Brendan Taylor – författare

During recent years, in its traditional role as an important Asia-Pacific regional power, Australia has had to cope with a rapidly changing external security environment and a series of new challenges, including a rising China, an increasingly assertive United States, and most notably the Global War against Terror.

This book considers the changing nature of Australia’s identity and role in the Asia-Pacific, and the forces behind these developments, with particular attention towards security alignments and alliance relationships. It outlines the contours of Australia’s traditional role as a key regional middle power and the patterns of its heavy reliance on security alignments and alliances. Brendan Taylor goes on to consider Australia’s relationships with other regional powers including Japan, China, Indonesia and India, uncovering the underlying purposes and expectations associated with these relationships, their evolving character – particularly in the post Cold War era – and likely future directions. He discusses the implications for the region of Australia’s new ‘Pacific doctrine’ of intervention, whether Australia’s traditional alliance preferences are compatible with the emergence of a new East Asian security mechanism, and the impact of new, transnational and non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism and failed states.

During recent years, in its traditional role as an important Asia-Pacific regional power, Australia has had to cope with a rapidly changing external security environment and a series of new challenges, including a rising China, an increasingly assertive United States, and most notably the Global War against Terror.

This book considers the changing nature of Australia’s identity and role in the Asia-Pacific, and the forces behind these developments, with particular attention towards security alignments and alliance relationships. It outlines the contours of Australia’s traditional role as a key regional middle power and the patterns of its heavy reliance on security alignments and alliances. Brendan Taylor goes on to consider Australia’s relationships with other regional powers including Japan, China, Indonesia and India, uncovering the underlying purposes and expectations associated with these relationships, their evolving character – particularly in the post Cold War era – and likely future directions. He discusses the implications for the region of Australia’s new ‘Pacific doctrine’ of intervention, whether Australia’s traditional alliance preferences are compatible with the emergence of a new East Asian security mechanism, and the impact of new, transnational and non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism and failed states.

Sanctions are a persistent – many would argue increasingly central – component of American efforts to shape foreign policy outcomes in the Asia-Pacific. The use of sanctions in the context of two of the most pressing regional security issues currently on Washington’s radar – the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis and the management of China’s emergence – clearly reaffirms this pattern. This book provides the first comprehensive treatment of US sanctions policy in the Asia-Pacific. Using the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies as a basis for comparison, it examines nine prominent episodes involving the US use of sanctions toward countries in this economically and strategically vital part of the world. In each case it addresses the reasons why sanctions were employed in the first place, the precise nature of sanctions and how they operated in practice, before evaluating their effectiveness. Finally, it identifies common trends that emerge from this analysis and draws out practical implications for US sanctions policy, in particular when and how the US can – and cannot – optimally use sanctions in an Asia-Pacific context.

Sanctions are a persistent – many would argue increasingly central – component of American efforts to shape foreign policy outcomes in the Asia-Pacific. The use of sanctions in the context of two of the most pressing regional security issues currently on Washington’s radar – the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis and the management of China’s emergence – clearly reaffirms this pattern. This book provides the first comprehensive treatment of US sanctions policy in the Asia-Pacific. Using the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies as a basis for comparison, it examines nine prominent episodes involving the US use of sanctions toward countries in this economically and strategically vital part of the world. In each case it addresses the reasons why sanctions were employed in the first place, the precise nature of sanctions and how they operated in practice, before evaluating their effectiveness. Finally, it identifies common trends that emerge from this analysis and draws out practical implications for US sanctions policy, in particular when and how the US can – and cannot – optimally use sanctions in an Asia-Pacific context.

Economic sanctions are becoming increasingly central to shaping strategic outcomes in the twenty-first century. They afford great powers a means by which to seek to influence the behaviour of states, to demonstrate international leadership and to express common values for the benefit of the international community at large. Closer to home, they can also offer a ''middle way'' for governments that apply them, satisfying moderates and hardliners alike. For some great powers in the multipolar world order, however, they pose a threat to trading relationships. They may also serve as a prelude to military action. With China''s international voice growing in prominence and Russia asserting its renewed strength, often in opposition to the use of sanctions, it will be ever more difficult to reach a consensus on their application. Against this backdrop, knowing what kind of measures to take and in which scenarios they are most likely to work is invaluable. This Adelphi focuses on the different sanctions strategies of the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the EU, with regard to the unfolding nuclear crises in Iran and North Korea. It examines how these measures, designed to marginalise the regimes in both countries and restrict their ability to develop nuclear weapons, have also influenced the sanctioning states'' international partners. As such, they are not just a tool of statecraft: they are potentially an important facet of grand strategy.

Economic sanctions are becoming increasingly central to shaping strategic outcomes in the twenty-first century. They afford great powers a means by which to seek to influence the behaviour of states, to demonstrate international leadership and to express common values for the benefit of the international community at large. Closer to home, they can also offer a ''middle way'' for governments that apply them, satisfying moderates and hardliners alike. For some great powers in the multipolar world order, however, they pose a threat to trading relationships. They may also serve as a prelude to military action. With China''s international voice growing in prominence and Russia asserting its renewed strength, often in opposition to the use of sanctions, it will be ever more difficult to reach a consensus on their application. Against this backdrop, knowing what kind of measures to take and in which scenarios they are most likely to work is invaluable. This Adelphi focuses on the different sanctions strategies of the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the EU, with regard to the unfolding nuclear crises in Iran and North Korea. It examines how these measures, designed to marginalise the regimes in both countries and restrict their ability to develop nuclear weapons, have also influenced the sanctioning states'' international partners. As such, they are not just a tool of statecraft: they are potentially an important facet of grand strategy.

Many scholars of international relations in Asia regard bilateralism and multilateralism as alternative and mutually exclusive approaches to security co-operation. They argue that multilateral associations such as ASEAN will eventually replace the system of bilateral alliances which were the predominant form of U.S. security co-operation with Asia-Pacific allies during the Cold War. Yet these bilateral alliances continue to be the primary means of the United States’ strategic engagement with the region. This book contends that bilateralism and multilateralism are not mutually exclusive, and that bilateralism is likely to continue strong even as multilateralism strengthens. It explores a wide range of issues connected with this question. It discusses how US bilateral alliances have been reinvigorated in recent years, examines how bilateral and multilateral approaches to specific problems can work alongside each other, and concludes by considering how patterns of international security are likely to develop in the region in future.

Many scholars of international relations in Asia regard bilateralism and multilateralism as alternative and mutually exclusive approaches to security co-operation. They argue that multilateral associations such as ASEAN will eventually replace the system of bilateral alliances which were the predominant form of U.S. security co-operation with Asia-Pacific allies during the Cold War. Yet these bilateral alliances continue to be the primary means of the United States’ strategic engagement with the region. This book contends that bilateralism and multilateralism are not mutually exclusive, and that bilateralism is likely to continue strong even as multilateralism strengthens. It explores a wide range of issues connected with this question. It discusses how US bilateral alliances have been reinvigorated in recent years, examines how bilateral and multilateral approaches to specific problems can work alongside each other, and concludes by considering how patterns of international security are likely to develop in the region in future.