Jesper Ryberg – författare

Most people assume that criminal offenders have only been convicted of a single crime. However, in reality almost half of offenders stand to be sentenced for more than one crime.The high proportion of multiple crime offenders poses a number of practical and theoretical challenges for the criminal justice system. For instance, how should courts punish multiple offenders relative to individuals who have been sentenced for a single crime? How should they be punished relative to each other? Sentencing for Multiple Crimes discusses these questions from the perspective of several legal theories. This volume considers questions such as the proportionality of the crimes committed, the temporal span between the crimes, and the relationship between theories about the punitive treatment of recidivists and multiple offenders. Contributors from around the world and in the fields of legal theory, philosophy, and psychology offer their perspectives to the volume. A comprehensive examination of the dynamics involved with sentencing multiple offenders has the potential to be a powerful tool for legal scholars and professionals, particularly given the practical importance of the topic and the relative dearth of research about punishment of multiple offense cases.

Advances in new neuroscientific research tools and technologies have not only led to new insight into the processes of the human brain, they have also refined and provided genuinely new ways of modifying and manipulating the human brain. The aspiration of such interventions is to affect conative, cognitive, and affective brain processes associated with emotional regulation, empathy, and moral judgment. Can the use of neuroscientific technologies for influencing the human functioning brain as a means of preventing offenders from engaging in future criminal conduct be justified? In Neurointerventions, Crime, and Punishment, Jesper Ryberg considers various ethical challenges surrounding this question. More precisely, he provides a framework for considering neuroethical issues within the criminal justice system and examines a set of procedures which the criminal justice system relies on to deal with criminal offending. To do this, Ryberg addresses the following questions, among others: Is it morally acceptable to offer more lenient sentences to offenders in return for participation in neuroscientific treatment programs? Or would such offers be unacceptably coercive? Is it possible to administer neurointerventions as a type of punishment? Would it be acceptable for physicians to participate in the administration of neurointerventions on offenders? What is the moral significance of the sordid history of brain interventions for the present or future use of such treatment options? As rehabilitation comes back into fashion after many decades and as neuroscientific knowledge and technology advance rapidly, these intricate and controversial topics become increasingly more urgent. Ryberg argues that many of the in-principle objections to neuroscientific treatment are premature, but given the way criminal justice systems currently function, such treatment methods should not be put into practice.

The first collective work devoted exclusively to the ethical and penal theoretical considerations of the use of artificial intelligence at sentencingIs it morally acceptable to use artificial intelligence (AI) in the determination of sentences on those who have broken the law? If so, how should such algorithms be used--and what are the consequences?Jesper Ryberg and Julian V. Roberts bring together leading experts to answer these questions. Sentencing and Artificial Intelligence investigates to what extent, and under which conditions, justice and the social good may be promoted by allocating parts of the most important task of the criminal court--that of determining legal punishment--to computerized sentencing algorithms. The introduction of an AI-based sentencing system could save significant resources and increase consistency across jurisdictions. But it could also reproduce historical biases, decrease transparency in decision-making, and undermine trust in the justice system. Dealing with a wide-range of pertinent issues including the transparency of algorithmic-based decision-making, the fairness and morality of algorithmic sentencing decisions, and potential discrimination as a result of these practices, this volume offers avaluable insight on the future of sentencing.

Should public opinion determine--or even influence--sentencing policy and practice? Should the punishment of criminal offenders reflect what the public regards as appropriate? These deceptively simple questions conceal complex theoretical and methodological challenges to the administration of punishment. In the West, politicians have often answered these questions in the affirmative; penal reforms have been justified with direct reference to the attitudes of the public. This is why the contention that politicians should bridge the gap between the public and criminal justice practice has widespread resonance. Criminal law scholars, for their part, have often been more reluctant to accept public input in penal practice, and some have even held that the idea of consulting public opinion constitutes a populist approach to punishment. The purpose of this book is to examine the moral significance of public opinion for penal theory and practice. For the first time in a single volume the editors, Jesper Ryberg and Julian V. Roberts, have assembled a number of respected criminologists, philosphers, and legal theorists to address the various aspects of why and how public opinion should be reflected in the way the criminal justice system deals with criminals. The chapters address the myriad complexities surrounding this issue by first weighing the justifications for incorporating public views into punishment practices and then considering the various ways this might be achieved through juries, prosecutors, restoratifve justice programs, and other means.

While increasing attention has been directed to the legal and criminological aspects of situational crime prevention, focused ethical discussion of the measures involved has been notable by its absence. Situational crime prevention measures are being used increasingly in various forms in cities all around the world. This book addresses the complex ethical challenges related to preventive exclusion that have only been addressed in a limited way in the academic literature.This volume brings together world-leading experts in ethics and penal theory to answer controversial questions about the ethics of preventing crime by exclusion. Situational crime prevention measures—such as gated communities, hostile design, or annoying music or noise—intended to exclude some or all people from an area to prevent crime present important ethical questions. Is the use of exclusionary measures antithetical to the attainment of social justice or to addressing the root causes of crime? If such measures result merely in the displacement of crime, does this mean they are without value, or morally questionable? What are the conceptual relationships between exclusionary measures, civic trust, and moral agency? Do some or all exclusionary measures fail to respect potential offenders as rational agents? When, if ever, is the use of exclusion to prevent crime discriminatory? And do such measures have a morally problematic expressive dimension?This book is invaluable for scholars with an interest in crime prevention, criminal law, and criminal justice. The practical implications will also appeal to practitioners in the criminal justice system involved in the implementation and administration of preventive exclusion.

While increasing attention has been directed to the legal and criminological aspects of situational crime prevention, focused ethical discussion of the measures involved has been notable by its absence. Situational crime prevention measures are being used increasingly in various forms in cities all around the world. This book addresses the complex ethical challenges related to preventive exclusion that have only been addressed in a limited way in the academic literature.This volume brings together world-leading experts in ethics and penal theory to answer controversial questions about the ethics of preventing crime by exclusion. Situational crime prevention measures—such as gated communities, hostile design, or annoying music or noise—intended to exclude some or all people from an area to prevent crime present important ethical questions. Is the use of exclusionary measures antithetical to the attainment of social justice or to addressing the root causes of crime? If such measures result merely in the displacement of crime, does this mean they are without value, or morally questionable? What are the conceptual relationships between exclusionary measures, civic trust, and moral agency? Do some or all exclusionary measures fail to respect potential offenders as rational agents? When, if ever, is the use of exclusion to prevent crime discriminatory? And do such measures have a morally problematic expressive dimension?This book is invaluable for scholars with an interest in crime prevention, criminal law, and criminal justice. The practical implications will also appeal to practitioners in the criminal justice system involved in the implementation and administration of preventive exclusion.

Most people (including moral philosophers), when faced with the fact that some of their cherished moral views lead up to the Repugnant Conclusion, feel that they have to revise their moral outlook. However, it is a moot question as to how this should be done. It is not an easy thing to say how one should avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, without having to face even more serious implications from one's basic moral outlook. Several such attempts are presented in this volume. This is the first volume devoted entirely to the cardinal problem of modern population ethics, known as 'The Repugnant Conclusion'.This book is a must for (moral) philosophers with an interest in population ethics.

The philosophical discussion of state punishment is well on in years. In contrast with a large number of ethical problems which are concerned with right and wrong in relation to a narrowly specified area of human life and practice and which hav- at least since the early 70’s - been regarded as a legitimate part of philosophical thinking constituting the area of applied ethics, reflections on punishment can be traced much further back in the history of western philosophy. This is not surprising. That the stately mandated infliction of death, suffering, or deprivation on citizens should be met with hesitation - from which ethical reflections may depar- seems obvious. Such a practice certainly calls for some persuasive justification. It is therefore natural that reflective minds have for a long time devoted attention to punishment and that the question of how a penal system can be justified has constituted the central question in philosophical discussion. Though it would certainly be an exaggeration to claim that the justification question is the only aspect of punishment with which philosophers have been concerned, there has in most periods been a clear tendency to regard this as the cardinal issue. Comparatively much less attention has been devoted to the more precise questions of how, and how much, criminals should be punished for their respective wrong-doings. This may, of course, be due to several reasons.

Predictive Sentencing addresses the role of risk assessment in contemporary sentencing practices. Predictive sentencing has become so deeply ingrained in Western criminal justice decision-making that despite early ethical discussions about selective incapacitation, it currently attracts little critique. Nor has it been subjected to a thorough normative and empirical scrutiny. This is problematic since much current policy and practice concerning risk predictions is inconsistent with mainstream theories of punishment. Moreover, predictive sentencing exacerbates discrimination and disparity in sentencing. Although structured risk assessments may have replaced ‘gut feelings’, and have now been systematically implemented in Western justice systems, the fundamental issues and questions that surround the use of risk assessment instruments at sentencing remain unresolved. This volume critically evaluates these issues and will be of great interest to scholars of criminal justice and criminology.

Predictive Sentencing addresses the role of risk assessment in contemporary sentencing practices. Predictive sentencing has become so deeply ingrained in Western criminal justice decision-making that despite early ethical discussions about selective incapacitation, it currently attracts little critique. Nor has it been subjected to a thorough normative and empirical scrutiny. This is problematic since much current policy and practice concerning risk predictions is inconsistent with mainstream theories of punishment. Moreover, predictive sentencing exacerbates discrimination and disparity in sentencing. Although structured risk assessments may have replaced ‘gut feelings’, and have now been systematically implemented in Western justice systems, the fundamental issues and questions that surround the use of risk assessment instruments at sentencing remain unresolved. This volume critically evaluates these issues and will be of great interest to scholars of criminal justice and criminology.

This book addresses the fundamental ethical and legal aspects, penal consequences, and social context arising from a citizen’s acceptance of guilt. The focus is upon sentencing people who have pleaded guilty; in short, post-adjudication, rather than issues arising from discussions in the pretrial phase of the criminal process.The vast majority of defendants across all common law jurisdictions plead guilty and as a result receive a reduced sentence. Concessions by a defendant attract more lenient State punishment in all western legal systems. The concession is significant: At a stroke, a guilty plea relieves the State of the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and in open court. Plea-based sentencing has become even more visible in recent years.The book provides insightful commentary on the following questions: - If an individual voluntarily accepts guilt, should the State receive this plea without further investigation or any disinterested adjudication?- Is it ethically acceptable to allow suspects and defendants, to self-convict in this manner, without independent confirmation and evidence to support a conviction? - If it is acceptable, what is the appropriate State response to such offenders?- If the defendant is detained pretrial, the ability to secure release in return for a plea may be particularly enticing. Might it be too enticing, resulting in wrongful convictions?

This book addresses the fundamental ethical and legal aspects, penal consequences, and social context arising from a citizen’s acceptance of guilt. The focus is upon sentencing people who have pleaded guilty; in short, post-adjudication, rather than issues arising from discussions in the pretrial phase of the criminal process.The vast majority of defendants across all common law jurisdictions plead guilty and as a result receive a reduced sentence. Concessions by a defendant attract more lenient State punishment in all western legal systems. The concession is significant: At a stroke, a guilty plea relieves the State of the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and in open court. Plea-based sentencing has become even more visible in recent years.The book provides insightful commentary on the following questions: - If an individual voluntarily accepts guilt, should the State receive this plea without further investigation or any disinterested adjudication?- Is it ethically acceptable to allow suspects and defendants, to self-convict in this manner, without independent confirmation and evidence to support a conviction? - If it is acceptable, what is the appropriate State response to such offenders?- If the defendant is detained pretrial, the ability to secure release in return for a plea may be particularly enticing. Might it be too enticing, resulting in wrongful convictions?

This volume explores ethical aspects relating to claims for mitigation arising from culpable state action (or inaction). It answers the important and controversial question: to what extent should the state mitigate sentencing for defendants who have been victims of state misconduct?The volume explores the normative justifications for mitigation and answers many intriguing questions. For example, in terms of the procedural challenges, should the offender have to prove a causal link between state wrongdoing or neglect and the offending? Can a court take judicial notice of state-induced social adversity and apply this consideration to all affected offenders? Other questions relate to the implications for courts and sentencing commissions which issue guidance to courts regarding mitigation at sentencing. To what extent is the offender less culpable as a result of state misconduct, and what are the limits of any resulting sentence reductions? Do sentence reductions for state misconduct undermine proportionality, or deprecate the seriousness of the impact on the victim of crime? Should this factor be included in any sentencing guidelines or possibly even as a statutory mitigating factor? Each contribution explores a distinct, cross-jurisdictional claim for mitigation on the basis of State negligence or misconduct towards the offender. The chapters all address the appropriate response of courts at sentencing.

This volume explores ethical aspects relating to claims for mitigation arising from culpable state action (or inaction). It answers the important and controversial question: to what extent should the state mitigate sentencing for defendants who have been victims of state misconduct?The volume explores the normative justifications for mitigation and answers many intriguing questions. For example, in terms of the procedural challenges, should the offender have to prove a causal link between state wrongdoing or neglect and the offending? Can a court take judicial notice of state-induced social adversity and apply this consideration to all affected offenders? Other questions relate to the implications for courts and sentencing commissions which issue guidance to courts regarding mitigation at sentencing. To what extent is the offender less culpable as a result of state misconduct, and what are the limits of any resulting sentence reductions? Do sentence reductions for state misconduct undermine proportionality, or deprecate the seriousness of the impact on the victim of crime? Should this factor be included in any sentencing guidelines or possibly even as a statutory mitigating factor? Each contribution explores a distinct, cross-jurisdictional claim for mitigation on the basis of State negligence or misconduct towards the offender. The chapters all address the appropriate response of courts at sentencing.

Most people (including moral philosophers), when faced with the fact that some of their cherished moral views lead up to the Repugnant Conclusion, feel that they have to revise their moral outlook. However, it is a moot question as to how this should be done. It is not an easy thing to say how one should avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, without having to face even more serious implications from one's basic moral outlook. Several such attempts are presented in this volume. This is the first volume devoted entirely to the cardinal problem of modern population ethics, known as 'The Repugnant Conclusion'.This book is a must for (moral) philosophers with an interest in population ethics.