Naval Studies Board – författare

To offer security in the maritime domain, governments around the world need the capabilities to directly confront common threats like piracy, drug-trafficking, and illegal immigration. No single navy or nation can do this alone.

Recognizing this new international security landscape, the former Chief of Naval Operations called for a collaborative international approach to maritime security, initially branded the "1,000-ship Navy." This concept envisions U.S. naval forces partnering with multinational, federal, state, local and private sector entities to ensure freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce, and the protection of ocean resources.

This new book from the National Research Council examines the technical and operational implications of the "1,000-ship Navy," as they apply to four levels of cooperative efforts:

Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) is a military option under consideration by the U.S. Department of Defense. This book, the final report from the National Research Council''s Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, analyzes proposed CPGS systems and evaluates the potential role CPGS could play in U.S. defense.

U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike provides near-, mid-, and long-term recommendations for possible CPGS development, addressing the following questions:

Owing to the expansion of network-centric operating concepts across the Department of Defense (DOD) and the growing threat to information and cybersecurity from lone actors, groups of like-minded actors, nation-states, and malicious insiders, information assurance is an area of significant and growing importance and concern. Because of the forward positioning of both the Navy''s afloat and the Marine Corps expeditionary forces, IA issues for naval forces are exacerbated, and are tightly linked to operational success. Broad-based IA success is viewed by the NRC''s Committee on Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces as providing a central underpinning to the DOD''s network-centric operational concept and the Department of the Navy''s (DON''s) FORCEnet operational vision. Accordingly, this report provides a view and analysis of information assurance in the context of naval ''mission assurance''.

Owing to the expansion of network-centric operating concepts across the Department of Defense (DOD) and the growing threat to information and cybersecurity from lone actors, groups of like-minded actors, nation-states, and malicious insiders, information assurance is an area of significant and growing importance and concern. Because of the forward positioning of both the Navy''s afloat and the Marine Corps expeditionary forces, IA issues for naval forces are exacerbated, and are tightly linked to operational success. Broad-based IA success is viewed by the NRC''s Committee on Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces as providing a central underpinning to the DOD''s network-centric operational concept and the Department of the Navy''s (DON''s) FORCEnet operational vision. Accordingly, this report provides a view and analysis of information assurance in the context of naval ''mission assurance''.

In response to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the National Research Council appointed a committee operating under the auspices of the Naval Studies Board to study the national security implications of climate change for U.S. naval forces. In conducting this study, the committee found that even the most moderate current trends in climate, if continued, will present new national security challenges for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. While the timing, degree, and consequences of future climate change impacts remain uncertain, many changes are already underway in regions around the world, such as in the Arctic, and call for action by U.S. naval leadership in response.

The terms of reference (TOR) directed that the study be based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios and other peer-reviewed assessment. Therefore, the committee did not address the science of climate change or challenge the scenarios on which the committee''s findings and recommendations are based. National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces addresses both the near- and long-term implications for U.S. naval forces in each of the four areas of the TOR, and provides corresponding findings and recommendations. This report and its conclusions are organized around six discussion areas—all presented within the context of a changing climate.

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) contracted with the Naval Studies Board (NSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to establish a committee to review ONR''s Air and Surface Weapons Technology (ASWT) program. The committee convened on May 14 and 15, 2002, and reviewed more than 20 science and technology (S&T) efforts that were presented as constituting the ASWT program. The committee then met separately on May 16, 2002, to formulate its findings and recommendations. This report represents the consensus views of the committee and is based on the information presented prior to and at the review, as well as on the committee members'' accumulated experience and expertise in military operations, systems, and technologies.

Knowledge of time is essential to precise knowledge of location, and for this reason the Navy, with its need to navigate on the high seas, has historically played an important role in the development and application of advanced time realization and dissemination technologies. Discoveries coming from basic research funded by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) lie at the heart of today''s highest performance atomic clocks, Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) expertise played a role in developing the space-qualified atomic clocks that enable the Global Positioning System (GPS), and the U.S. Naval Observatory (USNO) maintains and disseminates the standard of time for all of the Department of Defense (DOD). The Navy has made major investments in most aspects of precision time and time interval (PTTI) science and technology, although specific PTTI-related research has also been funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and non-DOD agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of Commerce. Navy funding, largely through ONR, has a history of being an early enabler of key new developments. Judicious funding decisions by the Navy—particularly by ONR program officers—have underpinned most of the major advances in PTTI science and technology (S&T) in the last 50 years.

PTTI is important to modern naval needs, and indeed to all the armed Services, for use in both navigation and communications. Precise time synchronization is needed to efficiently determine the start of a code sequence in secure communications, to perform navigation, and to locate the position of signal emitters. Precise frequency control is required in communications for spectrum utilization and frequency-hopped spread-spectrum techniques. There are many examples of essential military operations that depend on PTTI and could benefit from improvements in PTTI technology. These include:

-GPS clocks and autonomous operations,

-Weapon system four-dimensional coordination,

-GPS antijamming,

-Network-centric warfare, and

-Secure military communications.

This report summarizes that reductions in the size, weight, and power requirements and increases in the ruggedness of PTTI devices without sacrificing performance would put more accurate and precise timekeeping in the hands of the warrior, improving capabilities in all of the above operations.

Sea mines have been important in naval warfare throughout history and continue to be so today. They have caused major damage to naval forces, slowed or stopped naval actions and commercial shipping, and forced the alteration of strategic and tactical plans. The threat posed by sea mines continues, and is increasing, in today''s world of inexpensive advanced electronics, nanotechnology, and multiple potential enemies, some of which are difficult to identify. This report assesses the Department of the Navy''s capabilities for conducting naval mining and countermining sea operations.

At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the National Research Council, under the auspices of the Naval Studies Board, established a committee to assess the Department of the Navy''s current and future naval theater missile defense (TMD) capabilities. The Committee for Naval Forces'' Capability for Theater Missile Defense first convened in April 2000 and met approximately 2 days a month for 8 months. This report is based on the information presented to the committee during that period and on the committee members'' accumulated experience and expertise in military operations, systems, and technologies.

Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities is a study to advise the Department of the Navy regarding its transition strategy to achieve a network-centric naval force through technology application. This report discusses the technical underpinnings needed for a transition to networkcentric forces and capabilities.

The Department of the Navy strives to maintain, through its Office of Naval Research (ONR), a vigorous science and technology (S&T) program in those areas considered critically important to U.S. naval superiority in the maritime environment, including littoral waters and shore regions. In pursuing its S&T investments in such areas, ONR must ensure that (1) a robust U.S. research capability to work on long-term S&T problems in areas of interest to the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense is sustained, (2) an adequate supply of new scientists and engineers in these areas is maintained, and (3) S&T products and processes necessary to ensure future superiority in naval warfare are provided. One of the critical areas for the Department of the Navy is undersea weapons.

An Assessment of Undersea Weapons Science and Technology assesses the health of the existing Navy program in undersea weapons, evaluates the Navy''s research effort to develop the capabilities needed for future undersea weapons, identifies non-Navy-sponsored research and development efforts that might facilitate the development of such advanced weapons capabilities, and makes recommendations to focus the Navy''s research program so that it can meet future needs.

The Department of the Navy maintains a vigorous science and technology (S&T) research program in those areas that are critically important to ensuring U.S. naval superiority in the maritime environment. A number of these areas depend largely on sustained Navy Department investments for their health, strength, and growth. One such area is naval hydromechanics, that is, the study of the hydrodynamic and hydroacoustic performance of Navy ships, submarines, underwater vehicles, and weapons. A fundamental understanding of naval hydromechanics provides direct benefits to naval warfighting capabilities through improvements in the speed, maneuverability, and stealth of naval platforms and weapons.

An Assessment of Naval Hydromechanics Science and Technology is an assessment of S&T research in the area of naval hydromechanics. This report assesses the Navy''s research effort in the area of hydromechanics, identifies non-Navy-sponsored research and development efforts that might facilitate progress in the area, and provides recommendations on how the scope of the Navy''s research program should be focused to meet future objectives.

At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the National Research Council (NRC) conducted a study to determine the technological requirements, operational changes, and combat service support structure necessary to land and support forces ashore under the newly evolving Navy and Marine Corps doctrine. The Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics, operating under the auspices of the NRC''s Naval Studies Board, was appointed to (1) evaluate the packaging, sealift, and distribution network and identify critical nodes and operations that affect timely insertion of fuels, ammunition, water, medical supplies, food, vehicles, and maintenance parts and tool blocks; (2) determine specific changes required to relieve these critical nodes and support forces ashore, from assault through follow-on echelonment; and (3) present implementable changes to existing support systems, and suggest the development of innovative new systems and technologies to land and sustain dispersed units from the shoreline to 200 miles inland.

In the course of its study, the committee soon learned that development of OMFTS is not yet at a stage to allow, directly, detailed answers to many of these questions. As a result, the committee addressed the questions in terms of the major logistics functions of force deployment, force sustainment, and force medical support, and the fundamental logistics issues related to each of these functions.

Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept.

Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces'' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.

To offer security in the maritime domain, governments around the world need the capabilities to directly confront common threats like piracy, drug-trafficking, and illegal immigration. No single navy or nation can do this alone.

Recognizing this new international security landscape, the former Chief of Naval Operations called for a collaborative international approach to maritime security, initially branded the "1,000-ship Navy." This concept envisions U.S. naval forces partnering with multinational, federal, state, local and private sector entities to ensure freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce, and the protection of ocean resources.

This new book from the National Research Council examines the technical and operational implications of the "1,000-ship Navy," as they apply to four levels of cooperative efforts:

FORCEnet is currently defined as the operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age that integrates warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed, combat force that is scalable across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land. Although this definition views FORCEnet as the operational construct and the architectural framework for the entire transformed Navy, some have viewed FORCEnet merely as an information network and the associated FORCEnet architecture merely as an information systems architecture. FORCEnet Implementation Strategy provides advice regarding both the adequacy of this definition and the actions required to implement FORCEnet.

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have been used in military operations for more than 60 years, with torpedoes, cruise missiles, satellites, and target drones being early examples.1 They have also been widely used in the civilian sector—for example, in the disposal of explosives, for work and measurement in radioactive environments, by various offshore industries for both creating and maintaining undersea facilities, for atmospheric and undersea research, and by industry in automated and robotic manufacturing.

Recent military experiences with AVs have consistently demonstrated their value in a wide range of missions, and anticipated developments of AVs hold promise for increasingly significant roles in future naval operations. Advances in AV capabilities are enabled (and limited) by progress in the technologies of computing and robotics, navigation, communications and networking, power sources and propulsion, and materials.

Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations is a forward-looking discussion of the naval operational environment and vision for the Navy and Marine Corps and of naval mission needs and potential applications and limitations of AVs. This report considers the potential of AVs for naval operations, operational needs and technology issues, and opportunities for improved operations.