Amara Esther Chimakonam – författare

Since the early works of scholars like Alexis Kagame and Placide Tempels, discussions on the concept of vitality in African philosophy have acquired many dimensions. With scholars like Noah Dzobo and Thaddeus Metz projecting it as a grounding for human values and dignity, Aribiah Attoe and Yolanda Mlungwana each exploring vitalist conceptions of meaning in life, and Ada Agada approaching vitality from a proto-panpsychist/consolationist perspective. Indeed, vitality features as an important concept in African philosophy of religion. This Element contributes to the discourse on vitality in African philosophy of religion by providing a critical overview of some traditional interpretations of the concept from the Bantu, Yoruba, and Igbo religious/philosophical worldviews. Furthermore, it explores how the concept of vitality features in discussions of ethics, dignity, and meaning in life. Finally, the Element provides a critique of the concept based on the interventions of Innocent Asouzu, Metz, and Bernard Matolino. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

Since the early works of scholars like Alexis Kagame and Placide Tempels, discussions on the concept of vitality in African philosophy have acquired many dimensions. With scholars like Noah Dzobo and Thaddeus Metz projecting it as a grounding for human values and dignity, Aribiah Attoe and Yolanda Mlungwana each exploring vitalist conceptions of meaning in life, and Ada Agada approaching vitality from a proto-panpsychist/consolationist perspective. Indeed, vitality features as an important concept in African philosophy of religion. This Element contributes to the discourse on vitality in African philosophy of religion by providing a critical overview of some traditional interpretations of the concept from the Bantu, Yoruba, and Igbo religious/philosophical worldviews. Furthermore, it explores how the concept of vitality features in discussions of ethics, dignity, and meaning in life. Finally, the Element provides a critique of the concept based on the interventions of Innocent Asouzu, Metz, and Bernard Matolino. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

This anthology shows how African philosophy can provide novel ways of understanding the relationship between transhumanism and moral enhancement, which concerns the augmentation of individuals' moral capacities through scientific and technological interventions. These interventions help individuals surpass their moral limitations, making them always act morally in posthuman fashion. This volume considers how African axiological values can refute or support radical moral enhancement from African philosophical perspectives. For example, one can defend radical moral enhancement by envisioning a posthuman era in Africa, or argue alternatively that radical moral enhancement truncates the process of acquiring normative personhood. This volume is of interest to researchers, professionals, and students interested in exploring the prospects and challenges of transhumanism and moral enhancement beyond Western perspectives and within the African context.