This is motivated by the fact that in reality most agents act from within a family, and their interaction with the economy at large and tax policy in particular is mediated by the interdependence of the family members‘ choices, although taxation is typically studied in a framework in which the economic agents are isolated individuals.
Alessandro Balestrino is a full professor of Public Economics at the Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy. He also is a fellow of the Center for Economic Studies (CESifo), Munich, Germany. He acts as a referee for several international journals and has published various articles himself. His research focuses on taxation of the family, optimal taxation, public provision of private goods, non-welfarist theories of poverty and social norms.
Innehållsförteckning
Chapter 1. Standard optimal taxation with single agents: what it is and what to use in its place.- Chapter 2. Optimal taxation in the presence of household production.- Chapter 3. Income taxation with two-person households.- Chapter 4. Income taxation and public spending with two-person households.- Chapter 5. The fiscal treatment of family size: an overview.- Chapter 6. The fiscal treatment of family size: a further look.- Chapter 7. The tax treatment of children when parents act non-cooperatively: a preliminary account.