David Owens – författare

Do we control what we believe? Are we responsible for what we believe? These two questions are connected: the kind of responsibility we have for our beliefs depends on the form of control that we have over them. For a number of years David Owens has investigated what form of control we must have over something in order to be held to the norms governing that thing, and has argued that belief, intention and action each require a different type of control. The forms offreedom appropriate to each of them vary, and so do the presuppositions of responsibility associated with each of them. Issues in the moral psychology of belief cast light on some of the traditional problems of epistemology and in particular on the problems of scepticism and testimony.In this series of ten essays Owens explores various different forms of control we might have over belief and the different forms of responsibility they generate. He brings into the picture notable recent work in epistemology: on assurance theories of testimony, on ''pragmatic encroachment'', on the aim of belief and on the value of knowledge. He also considers topics in related fields such as the philosophy of mind (e.g. the problem of self-knowledge and theories of the first person) and thephilosophy of action (e.g. the guise of the good and the role of the will in free agency). Finally, Owens suggests a non-standard reading of the sceptical tradition in early modern philosophy as we find it in Descartes and Hume.Seven of the essays collected here are previously published, one has been heavily revised, and two are previously unpublished. Owens provides a substantial introduction bringing together the themes of the essays.

Shaping the Normative Landscape is an investigation of the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. David Owens shows that these are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment. Philosophers from Hume to Scanlon have supposed that when we make promises and give our consent, our real interest is in controlling (or being able to anticipate) what people will actually doand that our interest in rights and obligations is a by-product of this more fundamental interest. In fact, we value for its own sake the ability to decide who is obliged to do what, to determine when blame is appropriate, to settle whether an act wrongs us. Owens explores how we control the rights andobligations of ourselves and of those around us. We do so by making friends and thereby creating the rights and obligations of friendship. We do so by making promises and so binding ourselves to perform. We do so by consenting to medical treatment and thereby giving the doctor the right to go ahead. The normative character of our world matters to us on its own account. To make sense of promise, consent, friendship and other related phenomena we must acknowledge that normative interests areamongst our fundamental interests. We must also rethink the psychology of agency and the nature of social convention.

Do we control what we believe? Are we responsible for what we believe? These two questions are connected: the kind of responsibility we have for our beliefs depends on the form of control that we have over them. For a number of years David Owens has investigated what form of control we must have over something in order to be held to the norms governing that thing, and has argued that belief, intention and action each require a different type of control. The forms offreedom appropriate to each of them vary, and so do the presuppositions of responsibility associated with each of them. Issues in the moral psychology of belief cast light on some of the traditional problems of epistemology and in particular on the problems of scepticism and testimony.In this series of ten essays Owens explores various different forms of control we might have over belief and the different forms of responsibility they generate. He brings into the picture notable recent work in epistemology: on assurance theories of testimony, on ''pragmatic encroachment'', on the aim of belief and on the value of knowledge. He also considers topics in related fields such as the philosophy of mind (e.g. the problem of self-knowledge and theories of the first person) and thephilosophy of action (e.g. the guise of the good and the role of the will in free agency). Finally, Owens suggests a non-standard reading of the sceptical tradition in early modern philosophy as we find it in Descartes and Hume.Seven of the essays collected here are previously published, one has been heavily revised, and two are previously unpublished. Owens provides a substantial introduction bringing together the themes of the essays.

How should we assess the social structures that govern human conduct and settle whether we are bound by their rules? One approach is to ask whether those social arrangements (e.g. our family structures) reflect pre-conventional facts about our nature. If they do, compliance will serve our interests because these rules are not just conventions. Another approach is to ask whether following a convention has desirable consequences. For example, the rule which makes the dollar bill legal tender is a convention and the great usefulness of having a medium of exchange ensures that we should follow that convention by accepting paper money in return for things of real value. This work argues that being bound by a convention can also be valuable for its own sake. People need meaning in their lives and conventions infuse acts and attitudes with normative significance, rendering them right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, required or forbidden. Such rules bind us not just in virtue of their usefulness but also because their absence would impoverish our social world. Appreciating this point is essential to a proper understanding of our cultures of neighbourliness and hospitality, family structures, systems of property rights, conventions around speech, the norms governing how we deport ourselves in public, and even the rules of a game.

How should we assess the social structures that govern human conduct and settle whether we are bound by their rules? One approach is to ask whether those social arrangements (e.g. our family structures) reflect pre-conventional facts about our nature. If they do, compliance will serve our interests because these rules are not just conventions. Another approach is to ask whether following a convention has desirable consequences. For example, the rule which makes the dollar bill legal tender is a convention and the great usefulness of having a medium of exchange ensures that we should follow that convention by accepting paper money in return for things of real value. This work argues that being bound by a convention can also be valuable for its own sake. People need meaning in their lives and conventions infuse acts and attitudes with normative significance, rendering them right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, required or forbidden. Such rules bind us not just in virtue of their usefulness but also because their absence would impoverish our social world. Appreciating this point is essential to a proper understanding of our cultures of neighbourliness and hospitality, family structures, systems of property rights, conventions around speech, the norms governing how we deport ourselves in public, and even the rules of a game.

How should we assess the social structures that govern human conduct and settle whether we are bound by their rules? One approach is to ask whether those social arrangements (e.g. our family structures) reflect pre-conventional facts about our nature. If they do, compliance will serve our interests because these rules are not just conventions. Another approach is to ask whether following a convention has desirable consequences. For example, the rule which makes the dollar bill legal tender is a convention and the great usefulness of having a medium of exchange ensures that we should follow that convention by accepting paper money in return for things of real value. This work argues that being bound by a convention can also be valuable for its own sake. People need meaning in their lives and conventions infuse acts and attitudes with normative significance, rendering them right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, required or forbidden. Such rules bind us not just in virtue of their usefulness but also because their absence would impoverish our social world. Appreciating this point is essential to a proper understanding of our cultures of neighbourliness and hospitality, family structures, systems of property rights, conventions around speech, the norms governing how we deport ourselves in public, and even the rules of a game.

Shaping the Normative Landscape is an investigation of the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. David Owens shows that these are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment. Philosophers from Hume to Scanlon have supposed that when we make promises and give our consent, our real interest is in controlling (or being able to anticipate) what people will actually do and that our interest in rights and obligations is a by-product of this more fundamental interest. In fact, we value for its own sake the ability to decide who is obliged to do what, to determine when blame is appropriate, to settle whether an act wrongs us. Owens explores how we control the rights and obligations of ourselves and of those around us. We do so by making friends and thereby creating the rights and obligations of friendship. We do so by making promises and so binding ourselves to perform. We do so by consenting to medical treatment and thereby giving the doctor the right to go ahead. The normative character of our world matters to us on its own account. To make sense of promise, consent, friendship and other related phenomena we must acknowledge that normative interests are amongst our fundamental interests. We must also rethink the psychology of agency and the nature of social convention.

Do we control what we believe? Are we responsible for what we believe? These two questions are connected: the kind of responsibility we have for our beliefs depends on the form of control that we have over them. For a number of years David Owens has investigated what form of control we must have over something in order to be held to the norms governing that thing, and has argued that belief, intention and action each require a different type of control. The forms of freedom appropriate to each of them vary, and so do the presuppositions of responsibility associated with each of them. Issues in the moral psychology of belief cast light on some of the traditional problems of epistemology and in particular on the problems of scepticism and testimony.In this series of ten essays Owens explores various different forms of control we might have over belief and the different forms of responsibility they generate. He brings into the picture notable recent work in epistemology: on assurance theories of testimony, on 'pragmatic encroachment', on the aim of belief and on the value of knowledge. He also considers topics in related fields such as the philosophy of mind (e.g. the problem of self-knowledge and theories of the first person) and the philosophy of action (e.g. the guise of the good and the role of the will in free agency). Finally, Owens suggests a non-standard reading of the sceptical tradition in early modern philosophy as we find it in Descartes and Hume. Seven of the essays collected here are previously published, one has been heavily revised, and two are previously unpublished. Owens provides a substantial introduction bringing together the themes of the essays.

Do we control what we believe? Are we responsible for what we believe? These two questions are connected: the kind of responsibility we have for our beliefs depends on the form of control that we have over them. For a number of years David Owens has investigated what form of control we must have over something in order to be held to the norms governing that thing, and has argued that belief, intention and action each require a different type of control. The forms of freedom appropriate to each of them vary, and so do the presuppositions of responsibility associated with each of them. Issues in the moral psychology of belief cast light on some of the traditional problems of epistemology and in particular on the problems of scepticism and testimony.In this series of ten essays Owens explores various different forms of control we might have over belief and the different forms of responsibility they generate. He brings into the picture notable recent work in epistemology: on assurance theories of testimony, on 'pragmatic encroachment', on the aim of belief and on the value of knowledge. He also considers topics in related fields such as the philosophy of mind (e.g. the problem of self-knowledge and theories of the first person) and the philosophy of action (e.g. the guise of the good and the role of the will in free agency). Finally, Owens suggests a non-standard reading of the sceptical tradition in early modern philosophy as we find it in Descartes and Hume. Seven of the essays collected here are previously published, one has been heavily revised, and two are previously unpublished. Owens provides a substantial introduction bringing together the themes of the essays.

How should we assess the social structures that govern human conduct and settle whether we are bound by their rules? One approach is to ask whether social arrangements, such as our family structures, reflect pre-conventional facts about our nature. If they do, compliance will serve our interests because these rules are not just conventions. Another approach is to ask whether following a convention has desirable consequences. For example, the rule which makes the dollar bill legal tender is a convention, and the great usefulness of having a medium of exchange ensures we follow that convention by accepting paper money in return for things of real value. In this book, David Owens argues that being bound by a convention can also be valuable for its own sake. People need meaning in their lives and conventions infuse acts and attitudes with normative significance, rendering them right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, required or forbidden. Such rules bind us not just in virtue of their usefulness but also because their absence would impoverish our social world. Appreciating this point is essential to a proper understanding of our cultures of neighbourliness and hospitality, family structures, systems of property rights, conventions around speech, the norms governing how we deport ourselves in public, and even the rules of a game.

Shaping the Normative Landscape is an investigation of the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. David Owens shows that these are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment. Philosophers from Hume to Scanlon have supposed that when we make promises and give our consent, our real interest is in controlling (or being able to anticipate) what people will actually do and that our interest in rights and obligations is a by-product of this more fundamental interest. In fact, we value for its own sake the ability to decide who is obliged to do what, to determine when blame is appropriate, to settle whether an act wrongs us. Owens explores how we control the rights and obligations of ourselves and of those around us. We do so by making friends and thereby creating the rights and obligations of friendship. We do so by making promises and so binding ourselves to perform. We do so by consenting to medical treatment and thereby giving the doctor the right to go ahead. The normative character of our world matters to us on its own account. To make sense of promise, consent, friendship and other related phenomena we must acknowledge that normative interests are amongst our fundamental interests. We must also rethink the psychology of agency and the nature of social convention.

We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume - the founders of epistemology - and presents a critical discussion of the current trends in contemporary epistemology. He proposes that the problems we confront today - scepticism, the analysis of knowlege, and debates on epistemic justification - can be tackled only once we have understood the moral psychology of belief. This can be resolved when we realise that our responsibility for beliefs is profoundly different from our rationality and agency, and that memory and testimony can preserve justified belief without preserving the evidence which might be used to justify it. Reason Without Freedom should be of value to those interested in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, ethics, and the history of 17th and 18th century.

We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume - the founders of epistemology - and presents a critical discussion of the current trends in contemporary epistemology. He proposes that the problems we confront today - scepticism, the analysis of knowlege, and debates on epistemic justification - can be tackled only once we have understood the moral psychology of belief. This can be resolved when we realise that our responsibility for beliefs is profoundly different from our rationality and agency, and that memory and testimony can preserve justified belief without preserving the evidence which might be used to justify it. Reason Without Freedom should be of value to those interested in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, ethics, and the history of 17th and 18th century.

In an important departure from theories of causation, David Owens proposes that coincidences have no causes, and that a cause is something which ensures that its effects are no coincidence. In Causes and Coincidences, he elucidates the idea of a coincidence as an event which can be analysed into constituent events, the nomological antecedents of which are independent of each other. He also suggests that causal facts can be analysed in terms of non-causal facts, including relations of necessity. Thus, causation is defined in terms of coincidence, and coincidence without reference to causation. David Owens challenges the ideas associated with Hume, Davidson and Lewis, constructing a theory which distinguishes nomological necessity and sufficiency from their logical counterparts. He is able to offer novel solutions to the major problems of causation, including the direction of causation, the logical form of causal statements, the distinction betwen causal connections and logical connections, and the relationship between psychological and physical causation.

In an important departure from theories of causation, David Owens proposes that coincidences have no causes, and that a cause is something which ensures that its effects are no coincidence. In Causes and Coincidences, he elucidates the idea of a coincidence as an event which can be analysed into constituent events, the nomological antecedents of which are independent of each other. He also suggests that causal facts can be analysed in terms of non-causal facts, including relations of necessity. Thus, causation is defined in terms of coincidence, and coincidence without reference to causation. David Owens challenges the ideas associated with Hume, Davidson and Lewis, constructing a theory which distinguishes nomological necessity and sufficiency from their logical counterparts. He is able to offer novel solutions to the major problems of causation, including the direction of causation, the logical form of causal statements, the distinction betwen causal connections and logical connections, and the relationship between psychological and physical causation.

By the time you''ve read this book, you''ll be ready to design your own research project

Not everyone in clinical research is a scientific investigator. In fact, a large proportion of health professionals undertaking a research project are working in clinical care, as junior doctors, nurses or allied health professionals. For them a book that begins with the basics of study design and takes them through all the stages to data collection, analysis, and submission for publication is vital. Getting Started in Health Research is the answer. It provides fundamental information on:

Framing the research question Performing the literature search Choosing the study design Collecting data Getting funding Recruiting participants Writing your paper

Lively case studies provide a continuous narrative, addressing the pitfalls and problems that can occur.

Calling upon their vast experience of teaching health research methodology, these authors have turned a seemingly daunting task into a challenging and enjoyable prospect.

The companion of Understanding Clinical Papers  www.wiley.com/buy/9780470091302

Reviews of Understanding Clinical Papers

"...an excellent basis for all who intend to write scientific texts as well as those reading, evaluating, and trying to understand the results..." Clinical Chemistry, May 2007

"What makes this book unique is that each point presented is illustrated with excerpts from actual papers, often three or four per chapter...this is a very effective teaching device." Journal of the American Medical Association, December 26, 2006

"What strikes the reader ... straight away is clarity ... promises to become a recommended text for undergraduate and postgraduate courses." Journal of Tropical Pediatrics, September 2006

"This book should be an essential addition to the personal libraries of all health care workers . . . " Oncology, 2002

By the time you''ve read this book, you''ll be ready to design your own research project

Not everyone in clinical research is a scientific investigator. In fact, a large proportion of health professionals undertaking a research project are working in clinical care, as junior doctors, nurses or allied health professionals. For them a book that begins with the basics of study design and takes them through all the stages to data collection, analysis, and submission for publication is vital. Getting Started in Health Research is the answer. It provides fundamental information on:

Framing the research question Performing the literature search Choosing the study design Collecting data Getting funding Recruiting participants Writing your paper

Lively case studies provide a continuous narrative, addressing the pitfalls and problems that can occur.

Calling upon their vast experience of teaching health research methodology, these authors have turned a seemingly daunting task into a challenging and enjoyable prospect.

The companion of Understanding Clinical Papers  www.wiley.com/buy/9780470091302

Reviews of Understanding Clinical Papers

"...an excellent basis for all who intend to write scientific texts as well as those reading, evaluating, and trying to understand the results..." Clinical Chemistry, May 2007

"What makes this book unique is that each point presented is illustrated with excerpts from actual papers, often three or four per chapter...this is a very effective teaching device." Journal of the American Medical Association, December 26, 2006

"What strikes the reader ... straight away is clarity ... promises to become a recommended text for undergraduate and postgraduate courses." Journal of Tropical Pediatrics, September 2006

"This book should be an essential addition to the personal libraries of all health care workers . . . " Oncology, 2002

For two decades, Understanding Clinical Papers has been helping students and professionals understand the research that supports evidence-based practice. Now in its fourth edition, this popular introductory textbook covers every major aspect of reading and evaluating clinical research literature, from identifying the aims and objectives of a paper to analysing the data with different multivariable methods. Numerous excerpts from actual clinical research papers make learning real and immediate, supported by a unique visual approach that reinforces key points and connects examples with the chapter material. 

The fourth edition includes extensively revised content throughout, including four brand-new chapters covering qualitative studies, Poisson regression, studies of complex interventions, and research using previously collected data. New and updated material discusses the difference between clinical and statistical significance, the consequences of multiple testing and methods of correction, how topic guides are used to explore and explain participants'' experiences, standardised guidelines for writing trials and reviews, and much more. Offering clear explanations of important research-related topics, this reader-friendly resource: 

Offers a clear, concise, and accessible approach to learning how to read and analyse clinical research literature  Features new coverage of qualitative research, including descriptive studies, sampling and populations, and identifying, summarising, and measuring qualitative characteristics   Provides new material on missing data, sub-group analysis, feasibility and pilot studies, cluster randomised trials, and adaptive trial designs  Includes new tables, abstracts, and excerpts from recent clinical research literature 

Understanding Clinical Papers is essential reading for all healthcare professionals and students, particularly those involved in clinical work and medical research, as well as general readers wanting to improve their understanding of research literature. 

For two decades, Understanding Clinical Papers has been helping students and professionals understand the research that supports evidence-based practice. Now in its fourth edition, this popular introductory textbook covers every major aspect of reading and evaluating clinical research literature, from identifying the aims and objectives of a paper to analysing the data with different multivariable methods. Numerous excerpts from actual clinical research papers make learning real and immediate, supported by a unique visual approach that reinforces key points and connects examples with the chapter material. 

The fourth edition includes extensively revised content throughout, including four brand-new chapters covering qualitative studies, Poisson regression, studies of complex interventions, and research using previously collected data. New and updated material discusses the difference between clinical and statistical significance, the consequences of multiple testing and methods of correction, how topic guides are used to explore and explain participants'' experiences, standardised guidelines for writing trials and reviews, and much more. Offering clear explanations of important research-related topics, this reader-friendly resource: 

Offers a clear, concise, and accessible approach to learning how to read and analyse clinical research literature  Features new coverage of qualitative research, including descriptive studies, sampling and populations, and identifying, summarising, and measuring qualitative characteristics   Provides new material on missing data, sub-group analysis, feasibility and pilot studies, cluster randomised trials, and adaptive trial designs  Includes new tables, abstracts, and excerpts from recent clinical research literature 

Understanding Clinical Papers is essential reading for all healthcare professionals and students, particularly those involved in clinical work and medical research, as well as general readers wanting to improve their understanding of research literature. 

For two decades, Understanding Clinical Papers has been helping students and professionals understand the research that supports evidence-based practice. Now in its fourth edition, this popular introductory textbook covers every major aspect of reading and evaluating clinical research literature, from identifying the aims and objectives of a paper to analysing the data with different multivariable methods. Numerous excerpts from actual clinical research papers make learning real and immediate, supported by a unique visual approach that reinforces key points and connects examples with the chapter material. The fourth edition includes extensively revised content throughout, including four brand-new chapters covering qualitative studies, Poisson regression, studies of complex interventions, and research using previously collected data. New and updated material discusses the difference between clinical and statistical significance, the consequences of multiple testing and methods of correction, how topic guides are used to explore and explain participants' experiences, standardised guidelines for writing trials and reviews, and much more. Offering clear explanations of important research-related topics, this reader-friendly resource:  Offers a clear, concise, and accessible approach to learning how to read and analyse clinical research literature Features new coverage of qualitative research, including descriptive studies, sampling and populations, and identifying, summarising, and measuring qualitative characteristics  Provides new material on missing data, sub-group analysis, feasibility and pilot studies, cluster randomised trials, and adaptive trial designs Includes new tables, abstracts, and excerpts from recent clinical research literature Understanding Clinical Papers is essential reading for all healthcare professionals and students, particularly those involved in clinical work and medical research, as well as general readers wanting to improve their understanding of research literature.

We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume - the founders of epistemology - and presents a critical discussion of the current trends in contemporary epistemology. He proposes that the problems we confront today - scepticism, the analysis of knowlege, and debates on epistemic justification - can be tackled only once we have understood the moral psychology of belief. This can be resolved when we realise that our responsibility for beliefs is profoundly different from our rationality and agency, and that memory and testimony can preserve justified belief without preserving the evidence which might be used to justify it. Reason Without Freedom should be of value to those interested in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, ethics, and the history of 17th and 18th century.

We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume - the founders of epistemology - and presents a critical discussion of the current trends in contemporary epistemology. He proposes that the problems we confront today - scepticism, the analysis of knowlege, and debates on epistemic justification - can be tackled only once we have understood the moral psychology of belief. This can be resolved when we realise that our responsibility for beliefs is profoundly different from our rationality and agency, and that memory and testimony can preserve justified belief without preserving the evidence which might be used to justify it. Reason Without Freedom should be of value to those interested in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, ethics, and the history of 17th and 18th century.

By the time you've read this book, you'll be ready to design your own research project Not everyone in clinical research is a scientific investigator. In fact, a large proportion of health professionals undertaking a research project are working in clinical care, as junior doctors, nurses or allied health professionals. For them a book that begins with the basics of study design and takes them through all the stages to data collection, analysis, and submission for publication is vital. Getting Started in Health Research is the answer. It provides fundamental information on: Framing the research questionPerforming the literature searchChoosing the study designCollecting dataGetting fundingRecruiting participantsWriting your paperLively case studies provide a continuous narrative, addressing the pitfalls and problems that can occur.Calling upon their vast experience of teaching health research methodology, these authors have turned a seemingly daunting task into a challenging and enjoyable prospect.The companion of Understanding Clinical Papers  www.wiley.com/buy/9780470091302Reviews of Understanding Clinical Papers"...an excellent basis for all who intend to write scientific texts as well as those reading, evaluating, and trying to understand the results..."Clinical Chemistry, May 2007"What makes this book unique is that each point presented is illustrated with excerpts from actual papers, often three or four per chapter...this is a very effective teaching device."Journal of the American Medical Association, December 26, 2006"What strikes the reader ... straight away is clarity ... promises to become a recommended text for undergraduate and postgraduate courses."Journal of Tropical Pediatrics, September 2006"This book should be an essential addition to the personal libraries of all health care workers . . . "Oncology, 2002