Amara Esther Chimakonam – författare

Since the early works of scholars like Alexis Kagame and Placide Tempels, discussions on the concept of vitality in African philosophy have acquired many dimensions. With scholars like Noah Dzobo and Thaddeus Metz projecting it as a grounding for human values and dignity, Aribiah Attoe and Yolanda Mlungwana each exploring vitalist conceptions of meaning in life, and Ada Agada approaching vitality from a proto-panpsychist/consolationist perspective. Indeed, vitality features as an important concept in African philosophy of religion. This Element contributes to the discourse on vitality in African philosophy of religion by providing a critical overview of some traditional interpretations of the concept from the Bantu, Yoruba, and Igbo religious/philosophical worldviews. Furthermore, it explores how the concept of vitality features in discussions of ethics, dignity, and meaning in life. Finally, the Element provides a critique of the concept based on the interventions of Innocent Asouzu, Metz, and Bernard Matolino. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

Since the early works of scholars like Alexis Kagame and Placide Tempels, discussions on the concept of vitality in African philosophy have acquired many dimensions. With scholars like Noah Dzobo and Thaddeus Metz projecting it as a grounding for human values and dignity, Aribiah Attoe and Yolanda Mlungwana each exploring vitalist conceptions of meaning in life, and Ada Agada approaching vitality from a proto-panpsychist/consolationist perspective. Indeed, vitality features as an important concept in African philosophy of religion. This Element contributes to the discourse on vitality in African philosophy of religion by providing a critical overview of some traditional interpretations of the concept from the Bantu, Yoruba, and Igbo religious/philosophical worldviews. Furthermore, it explores how the concept of vitality features in discussions of ethics, dignity, and meaning in life. Finally, the Element provides a critique of the concept based on the interventions of Innocent Asouzu, Metz, and Bernard Matolino. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

This edited volume demonstrates how African philosophy can offer new ways to understand transhumanism and moral enhancement, which involve improving humans' moral, emotional, and cognitive capacities, genes, and physical abilities through scientific and technological interventions. These interventions aim to help individuals overcome some (if not all) biological and natural limitations, such as diseases, ageing, and even death, in order to become transhumans and posthumans. The volume considers how African values can either support and/or challenge transhumanism and moral enhancement from African philosophical perspectives. For example, one might defend moral enhancement by imagining a posthuman future in Africa or argue that it truncates the process of acquiring personhood within the African philosophical context. This volume is of great benefit to researchers, professionals, and students interested in exploring the prospects and challenges of transhumanism and moral enhancement from a perspective beyond the Western worldview.