Lorenz Kruger – författare
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11 produkter
11 produkter
Del 12 - Ideas in Context
The Empire of Chance
How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life
Häftad, Engelska, 1990
354 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
The Empire of Chance tells how quantitative ideas of chance transformed the natural and social sciences, as well as daily life over the last three centuries. A continuous narrative connects the earliest application of probability and statistics in gambling and insurance to the most recent forays into law, medicine, polling and baseball. Separate chapters explore the theoretical and methodological impact in biology, physics and psychology. Themes recur - determinism, inference, causality, free will, evidence, the shifting meaning of probability - but in dramatically different disciplinary and historical contexts. In contrast to the literature on the mathematical development of probability and statistics, this book centres on how these technical innovations remade our conceptions of nature, mind and society. Written by an interdisciplinary team of historians and philosophers, this readable, lucid account keeps technical material to an absolute minimum. It is aimed not only at specialists in the history and philosophy of science, but also at the general reader and scholars in other disciplines.
Häftad, Engelska, 1990
856 kr
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Inbunden, Tyska, 1994
1 389 kr
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E-bok
PDF, Tyska, 20181 655 kr
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Del 6 - ISSN
Begriff des Empirismus
Inbunden, Tyska, 1973
2 024 kr
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Inbunden, Engelska, 2005
1 652 kr
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What are the relationships between philosophy and the history of philosophy, the history of science and the philosophy of science? This selection of essays by Lorenz Krüger (1932-1994) presents exemplary studies on the philosophy of John Locke and Immanuel Kant, on the history of physics and on the scope and limitations of scientific explanation, and a realistic understanding of science and truth. In his treatment of leading currents in 20th century philosophy, Krüger presents new and original arguments for a deeper understanding of the continuity and dynamics of the development of scientific theory. These result in significant consequences for the claim of the sciences that they understand reality in a rational manner. The case studies are complemented by fundamental thoughts on the relationship between philosophy, science, and their common history.
E-bok
PDF, Tyska, 20111 849 kr
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E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20121 509 kr
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Wie sind Philosophie und Philosophiegeschichte, Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Wissenschaftstheorie aufeinander bezogen?
Diese Auswahl von Essays von Lorenz Krüger (1932-1994) präsentiert exemplarische Studien zur Philosophie John Lockes und Immanuel Kants, zur Geschichte der Physik, sowie zu den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen wissenschaftlicher Erklärung und einer realistischen Auffassung von Wissenschaft und Wahrheit. In Auseinandersetzung mit führenden philosophischen Richtungen des 20. Jahrhunderts präsentiert Krüger neue und originelle Argumente für ein vertieftes Verständnis von Kontinuität und Dynamik wissenschaftlicher Theorieentwicklung. Daraus ergeben sich bedeutsame Konsequenzen für den Anspruch der Wissenschaften, die Wirklichkeit auf rationale Weise zu verstehen. Die Fallstudien werden ergänzt durch grundsätzliche Überlegungen zum Verhältnis zwischen der Philosophie, den Wissenschaften und ihrer gemeinsamen Geschichte.
Inbunden, Engelska, 1979
1 619 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope for in the justifi cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously.
Häftad, Engelska, 1979
1 619 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope for in the justifi cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20122 049 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a ''conceptual framework'' or ''conceptual scheme'', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope for in the justifi cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously.