"Sidak and Spulber offer not only a profitable eye-opener of how deregulation of government-sponsored monopolies is a 'taking' of private property from the investors in those firms, but also a well-written analysis of the economics of networking in the modern economy. Every investor in the telecommunications industry would profit from their analysis." Armen A. Alchian, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles

• Preface; 1. The nature of the controversy; 2. Deregulation and network pricing; 3. Quarantines and quagmires; 4. The regulatory contract; 5. Remedies for breach of the regulatory contract; 6. Takings and the property of the regulated utility; 7. Just compensation for deregulatory takings; 8. The efficient component-pricing rule; 9. The market-determined efficient component-pricing rule; 10. Answering the critics of efficient component-pricing; 11. The equivalence rule; 12. TSLRIC pricing and the fallacy of forward-looking costs; 13. Deregulatory takings and efficient capital markets; 14. Limiting principles for stranded cost recovery; 15. Deregulation and managed competition in network industries; 16. The tragedy of the telecommons; References; Indices.

"Sidak and Spulber offer not only a profitable eye-opener of how deregulation of government-sponsored monopolies is a 'taking' of private property from the investors in those firms, but also a well-written analysis of the economics of networking in the modern economy. Every investor in the telecommunications industry would profit from their analysis." Armen A. Alchian, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles

• Preface; 1. The nature of the controversy; 2. Deregulation and network pricing; 3. Quarantines and quagmires; 4. The regulatory contract; 5. Remedies for breach of the regulatory contract; 6. Takings and the property of the regulated utility; 7. Just compensation for deregulatory takings; 8. The efficient component-pricing rule; 9. The market-determined efficient component-pricing rule; 10. Answering the critics of efficient component-pricing; 11. The equivalence rule; 12. TSLRIC pricing and the fallacy of forward-looking costs; 13. Deregulatory takings and efficient capital markets; 14. Limiting principles for stranded cost recovery; 15. Deregulation and managed competition in network industries; 16. The tragedy of the telecommons; References; Indices.

"Sidak and Spulber offer not only a profitable eye-opener of how deregulation of government-sponsored monopolies is a 'taking' of private property from the investors in those firms, but also a well-written analysis of the economics of networking in the modern economy. Every investor in the telecommunications industry would profit from their analysis." Armen A. Alchian, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles

• Preface; 1. The nature of the controversy; 2. Deregulation and network pricing; 3. Quarantines and quagmires; 4. The regulatory contract; 5. Remedies for breach of the regulatory contract; 6. Takings and the property of the regulated utility; 7. Just compensation for deregulatory takings; 8. The efficient component-pricing rule; 9. The market-determined efficient component-pricing rule; 10. Answering the critics of efficient component-pricing; 11. The equivalence rule; 12. TSLRIC pricing and the fallacy of forward-looking costs; 13. Deregulatory takings and efficient capital markets; 14. Limiting principles for stranded cost recovery; 15. Deregulation and managed competition in network industries; 16. The tragedy of the telecommons; References; Indices.