Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract

The Competitive Transformation of Network Industries in the United States

AvJ. Gregory Sidak,Daniel F. Spulber

Häftad, Engelska, 1998

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Beskrivning

This 1998 book addresses deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy the value of private property in network industries without any accompanying payment of just compensation, policies that are termed 'deregulatory takings'. The authors further consider the problem of renegotiation of the regulatory contract, which changes the terms and conditions of operation of utility companies. They argue that constitutional protections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for contractual breach, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of the network industries. The benefits of competition do not stem from government regulations that redistribute income from utility investors to customers, nor do such benefits stem from regulatory policies for network access that promote free riding on incumbent facilities by entrants. Such actions represent a new version of increased regulation, not deregulation.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1998-10-13
Mått:161 x 235 x 41 mm
Vikt:1 027 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:656
Upplaga:3002
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521658713

Utforska kategorier

Mikroekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Recensioner i media

"Sidak and Spulber offer not only a profitable eye-opener of how deregulation of government-sponsored monopolies is a 'taking' of private property from the investors in those firms, but also a well-written analysis of the economics of networking in the modern economy. Every investor in the telecommunications industry would profit from their analysis." Armen A. Alchian, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles

Innehållsförteckning

Preface; 1. The nature of the controversy; 2. Deregulation and network pricing; 3. Quarantines and quagmires; 4. The regulatory contract; 5. Remedies for breach of the regulatory contract; 6. Takings and the property of the regulated utility; 7. Just compensation for deregulatory takings; 8. The efficient component-pricing rule; 9. The market-determined efficient component-pricing rule; 10. Answering the critics of efficient component-pricing; 11. The equivalence rule; 12. TSLRIC pricing and the fallacy of forward-looking costs; 13. Deregulatory takings and efficient capital markets; 14. Limiting principles for stranded cost recovery; 15. Deregulation and managed competition in network industries; 16. The tragedy of the telecommons; References; Indices.