Holger H. Herwig - Böcker

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The Great War toppled four empires, cost the world 24 million lives, and sowed some of the seeds of another worldwide conflagration 20 years later. Yet, until now, there has been no comprehensive treatment of how Germany and Austria-Hungary - two of the key belligerents - conducted the war and what defeat meant to them. How did the Hohenzollern and Habsburg empires conceive of and conduct 'total war'? What impact did the prolonged fighting have on their societies? Drawing on his own archival research over the past decade, Holger Herwig analyses why Vienna opted for war in 1914 and why Berlin took the calculated risk to back that decision. The war plans and military campaigns on both Eastern and Western fronts are examined in detail and key battles, some of the bloodiest and most wasteful in military history, are narrated and analysed. On the home front, the mobilization of the civilian populations behind the war effort had profound social consequences. The militarization of the key war-related industries led to an industrial women's labour force emerging in both countries, deeply affecting the role of women in Germanic society."The great seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century', as American statesman George F Kennan described the war, has had no shortage of accounts seen chiefly from Allied perspectives. In using Vienna and Berlin as his vantage points, Herwig has comprehensively shown for the first time the other side of that prodigiously wasteful conflict.

This work poses a straightforward - yet at the same time perplexing - question about World War I: Why did it happen? Several of the oft-cited causes are reviewed and discussed. The argument of the alliance systems is inadequate, lacking relevance or compelling force. The arguments of mass demands, those focusing on nationalism, militarism and social Darwinism, it is argued, are insufficient, lacking indications of frequency, intensity, and process (how they influenced the various decisions). The work focuses on decision-making, on the choices made by small coteries, in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and elsewhere. The decisions made later by leaders in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, the Balkans, and the United States are also explored. The final chapters review the 'basic causes' once again. An alternative position is advanced, one focused on elites and coteries, their backgrounds and training, and on their unique agendas.

The major European powers drafted war plans before 1914 and executed them in August 1914; none brought the expected victory by Christmas. Why? This tightly focused collection of essays by international experts in military history reassesses the war plans of 1914 in a broad diplomatic, military, and political setting for the first time in three decades. The book analyzes the war plans of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia on the basis of the latest research and explores their demise in the opening months of World War I. Collectively and comparatively, these essays place contingency war planning before 1914 in the different contexts and challenges each state faced as well as into a broad European paradigm. This is the first such undertaking since Paul Kennedy's groundbreaking War Plans of the Great Powers (1979), and the end result is breathtaking in both scope and depth of analysis.

Decisions for War focuses on the choices made by small coteries in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and elsewhere to address a common yet perplexing question: why did World War I happen? Several of the usual causes for the war are reviewed and discussed. Rather than accepting arguments of mass demands, nationalism, militarism, and social Darwinism, the book shows how in each country, the decision to enter the war was made by only a handful of individuals - monarchs, ministers, military people, party leaders, ambassadors, and others. In each case, we also see separate and distinct agendas, the considerations differing from one nation to the next. The leadership of Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, the Balkans, and the United States are explored, as well as that of the major European countries involved.

This work poses a straightforward - yet at the same time perplexing - question about World War I: Why did it happen? Several of the oft-cited causes are reviewed and discussed. The argument of the alliance systems is inadequate, lacking relevance or compelling force. The arguments of mass demands, those focusing on nationalism, militarism and social Darwinism, it is argued, are insufficient, lacking indications of frequency, intensity, and process (how they influenced the various decisions). The work focuses on decision-making, on the choices made by small coteries, in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and elsewhere. The decisions made later by leaders in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, the Balkans, and the United States are also explored. The final chapters review the 'basic causes' once again. An alternative position is advanced, one focused on elites and coteries, their backgrounds and training, and on their unique agendas.

Decisions for War focuses on the choices made by small coteries in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and elsewhere to address a common yet perplexing question: why did World War I happen? Several of the usual causes for the war are reviewed and discussed. Rather than accepting arguments of mass demands, nationalism, militarism, and social Darwinism, the book shows how in each country, the decision to enter the war was made by only a handful of individuals - monarchs, ministers, military people, party leaders, ambassadors, and others. In each case, we also see separate and distinct agendas, the considerations differing from one nation to the next. The leadership of Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, the Balkans, and the United States are explored, as well as that of the major European countries involved.

The book details which Germans pushed for overseas expansion, how they tried to implement their ambitions, and why they ultimately failed. Discussions of political leaders and diplomats, the navy, German nationals overseas, and the German Evangelical Church and its missions abroad contribute to the history of Wilhelmian Germany Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The book details which Germans pushed for overseas expansion, how they tried to implement their ambitions, and why they ultimately failed. Discussions of political leaders and diplomats, the navy, German nationals overseas, and the German Evangelical Church and its missions abroad contribute to the history of Wilhelmian Germany Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

This collection of essays investigates such diverse vehicles for war commemoration as poems, battlefield tours, souvenirs, books, films, architectural structures, comics, websites, and video games. Drawing on essayists from Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Israel and the United States, this work explores the evolution from traditional to contemporary forms of war commemoration while addressing the fundamental question of whether these new forms of memorial are meant to encourage the remembering or the forgetting of the experience of war, as well as what implications the process of commemoration may have for the continuation of the modern nation state.Instructors considering this book for use in a course may request an examination copy here.

World History of Warfare is designed as a textbook for introductory college courses in military history. The text covers worldwide military history from ancient times to the present. Its principal theme is an exploration of change and continuity, revolution and tradition, in three thousand years of warfare. The work teaches students and general readers how warfare evolved and how that evolution affected human society, with emphasis on major turning points in the conduct of warfare rather than a superficial general history of wars. This volume addresses traditional subjects such as generals and tactics, but each chapter also includes discussions of the idea of war, the role of the common soldier, and the changing interpretations of the military's place in society and politics. Of special value is the authors' treatment of non-Western societies. Too often military history has meant the study of warfare in England, France, and Germany, especially as it was shaped by the Napoleonic conflicts. In contrast, the authors of this volume examine the role that military forces have played in shaping societies worldwide.

The Grand Illusion analyzes the impact of European military institutions on Hispanic America in general and examines the putative "Prussianization" of the Chilean army in particular. The authors focus on Chile's attempt to import and assimilate foreign military methods, doctrine, and matériel. They incorporate research from Chilean, Austrian, German, British, and American archives to offer a new interpretation of Chile's military reforms. The authors argue that the Chilean army adopted only the most superficial aspects of the German military ethos, which eventually led to the creation of a large but ineffective army. The transfer of technology and doctrine failed because German institutions and policies did not suit Chile. Political infighting, greed, and corruption further encumbered the assimilation process. The authors' findings call into question the widely accepted thesis that developed nations could, and in fact did, change the nature of the military in developing countries.

World History of Warfare is designed as a textbook for introductory college courses in military history. The text covers worldwide military history from ancient times to the present. Its principal theme is an exploration of change and continuity, revolution and tradition, in three thousand years of warfare. The work teaches students and general readers how warfare evolved and how that evolution affected human society, with emphasis on major turning points in the conduct of warfare rather than a superficial general history of wars. This volume addresses traditional subjects such as generals and tactics, but each chapter also includes discussions of the idea of war, the role of the common soldier, and the changing interpretations of the military's place in society and politics. Of special value is the authors' treatment of non-Western societies. Too often military history has meant the study of warfare in England, France, and Germany, especially as it was shaped by the Napoleonic conflicts. In contrast, the authors of this volume examine the role that military forces have played in shaping societies worldwide.

General Fritz von Lossberg (1868--1942) directed virtually all the major German defensive battles on the Western Front during the First World War. Hailed as "the Lion of the Defensive," he was an extremely influential military tactician and, unlike many other operations officers of his era, was quick to grasp the changes wrought by technology.Now available for the first time in English, Lossberg's memoir explains how he developed, tested, and implemented his central principles -- flexibility, decentralized control, and counterattack -- which were based on a need to adapt to shifting conditions on the battlefield. Lossberg first put his theory of elastic defense combined with defense-in-depth into practice during the Battle of Arras (April--May 1917), where it succeeded. At the Battle of Passchendaele (June--November 1917), his achievements on the field proved the feasibility of his strategy of employing a thinly manned front line that minimized the number of soldiers exposed to artillery fire. Lossberg's tactical modernizations have become essential components of army doctrine, and Lossberg's War: The World War I Memoirs of A German Chief of Staff will take readers inside the mind of one of the most significant military innovators of the twentieth century.

The major European powers drafted war plans before 1914 and executed them in August 1914; none brought the expected victory by Christmas. Why? This tightly focused collection of essays by international experts in military history reassesses the war plans of 1914 in a broad diplomatic, military, and political setting for the first time in three decades. The book analyzes the war plans of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia on the basis of the latest research and explores their demise in the opening months of World War I. Collectively and comparatively, these essays place contingency war planning before 1914 in the different contexts and challenges each state faced as well as into a broad European paradigm. This is the first such undertaking since Paul Kennedy's groundbreaking War Plans of the Great Powers (1979), and the end result is breathtaking in both scope and depth of analysis.

Karl Haushofer, a Bavarian general and professor, is widely recognized as the “father of geopolitics.” In 1945 the United States sought to put him on trial at Nuremberg as a major war criminal for being “Hitler’s intellectual godfather” and the true author of Mein Kampf. In this definitive biography, noted historian Holger H. Herwig assesses the fiction and reality behind these claims. Making comprehensive use of Haushofer’s previously unavailable private papers, Herwig analyzes Haushofer’s geopolitical concepts, his relations with his student Rudolf Hess, and his mentorship of Hitler and Hess at Landsberg Prison in 1924. Herwig offers unique insights into Haushofer’s crucial behind-the-scenes influence in providing the Nazis with his theories of Autarky and Lebensraum, the rationale for Germany’s control of Europe and the world. This riveting book ends with Haushofer’s final verdict on himself: “I want to be forgotten and forgotten.” But the author concludes with the admonition that the “demon” of Geopolitik demands much closer scrutiny in this new age of geopolitics.

The Great War toppled four empires, cost the world 24 million dead, and sowed the seeds of another worldwide conflict 20 years later. This is the only book in the English language to offer comprehensive coverage of how Germany and Austria-Hungary, two of the key belligerents, conducted the war and what defeat meant to them. This new edition has been thoroughly updated throughout, including new developments in the historiography and, in particular, addressing new work on the cultural history of the war. This edition also includes: - New material on the domestic front, covering Austria-Hungary's internal political frictions and ethnic fissures - More on Austria-Hungary and Germany's position within the wider geopolitical framework - Increased coverage of the Eastern front The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 offers an authoritative and well-researched survey of the role of the Central powers that will be an invaluable text for all those studying the First World War and the development of modern warfare.

The Great War toppled four empires, cost the world 24 million dead, and sowed the seeds of another worldwide conflict 20 years later. This is the only book in the English language to offer comprehensive coverage of how Germany and Austria-Hungary, two of the key belligerents, conducted the war and what defeat meant to them. This new edition has been thoroughly updated throughout, including new developments in the historiography and, in particular, addressing new work on the cultural history of the war. This edition also includes: - New material on the domestic front, covering Austria-Hungary's internal political frictions and ethnic fissures - More on Austria-Hungary and Germany's position within the wider geopolitical framework - Increased coverage of the Eastern front The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 offers an authoritative and well-researched survey of the role of the Central powers that will be an invaluable text for all those studying the First World War and the development of modern warfare.