J. Gregory Sidak – författare

Restrictions on foreign investment in US telecommunications firms have harmed the interests of American consumers and investors, argues the author of this study. He seeks to show why these restrictions, originally intended to protect America from the perils of wireless telegraphy by foreign agents, should be repealed. Basing his analysis on legislative history, statutory and constitutional interpretation, and finance and trade theory, Sidak demonstrates that these restrictions no longer serve their national security purpose. Instead they deny American consumers lower prices and more robust innovation, hamper access of American investors to foreign telecommunications markets, and unconstitutionally impinge on freedom of speech. The study encompasses the Telecommunications Act of 1996, recent global mergers such as British Telecom-MCI, and the 1997 World Trade Organization agreement to liberalize trade in telecommunications services.

Restrictions on foreign investment in U.S. telecommunications firms have harmed the interests of American consumers and investors, argues J. Gregory Sidak in this convincing study. Sidak shows why these restrictions, originally intended to protect America from the perils of wireless telegraphy by foreign agents, should be repealed. Basing his analysis on legislative history, statutory and constitutional interpretation, and finance and trade theory, Sidak shows that these restrictions no longer serve their national security purpose (if they ever did). Instead they deny American consumers lower prices and more robust innovation, hamper access of American investors to foreign telecommunications markets, and unconstitutionally impinge on freedom of speech. Sidak''s study encompasses the Telecommunications Act of 1996, recent global mergers such as British Telecom-MCI, and the 1997 World Trade Organization agreement to liberalize trade in telecommunications services.

This 1998 book addresses deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy the value of private property in network industries without any accompanying payment of just compensation, policies that are termed 'deregulatory takings'. The authors further consider the problem of renegotiation of the regulatory contract, which changes the terms and conditions of operation of utility companies. They argue that constitutional protections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for contractual breach, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of the network industries. The benefits of competition do not stem from government regulations that redistribute income from utility investors to customers, nor do such benefits stem from regulatory policies for network access that promote free riding on incumbent facilities by entrants. Such actions represent a new version of increased regulation, not deregulation.

This 1998 book addresses deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy the value of private property in network industries without any accompanying payment of just compensation, policies that are termed 'deregulatory takings'. The authors further consider the problem of renegotiation of the regulatory contract, which changes the terms and conditions of operation of utility companies. They argue that constitutional protections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for contractual breach, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of the network industries. The benefits of competition do not stem from government regulations that redistribute income from utility investors to customers, nor do such benefits stem from regulatory policies for network access that promote free riding on incumbent facilities by entrants. Such actions represent a new version of increased regulation, not deregulation.

This volume brings together academic economists and lawyers to evaluate and compare the regulation of telecommunications markets in Germany and the United States. The unifying theme in all of the pa­ pers is that the goal of public policy in this area should be to make the broadest and most functional competition possible by means of an ap­ propriate regulatory framework. Because the European and American telecommunications markets are becoming more intertwined each day, the issues addressed in this volume will be topical to the business, government, and academic communities for some time. For the chairman of the Monopoly Commission, Wernhard Moschel, the opening of the German telecommunications market has been successful in principle. This is clearly recognizable in the case of the competition in long-distance transport. Based on the view that the regulatory authority should make itself obsolete, Professor Moschel advocates an incremental review and gradual reduction of regulation.

This volume brings together academic economists and lawyers to evaluate and compare the regulation of telecommunications markets in Germany and the United States. The unifying theme in all of the pa­ pers is that the goal of public policy in this area should be to make the broadest and most functional competition possible by means of an ap­ propriate regulatory framework. Because the European and American telecommunications markets are becoming more intertwined each day, the issues addressed in this volume will be topical to the business, government, and academic communities for some time. For the chairman of the Monopoly Commission, Wernhard Moschel, the opening of the German telecommunications market has been successful in principle. This is clearly recognizable in the case of the competition in long-distance transport. Based on the view that the regulatory authority should make itself obsolete, Professor Moschel advocates an incremental review and gradual reduction of regulation.