Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov – författare
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4 produkter
4 produkter
1 319 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
An investigation of criminal attempts unearths some of the most fundamental, intriguing and perplexing questions about criminal law and its place in human action. When does attempting begin? What is the relationship between attempting and intending? Do we always attempt the possible and, if so, possible to whom? Does attempting involve action and does action involve attempting? Is my attempt fixed by me or can another perspective reveal what it is? How 'much' action is needed for an attempt, how 'much' intention is needed and can these matters be decided categorically? Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov's answers to these questions will interest criminal law theorists, philosophers and lawyers or law reformers, who encounter the mixed practical and philosophical phenomenon of attempting. Inspired by G. E. M. Anscombe's philosophy, Part I examines attempting generally and its relationship with intention, action subjectivity, and possibility. From the conclusions reached, Part II proposes a specific theory of criminal attempts.
1 271 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Law regulates human behaviour, a phenomenon about which neuroscience has much to say. Neuroscience can tell us whether a defendant suffers from a brain abnormality, or injury and it can correlate these neural deficits with criminal offending. Using fMRI and other technologies it might indicate whether a witness is telling lies or the truth. It can further propose neuro-interventions to 'change' the brains of offenders and so to reduce their propensity to offend. And, it can make suggestions about whether a defendant knows or merely suspects a prohibited state of affairs; so, drawing distinctions among the mental states that are central to legal responsibility. Each of these matters has philosophical import; is a neurological 'deficit' inculpatory or exculpatory; what is the proper role for law if the mind is no more than the brain; is lying really a brain state and can neuroscience really 'read' the brain? In this edited collection, leading contributors to the field provide new insights on these matters, bringing to light the great challenges that arise when disciplinary boundaries merge.
416 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Law regulates human behaviour, a phenomenon about which neuroscience has much to say. Neuroscience can tell us whether a defendant suffers from a brain abnormality, or injury and it can correlate these neural deficits with criminal offending. Using fMRI and other technologies it might indicate whether a witness is telling lies or the truth. It can further propose neuro-interventions to 'change' the brains of offenders and so to reduce their propensity to offend. And, it can make suggestions about whether a defendant knows or merely suspects a prohibited state of affairs; so, drawing distinctions among the mental states that are central to legal responsibility. Each of these matters has philosophical import; is a neurological 'deficit' inculpatory or exculpatory; what is the proper role for law if the mind is no more than the brain; is lying really a brain state and can neuroscience really 'read' the brain? In this edited collection, leading contributors to the field provide new insights on these matters, bringing to light the great challenges that arise when disciplinary boundaries merge.
Sociable Person and the Law
Recognising and Regulating the Social Dimension of the Human Experience
Inbunden, Engelska, 2027
1 362 kr
Kommande
This cutting-edge collection is a riposte to the deep assumption that law should be written exclusively for and by the reasonable person, as the person to whom law is addressed and by reference to whom laws are designed and calibrated.The book looks at how the social dimension of the human experience is central to human existence: connections with other people shape our lives in profound ways. While law confers formal status on certain relationships and intervenes to remedy serious injustices that occur, it does not generally concern itself with the individual as a person formed through those and other relationships. It is most often addressed to the individual, on the assumption that individuals are rational autonomous agents.It poses a deep challenge to that assumption. First, the collection opens space for conversation on the social dimension of the human experience in the context of law by critically considering existing conceptual tools that could support such a conversation, e.g., community, solidarity, associations,collective rights, and cosmopolitan law.Second, the collection takes an inventory of the extent to which law currently takes the social dimension of personhood into account in fields as diverse as criminal culpability, natural resources law, human rights, company lawand administrative justice.In moving beyond the fields that have already been the subject of post-individualist and post-autonomy discourse, such as family law and medical law, this collection is a vital contribution to igniting a broader conversation about the relationship between the sociable person and the law.