Richard F. Hamilton – författare

Hamilton provides an interdisciplinary explication and assessment of Marxism, of Marxist revisionism, and of Leninism, and delineates the major propositions of the three theories. Because the propositions cover a wide range of subjects, including the growth of cities and large factories, the changing quality of work, declining real incomes, economic crises, working-class organizations, and revolutions, Hamilton assesses them from the viewpoints of urban and industrial sociology, economic and political history, and social movements. Hamilton concludes that little empirical support is found for the claims of Marxism and Leninism, while modest support is found for the revisionist claims. Where others texts fail to provide serious reviews of evidence or references to critical studies or to relevant appropriate sources, this book remedies those deficiencies in a brief, clear, and thoroughly documented format.The 20th century has been dominated by a clash between capitalism and communism or, put differently, between the underlying theories, liberalism and Marxism. Although central to the recent history, these contending theories are poorly understood. To remedy this misunderstanding, the book begins with brief straightforward explications of liberalism, Marxism, and two variants of the latter, revisionism and Leninism. It then moves on to a more detailed examination of each theory, offering an assessment of the propositions from a variety of social science perspectives. Hamilton completes the work with his conclusions regarding the validity and adequacy of these theories.

Three major social theories--mass society, pluralism, and bureaucracy--are often employed to interpret and explain modern societies. Although frequently invoked, the theories themselves are poorly understood. This book seeks to clarify the background, context, and major arguments of the theories, assess the claims and validity of each, provide expert commentary, and suggest avenues for further work in each area. Drawing on work in the humanities, history, sociology, economic history, and political science, Hamilton is able to provide readers with a clear, concise, and accurate overview of the adequacy of these theories as well as their empirical validity.Beginning with the mass society theory, Hamilton offers a systematic empirical assessment of its major tenets and its abundant shortcomings. While the validity of the mass society theory does not hold up, there is more support for pluralism, and Hamilton adeptly assesses its arguments while suggesting a more realistic and partitive reading of the theory. And while the image of an all-pervasive and growing bureaucracy seems to overwhelm society, Hamilton argues that the theory seriously misrepresents the character of modern life. Working through each of these theories using an integrated approach, the author concludes each assessment with suggestions for which elements of the theory should be retained, which should be reworked, and which should be discarded altogether.

From the time of the ancient Greeks, thinkers have known the earth is round. Yet popular legend has persisted that Columbus proved this fact for the first time, and scholarship abounds with similar perpetuated errors. Why do social misconstructions—widely shared, long-lasting acceptance of facts or interpretations that are mistaken—persist when ample evidence is readily available to counter them? How and why are corrections resisted or dismissed? In this provocative book Richard F. Hamilton examines the social determinants of knowledge, focusing on three well-accepted but erroneous social theories and looking closely at the ways social misconstructions originate and thrive.Hamilton finds that despite critiques by historians, some scholars continue to believe Max Weber's claim that a strong linkage between Protestantism and worldly success led to the rise of the capitalist West. Similarly, many academics still argue the discredited view that the German lower middle class voted overwhelmingly for the Nazis. Foucault's flawed interpretation of the "birth of prison" and other disciplinary concepts in modern society finds wide acceptance in many academic circles, despite a lack of serious empirical support. In each of these three cases, the author assesses the logic and empirical accuracy of the accepted theory and alternative theories, and he investigates the social processes giving rise to misconstructions. He finds a remarkable disparity between the presumed commitment of scholars to evidence and their easy acceptance of undocumented argument. His book sounds a clear alert to the academic community.

This work poses a straightforward - yet at the same time perplexing - question about World War I: Why did it happen? Several of the oft-cited causes are reviewed and discussed. The argument of the alliance systems is inadequate, lacking relevance or compelling force. The arguments of mass demands, those focusing on nationalism, militarism and social Darwinism, it is argued, are insufficient, lacking indications of frequency, intensity, and process (how they influenced the various decisions). The work focuses on decision-making, on the choices made by small coteries, in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and elsewhere. The decisions made later by leaders in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, the Balkans, and the United States are also explored. The final chapters review the 'basic causes' once again. An alternative position is advanced, one focused on elites and coteries, their backgrounds and training, and on their unique agendas.

The major European powers drafted war plans before 1914 and executed them in August 1914; none brought the expected victory by Christmas. Why? This tightly focused collection of essays by international experts in military history reassesses the war plans of 1914 in a broad diplomatic, military, and political setting for the first time in three decades. The book analyzes the war plans of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia on the basis of the latest research and explores their demise in the opening months of World War I. Collectively and comparatively, these essays place contingency war planning before 1914 in the different contexts and challenges each state faced as well as into a broad European paradigm. This is the first such undertaking since Paul Kennedy's groundbreaking War Plans of the Great Powers (1979), and the end result is breathtaking in both scope and depth of analysis.

Decisions for War focuses on the choices made by small coteries in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and elsewhere to address a common yet perplexing question: why did World War I happen? Several of the usual causes for the war are reviewed and discussed. Rather than accepting arguments of mass demands, nationalism, militarism, and social Darwinism, the book shows how in each country, the decision to enter the war was made by only a handful of individuals - monarchs, ministers, military people, party leaders, ambassadors, and others. In each case, we also see separate and distinct agendas, the considerations differing from one nation to the next. The leadership of Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, the Balkans, and the United States are explored, as well as that of the major European countries involved.

This work poses a straightforward - yet at the same time perplexing - question about World War I: Why did it happen? Several of the oft-cited causes are reviewed and discussed. The argument of the alliance systems is inadequate, lacking relevance or compelling force. The arguments of mass demands, those focusing on nationalism, militarism and social Darwinism, it is argued, are insufficient, lacking indications of frequency, intensity, and process (how they influenced the various decisions). The work focuses on decision-making, on the choices made by small coteries, in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and elsewhere. The decisions made later by leaders in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, the Balkans, and the United States are also explored. The final chapters review the 'basic causes' once again. An alternative position is advanced, one focused on elites and coteries, their backgrounds and training, and on their unique agendas.

Decisions for War focuses on the choices made by small coteries in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and elsewhere to address a common yet perplexing question: why did World War I happen? Several of the usual causes for the war are reviewed and discussed. Rather than accepting arguments of mass demands, nationalism, militarism, and social Darwinism, the book shows how in each country, the decision to enter the war was made by only a handful of individuals - monarchs, ministers, military people, party leaders, ambassadors, and others. In each case, we also see separate and distinct agendas, the considerations differing from one nation to the next. The leadership of Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, the Balkans, and the United States are explored, as well as that of the major European countries involved.

Challenging the traditional belief that Hitler's supporters were largely from the lower middle class, Richard F. Hamilton analyzes Nazi electoral successes by turning to previously untapped sources--urban voting records. This examination of data from a series of elections in fourteen of the largest German cities shows that in most of them the vote for the Nazis varied directly with the class level of the district, with the wealthiest districts giving it the strongest support. Originally published in 1982. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The basic concern of the author is to find the reason for the persistent leftist character of French working-class politics in a period of rapid industrialization and improving living standards. Reanalyzing material from surveys made by two French organizations, he finds that increased affluence is correlated with changes in social structure that increase radicalism. As rural and small-town workers come into big cities and large plants, they are influenced by political activists who provide them with a Communist frame of reference for interpreting the meaning of new affluence. Originally published in 1967. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Challenging the traditional belief that Hitler's supporters were largely from the lower middle class, Richard F. Hamilton analyzes Nazi electoral successes by turning to previously untapped sources--urban voting records. This examination of data from a series of elections in fourteen of the largest German cities shows that in most of them the vote for the Nazis varied directly with the class level of the district, with the wealthiest districts giving it the strongest support. Originally published in 1982. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The basic concern of the author is to find the reason for the persistent leftist character of French working-class politics in a period of rapid industrialization and improving living standards. Reanalyzing material from surveys made by two French organizations, he finds that increased affluence is correlated with changes in social structure that increase radicalism. As rural and small-town workers come into big cities and large plants, they are influenced by political activists who provide them with a Communist frame of reference for interpreting the meaning of new affluence. Originally published in 1967. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The "progressive" reading of history focuses on two major antecedents for the origins of the United States' 1898 war with Spain: the 1896 presidential election and the Hearst-Pulitzer press war that, reportedly, generated an irresistible clamor from an "aroused public." Underlying those narratives are two very different theoretical frameworks: a class-dominance view and that of the mass society. Volume 1 of President McKinley, War and Empire assesses the adequacy of those readings.In the 1896 election the Republicans, led by William McKinley, were challenged by William Jennings Bryan, a radical and an inflationist, who had defeated the conservative leaders of the Democratic Party. The Bryanites portrayed the 1896 election as a struggle between "Wall Street" and "the people." McKinley was portrayed as a docile, pliable figure whose campaign was directed by an adept Ohio business magnate, Mark Hanna. The McKinley victory meant that "big business" was now "in control."The Cuban insurgency, begun in 1895, gained attention and support from the American newspapers. This began with a circulation war in New York City, with Hearst and Pulitzer publishing "sensational" reports about the struggle in Cuba. The resulting public clamor, it is said, overwhelmed the members of the legislative and executive branches. McKinley and his advisors fended off those demands as best they could but, following the sinking of the Maine, he conceded and asked Congress to authorize intervention.This work provides an original assessment of those long-standing claims, the basic elements of the progressive history. It reviews McKinley's biography, principally the events leading up to his election victory, including discussion of Hanna's role. It then examines the events leading up to the war. Studies of press content are reviewed and new material is introduced. The work also argues that two other factors were decisive: the efforts of an adept Cuban pressure group and partisan politics. The theoretical implications are explored and an alternative framework, elitism, is argued. The result is a different, a more complex view of the origins of the war.

This second volume of President McKinley, War and Empire assesses five theories that have dominated analysis of modern societies in the last century--liberalism, Marxism, mass society, pluralism, and elitism--in accounting for an aberrant event in American history: the Spanish-American War. President McKinley and the Coming of the War 1898, volume 1 of this definitive history, considered the origins of that war. This second volume is concerned with the war's outcome; the settlement in which the U.S. gained an "empire."The book begins by reviewing various expansionist episodes in U.S. history--some successes, some failures--and by analyzing the complexities, support, and opposition involved in expansionism. It then examines the work of expansionist writers, men said to have "driven" the 1898-99 movement, finding these claims to be questionable.Hamilton assesses McKinley's decision-making in regard to the settlement of the Spanish-American War, including the influences that might have moved him, as well as his own justifications. He then reviews the subsequent achievements: the size and character of the new American "empire;" trade flows the Philippine experience and U.S. efforts in China--supposedly the prime goal of the new imperialism. Many contemporary writers anticipated great possibilities in China, but that "fabled" market remained minuscule throughout the following century. Much American trade continued to be with Western Europe, while the biggest change in U.S. exports went largely unnoticed--Canada became the nation's number one trading partner.In much historical writing, McKinley is portrayed as little more than a "front man" for Mark Hanna, the adept businessman-politician who organized and led his presidential campaign, aided by generous financial contributions from business leaders across the nation. Hanna certainly was a leading figure in McKinley's career, but the assumption that his influence was controlling is not justified, as has been shown in recent research. McKinley was far more than a figurehead easily manipulated by representatives of "the interests."

Richard Hamilton provides an in-depth critique of the writngs of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on Britain, France, and Germany. Hamilton contends that the validity of their principal historical claims has been assumed more often than investigated, and he reviews the logic of their historical arguments, citing relevant sources that challenge many of the assertions they used to build their theory of inexorable historical change.Although Marx emphasized the need for systematic empirical research into historical events, he and Engels in fact relied on impressionistic evidence to support their claims of how fault lines were forming in capitalist society. Marxist theory, Hamilton concludes, is poorly supported in the historical analysis supplied by its original formulators. In showing that the historical record points to alternative readings of the course of social, economic, and political development in Western society, Hamilton argues that class boundaries tend to be fluid and that major change is more often than not the product of evolutionary -- rather than revolutionary -- forces.Originally published in 1991.

The major European powers drafted war plans before 1914 and executed them in August 1914; none brought the expected victory by Christmas. Why? This tightly focused collection of essays by international experts in military history reassesses the war plans of 1914 in a broad diplomatic, military, and political setting for the first time in three decades. The book analyzes the war plans of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia on the basis of the latest research and explores their demise in the opening months of World War I. Collectively and comparatively, these essays place contingency war planning before 1914 in the different contexts and challenges each state faced as well as into a broad European paradigm. This is the first such undertaking since Paul Kennedy's groundbreaking War Plans of the Great Powers (1979), and the end result is breathtaking in both scope and depth of analysis.

The "progressive" reading of history focuses on two major antecedents for the origins of the United States' 1898 war with Spain: the 1896 presidential election and the Hearst-Pulitzer press war that, reportedly, generated an irresistible clamor from an "aroused public." Underlying those narratives are two very different theoretical frameworks: a class-dominance view and that of the mass society. Volume 1 of President McKinley, War and Empire assesses the adequacy of those readings.In the 1896 election the Republicans, led by William McKinley, were challenged by William Jennings Bryan, a radical and an inflationist, who had defeated the conservative leaders of the Democratic Party. The Bryanites portrayed the 1896 election as a struggle between "Wall Street" and "the people." McKinley was portrayed as a docile, pliable figure whose campaign was directed by an adept Ohio business magnate, Mark Hanna. The McKinley victory meant that "big business" was now "in control."The Cuban insurgency, begun in 1895, gained attention and support from the American newspapers. This began with a circulation war in New York City, with Hearst and Pulitzer publishing "sensational" reports about the struggle in Cuba. The resulting public clamor, it is said, overwhelmed the members of the legislative and executive branches. McKinley and his advisors fended off those demands as best they could but, following the sinking of the Maine, he conceded and asked Congress to authorize intervention.This work provides an original assessment of those long-standing claims, the basic elements of the progressive history. It reviews McKinley's biography, principally the events leading up to his election victory, including discussion of Hanna's role. It then examines the events leading up to the war. Studies of press content are reviewed and new material is introduced. The work also argues that two other factors were decisive: the efforts of an adept Cuban pressure group and partisan politics. The theoretical implications are explored and an alternative framework, elitism, is argued. The result is a different, a more complex view of the origins of the war.

This second volume of President McKinley, War and Empire assesses five theories that have dominated analysis of modern societies in the last century--liberalism, Marxism, mass society, pluralism, and elitism--in accounting for an aberrant event in American history: the Spanish-American War. President McKinley and the Coming of the War 1898, volume 1 of this definitive history, considered the origins of that war. This second volume is concerned with the war's outcome; the settlement in which the U.S. gained an "empire."The book begins by reviewing various expansionist episodes in U.S. history--some successes, some failures--and by analyzing the complexities, support, and opposition involved in expansionism. It then examines the work of expansionist writers, men said to have "driven" the 1898-99 movement, finding these claims to be questionable.Hamilton assesses McKinley's decision-making in regard to the settlement of the Spanish-American War, including the influences that might have moved him, as well as his own justifications. He then reviews the subsequent achievements: the size and character of the new American "empire;" trade flows the Philippine experience and U.S. efforts in China--supposedly the prime goal of the new imperialism. Many contemporary writers anticipated great possibilities in China, but that "fabled" market remained minuscule throughout the following century. Much American trade continued to be with Western Europe, while the biggest change in U.S. exports went largely unnoticed--Canada became the nation's number one trading partner.In much historical writing, McKinley is portrayed as little more than a "front man" for Mark Hanna, the adept businessman-politician who organized and led his presidential campaign, aided by generous financial contributions from business leaders across the nation. Hanna certainly was a leading figure in McKinley's career, but the assumption that his influence was controlling is not justified, as has been shown in recent research. McKinley was far more than a figurehead easily manipulated by representatives of "the interests."

In this volume, Hamilton deals with some of the antecedents and the outcome of the Spanish-American war, specifically, the acquisition of an American empire. It critiques the "progressive" view of those events, questioning the notion that businessmen (and compliant politicians) aggressively sought new markets, particularly those of Asia. Hamilton shows that United States' exports continued to go, predominantly, to the major European nations. The progressive tradition has focused on empire, specifically on the Philippines depicted as a stepping stone to the China market. Hamilton shows that the Asian market remained minuscule in the following decades, and that other historical works have neglected the most important change in the nation's trade pattern, the growth of the Canada market, which two decades after the 1898 war, became the United States' largest foreign market.The book begins with a review and criticism of the basic assumptions of the progressive framework. These are, first, that the nation is ruled by big business (political leaders being compliant co-workers). Second, that those businessmen are zealous profit seekers. And third, that they are well-informed rational decision-makers. A further underlying assumption is that the economy was not functioning well in the 1890s and that a need for new markets was recognized as an urgent necessity, so that big business, accordingly, demanded world power and empire. Each of these assumptions, pivotal elements in the dominant progressive tradition in historical writing, is challenged, with an alternative viewpoint presented.Hamilton presents a different, more complex view of the events following the Spanish-American War. The class-dominance theory is not supported. The alternative argued here, elitism, proves appropriate and more useful. This review and assessment of arguments about American expansion in the 1890s adds much to the literature of the period.