VII The TU Value: The Non-differentiable Case.- Addendum: The Shapley value of a perfectly competitive market may not exist.- VIII The Harsanyi Value.- IX Value Equivalence Theorems: The TU and NTU Cases.- X Economic Applications of the Shapley Value.- C The Cooperative Approach to Large Markets and Games.- XI An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon.- XII Large Games and Economies with Effective Small Groups.- D The Non-Cooperative Approach.- XIII Strategic Market Games: a Survey of Some Results.- XIV From Nash to Walras Equilibrium.- XV Correlated- and Communication Equilibria.- XVI Notes on Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium.- XVII Implementation with Plain Conversation.