Daniel Verdier - Böcker
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3 produkter
3 produkter
733 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Since the nineteenth century, there has been an accepted distinction between financial systems that separate commercial and investment banking and those that do not. This comprehensive collection aims to establish how and why financial systems develop, and how knowledge of financial differentiation in the nineteenth century may afford insight into the development of contemporary banking structure.This book poses a systematic challenge to Alexander Gerschenkron's 1950s thesis on universal banks. With contributions from leading scholars such as Ranald Michie and Jaime Reis, this well written book provides solid and intriguing arguments throughout.
441 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Moving Money analyses the influence of politics on financial systems. Daniel Verdier examines how information asymmetry and economies of scale over time have created a redistributional conflict between large and small banks, financial centres and their peripheries, and he discusses how governments have attempted to arbitrate this conflict. He argues that centralized states have tended to create concentrated, internationalized, market-based and specialized financial systems, whereas decentralized states have favoured dispersed, national, bank-based and, with a few exceptions, universal systems. Verdier then sets out to uncover the sources, political and economic, of cross-country variation in financial market organization, examining 15 to 20 OECD countries from 1850 onwards.
Democracy and International Trade
Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990
Häftad, Engelska, 1995
761 kr
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In this ambitious exploration of how foreign trade policy is made in democratic regimes, Daniel Verdier shows that special interests, party ideologues, and state officials and diplomats act as agents of the voters. Constructing a general theory in which existing theories (rent-seeking, median voting, state autonomy) function as partial explanations, he shows that trade institutions are not fixed entities but products of political competition.