This book analyzes the intellectual side of the American war effort against Nazi Germany. It shows how conflicting interpretations of 'the German problem' shaped American warfare and postwar planning. The story of how Americans understood National Socialism in the 1930s and 1940s provides a counter-example to the usual tale of enemy images. The level of German popular support for the Nazi regime, the nature of Nazi war aims, and the postwar prospects of German democratization stood at the center of public and governmental debates. American public perceptions of the Third Reich - based in part on ethnic identification with the Germans - were often forgiving but also ill-informed. This conflicted with the Roosevelt administration's need to create a compelling enemy image. The tension between popular and expert views generated complex and fruitful discussions among America's political and cultural elites and produced insightful, yet contradictory interpretations of Nazism.

This book analyzes the intellectual side of the American war effort against Nazi Germany. It shows how conflicting interpretations of 'the German problem' shaped American warfare and postwar planning. The story of how Americans understood National Socialism in the 1930s and 1940s provides a counter-example to the usual tale of enemy images. The level of German popular support for the Nazi regime, the nature of Nazi war aims, and the postwar prospects of German democratization stood at the center of public and governmental debates. American public perceptions of the Third Reich - based in part on ethnic identification with the Germans - were often forgiving but also ill-informed. This conflicted with the Roosevelt administration's need to create a compelling enemy image. The tension between popular and expert views generated complex and fruitful discussions among America's political and cultural elites and produced insightful, yet contradictory interpretations of Nazism.

the republican party, especially within those groups that supported President Bush. There was a strong backlash in Europe against this more unilateralist and more isolationist foreign policy of the Bush administration. Transatlantic re­ lations went through a difficult phase in the Spring of 2001, each side criti­ cizing the other for doing the wrong thing and for damaging transatlantic re­ lations. In Europe, President Bush was not seen as a world leader, but rather as the governor from Texas. Europeans criticized the Bush administration for not accepting the role as the only remaining superpower and for not accepting the global responsibility linked to being a global power. Transatlantic rela­ tions were at a low point in June of 2001 when President Bush came to Europe the first time. All of that changed overnight with the terror attacks of September 11, 200 I. Millions of Europeans demonstrated their solidarity with the American people. In Berlin, for example, approximately 200,000 people took part in a demonstration in front of the Brandenburg Gate on September 14 to show their solidarity with the American people. International terrorism was the new common challenge. For several months it seemed like the old trans­ atlantic quarrels would be forgotten. There was a new spirit in transatlantic relations, a new commitment to fight common enemies and protect common values. The question was, how long would it last.

This book analyzes the intellectual side of the American war effort against Nazi Germany. It shows how conflicting interpretations of 'the German problem' shaped American warfare and postwar planning. The story of how Americans understood National Socialism in the 1930s and 1940s provides a counter-example to the usual tale of enemy images. The level of German popular support for the Nazi regime, the nature of Nazi war aims, and the postwar prospects of German democratization stood at the center of public and governmental debates. American public perceptions of the Third Reich - based in part on ethnic identification with the Germans - were often forgiving but also ill-informed. This conflicted with the Roosevelt administration's need to create a compelling enemy image. The tension between popular and expert views generated complex and fruitful discussions among America's political and cultural elites and produced insightful, yet contradictory interpretations of Nazism.

This book analyzes the intellectual side of the American war effort against Nazi Germany. It shows how conflicting interpretations of 'the German problem' shaped American warfare and postwar planning. The story of how Americans understood National Socialism in the 1930s and 1940s provides a counter-example to the usual tale of enemy images. The level of German popular support for the Nazi regime, the nature of Nazi war aims, and the postwar prospects of German democratization stood at the center of public and governmental debates. American public perceptions of the Third Reich - based in part on ethnic identification with the Germans - were often forgiving but also ill-informed. This conflicted with the Roosevelt administration's need to create a compelling enemy image. The tension between popular and expert views generated complex and fruitful discussions among America's political and cultural elites and produced insightful, yet contradictory interpretations of Nazism.

the republican party, especially within those groups that supported President Bush. There was a strong backlash in Europe against this more unilateralist and more isolationist foreign policy of the Bush administration. Transatlantic re­ lations went through a difficult phase in the Spring of 2001, each side criti­ cizing the other for doing the wrong thing and for damaging transatlantic re­ lations. In Europe, President Bush was not seen as a world leader, but rather as the governor from Texas. Europeans criticized the Bush administration for not accepting the role as the only remaining superpower and for not accepting the global responsibility linked to being a global power. Transatlantic rela­ tions were at a low point in June of 2001 when President Bush came to Europe the first time. All of that changed overnight with the terror attacks of September 11, 200 I. Millions of Europeans demonstrated their solidarity with the American people. In Berlin, for example, approximately 200,000 people took part in a demonstration in front of the Brandenburg Gate on September 14 to show their solidarity with the American people. International terrorism was the new common challenge. For several months it seemed like the old trans­ atlantic quarrels would be forgotten. There was a new spirit in transatlantic relations, a new commitment to fight common enemies and protect common values. The question was, how long would it last.