David J. Bercuson – författare

Why was Winnipeg the scene of the longest and most complete general strike in North American history? Bercuson answers this question by examining the development of union labour and the impact of depression and war in the two decades preceding the strike.

In January 1992 the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) broadcast The Valour and the Horror, a three-part television series on Canada''s role in World War II. It sparked a major controversy among viewers, war veterans, and historians. Brian and Terence McKenna, the authors-producers of the series, were accused of distorting historical facts, maligning individuals such as commanders Arthur Harris and Guy Simonds, presenting a biased account of events, and overstepping the line between journalism and drama. The Valour and the Horror Revisited brings together source documents, original essays, and commentaries to provide an analysis of the specific accusations and of larger questions concerning responsible journalism. Included in the collection are reports by David Bercuson and S.F. Wise, who were asked by the CBC ombudsman to assess the series; the CBC ombudsman''s report; the McKennas'' response to the ombudsman''s report; the ombudsman''s commentary on the McKennas'' response; and three new essays by historians John Ferris, William McAndrew, and Scot Robertson on the incidents covered in the series - Canadian involvement in the battles in Hong Kong and Normandy, and the bombing of Germany. The Valour and the Horror Revisited addresses such important issues as the dangers of "docudrama," the calibre of the Canadian media, the meaning of the Canadian experience in the war, and the nature of history.

The Atlantic Canada and Western Canada Studies Conferences have focused attention in recent years on the culture and development of two widely separated regions which have been frequently ignored in studies of the Canadian nation. The Atlantic Canada Studies Conference, meeting in 1974 and 1976 at the University of New Brunswick, and the Western Canadian Studies Conference, meeting annually since 1968 at the University of Calgary, have brought together scholars from a variety of disciplines to study the identities and characteristics of these two hinterlands. In 1978 the two conferences met jointly, in a session in Fredericton and one at Calgary with a core of speakers and papers common to both. The purpose was to compare and contrast subjects and experiences of interest and concern in the west and in Atlantic Canada. The ten papers which comprise Eastern and Western Perspectives are selected from twenty-seven presented at the joint conference.The topic chosen not only illustrate some of the preoccupations of regional historians and political scientists, but also echo many of the concerns of Canadians in general. The plight of islands and francophone culture in the midst of an overwhelmingly Anglo-American society, the search for identities in the face of persisting stereotypes, the effects of economic and urban development, the distinctiveness of local political cultures-all are subjects whose study enriches both regional and national history. This volume brings together explorations of these themes from eastern and western points of view and makes a unique contribution to a greater understanding and awareness of the regional dimension in Canadian life.

Canadian Zionists of the 1930s were anxious to involve their government in the Palestine question. The pressure they brought to bear was fuelled by a new urgency when British policy in Palestine denied entry to Jewish refugees from the Nazi terror. Today there is a widely held impression that the Canadian government responded quickly and sympathetically to that pressure. Jews and Arabs alike, each for their own purposes, have created the image of a Canada friendly to Zionism, and of Canadian policy directed by such pro-Zionists as Lester Pearson.But as David Bercuson demonstrates, the truth is far more complex. In fact, Zionist efforts to involve Canada in the Palestine question met with considerable resistance from Ottawa, even when Canada was elected to membership on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. The partition of Palestine was eventually supported by Canada, but begrudgingly. Ottawa viewed partition as the ‘least lousy’ solution to a problem that was acutely sensitive both diplomatically and politically.Hardly the champions of Zionism that it has generally been considered, Canada is revealed in Bercuson’s study as having established a middle east policy, not on moral or ideological grounds, but on the basis of the politicians’ view of its own national interests.

The Atlantic Canada and Western Canada Studies Conferences have focused attention in recent years on the culture and development of two widely separated regions which have been frequently ignored in studies of the Canadian nation. The Atlantic Canada Studies Conference, meeting in 1974 and 1976 at the University of New Brunswick, and the Western Canadian Studies Conference, meeting annually since 1968 at the University of Calgary, have brought together scholars from a variety of disciplines to study the identities and characteristics of these two hinterlands. In 1978 the two conferences met jointly, in a session in Fredericton and one at Calgary with a core of speakers and papers common to both. The purpose was to compare and contrast subjects and experiences of interest and concern in the west and in Atlantic Canada. The ten papers which comprise Eastern and Western Perspectives are selected from twenty-seven presented at the joint conference.The topic chosen not only illustrate some of the preoccupations of regional historians and political scientists, but also echo many of the concerns of Canadians in general. The plight of islands and francophone culture in the midst of an overwhelmingly Anglo-American society, the search for identities in the face of persisting stereotypes, the effects of economic and urban development, the distinctiveness of local political cultures-all are subjects whose study enriches both regional and national history. This volume brings together explorations of these themes from eastern and western points of view and makes a unique contribution to a greater understanding and awareness of the regional dimension in Canadian life.

Canadian Zionists of the 1930s were anxious to involve their government in the Palestine question. The pressure they brought to bear was fuelled by a new urgency when British policy in Palestine denied entry to Jewish refugees from the Nazi terror. Today there is a widely held impression that the Canadian government responded quickly and sympathetically to that pressure. Jews and Arabs alike, each for their own purposes, have created the image of a Canada friendly to Zionism, and of Canadian policy directed by such pro-Zionists as Lester Pearson.But as David Bercuson demonstrates, the truth is far more complex. In fact, Zionist efforts to involve Canada in the Palestine question met with considerable resistance from Ottawa, even when Canada was elected to membership on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. The partition of Palestine was eventually supported by Canada, but begrudgingly. Ottawa viewed partition as the ‘least lousy’ solution to a problem that was acutely sensitive both diplomatically and politically.Hardly the champions of Zionism that it has generally been considered, Canada is revealed in Bercuson’s study as having established a middle east policy, not on moral or ideological grounds, but on the basis of the politicians’ view of its own national interests.

Canadian Zionists of the 1930s were anxious to involve their government in the Palestine question. The pressure they brought to bear was fuelled by a new urgency when British policy in Palestine denied entry to Jewish refugees from the Nazi terror. Today there is a widely held impression that the Canadian government responded quickly and sympathetically to that pressure. Jews and Arabs alike, each for their own purposes, have created the image of a Canada friendly to Zionism, and of Canadian policy directed by such pro-Zionists as Lester Pearson.But as David Bercuson demonstrates, the truth is far more complex. In fact, Zionist efforts to involve Canada in the Palestine question met with considerable resistance from Ottawa, even when Canada was elected to membership on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. The partition of Palestine was eventually supported by Canada, but begrudgingly. Ottawa viewed partition as the ‘least lousy’ solution to a problem that was acutely sensitive both diplomatically and politically.Hardly the champions of Zionism that it has generally been considered, Canada is revealed in Bercuson’s study as having established a middle east policy, not on moral or ideological grounds, but on the basis of the politicians’ view of its own national interests.

The Atlantic Canada and Western Canada Studies Conferences have focused attention in recent years on the culture and development of two widely separated regions which have been frequently ignored in studies of the Canadian nation. The Atlantic Canada Studies Conference, meeting in 1974 and 1976 at the University of New Brunswick, and the Western Canadian Studies Conference, meeting annually since 1968 at the University of Calgary, have brought together scholars from a variety of disciplines to study the identities and characteristics of these two hinterlands. In 1978 the two conferences met jointly, in a session in Fredericton and one at Calgary with a core of speakers and papers common to both. The purpose was to compare and contrast subjects and experiences of interest and concern in the west and in Atlantic Canada. The ten papers which comprise Eastern and Western Perspectives are selected from twenty-seven presented at the joint conference.The topic chosen not only illustrate some of the preoccupations of regional historians and political scientists, but also echo many of the concerns of Canadians in general. The plight of islands and francophone culture in the midst of an overwhelmingly Anglo-American society, the search for identities in the face of persisting stereotypes, the effects of economic and urban development, the distinctiveness of local political cultures-all are subjects whose study enriches both regional and national history. This volume brings together explorations of these themes from eastern and western points of view and makes a unique contribution to a greater understanding and awareness of the regional dimension in Canadian life.

The Korean War represented a series of firsts for Canadian soldiers - their first military action under UN auspices, their first under U.S. corps and army command, their first in Asia as ground troops, and their first in which people at home initially ignored their efforts, and then forgot about them. David Bercuson evokes the tastes and smells, the frustrations, the unfamiliar terrain, the international complexities, and the heroism that made the Korean War an unforgettable experience for those who fought there.Caught by surprise with only a phantom army, the Canadian government in the summer of 1950 was forced by its major allies to promise a ground combat contribution to the UN effort to push back the Communist invasion of South Korea from the north. The Canadian Army Special Force, as the Korean contingent was first called, was hurriedly raised, trained, and sent to Korea, ill-prepared for a mountain war against a determined, well-armed enemy. Canadian soldiers fought bravely, often against impossible odds, to carry out their mission, but they were hindered by several factors - cautious UN Command strategy, poor British and Canadian defence doctrine, uneven leadership, and inadequate equipment and training. They did their duty, and more, in stopping Communist aggression in its tracks, but the Canadian army chose not to remember the lessons of Korea, even though that conflict, as a limited war, set the pattern for virtually all those that followed.Blood on the Hills is the first full, non-official history of the Canadian army's operations in the Korean War. The book covers the period from the start of that war to the cease-fire in July 1953 and describes and analyses the mobilization of the Canadian contingent, its training, manning, and equipment, and its efforts in combat. David Bercuson focuses on the many consequences of the army's unreadiness for combat in Korea and on the army's lack of success in learning lessons from its experience in an active theatre of war.

Late in the morning of 27 May 1941, the German battleship Bismarck was sunk by an overwhelming British armada in a fierce battle that lasted ninety minutes. Admiral Gunther Lutjens, Captain Ernst Lindemann and 2,206 men of her crew were lost, only 115 survived. Five days earlier, an RAF reconnaissance plane flying low off the coast of Norway spotted four large warships in the sea below. At 19,000 tons fully loaded, the sight of the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen was shocking enough; even more so was the sight of the 50,000 ton battleship Bismarck - the pride of the German navy - a ship shrouded in myth, an awesome and mysterious behemoth of destruction. Their purpose in these waters was obvious and chilling: the German navy was sending this powerful four-battleship task force to seize control of the North Atlantic sea lanes. The survival of free Britain was at stake. With almost all of Europe under Hitler's thumb, and the United States still frustratingly neutral, Britain was left alone to fight Nazi Germany. The only hope lay in the convoy route across the North Atlantic from the United States. The fate of Britain and the United States hung in the balance, and all knew that the destruction of the Bismarck would be a dramatic turning point in the war. Noted historians Bercuson and Herwig have uncovered much new information on the Bismarck, including a close examination of classified British and United States diplomatic files, only recently opened, revealing secret diplomatic manoeuvrings between Churchill and Roosevelt. They tell the full story of the Bismarck for the first time, from the key strategic decisions of the national leaders, to the gripping hour-by-hour account of the battle. This is the definitive account of one of the most dramatic and momentous events of the Second World War.