Norrin M. Ripsman – författare

The chapters that follow are grouped in three sections, corresponding to the three stages of peacemaking: reduction or management of regional conflict; peacemaking or progress toward a peace treaty; and maintenance of bilateral peace and the regionalization of the peace settlement. In each chapter, the contributors consider the five key questions from a variety of methodological, historical, cultural, and empirical perspectives, drawing data from the Pacific, the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The conclusion expands on several themes found in the chapters and proposes an agenda for future research.

This book analyses the near crisis phase of conflict and escalation in world politics.

Time-sensitive disputes between states, and even with violent non-state actors, do not involve significant risk of military escalation, at least in the moment. Investigating how and why some near crises escalate, while others do not, requires an explanation of the different dynamics of international disputes and the policy tools that states and international institutions can employ. This volume examines cases such as Hezbollah’s 2006 cross-border raid, the 2015 Iranian Ballistic Missile Test, and the 1995 Norwegian Black Brant Missile Launch to reveal there is much to be learned about the full process of (de)-escalation once the near crisis stage is included, as well as from cases that did not escalate to crisis. Overall, this volume contributes toward higher levels of understanding about how and why some international conflicts escalate while others do not.

This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, conflict studies, foreign policy and International Relations.

This book analyses the near crisis phase of conflict and escalation in world politics.

Time-sensitive disputes between states, and even with violent non-state actors, do not involve significant risk of military escalation, at least in the moment. Investigating how and why some near crises escalate, while others do not, requires an explanation of the different dynamics of international disputes and the policy tools that states and international institutions can employ. This volume examines cases such as Hezbollah’s 2006 cross-border raid, the 2015 Iranian Ballistic Missile Test, and the 1995 Norwegian Black Brant Missile Launch to reveal there is much to be learned about the full process of (de)-escalation once the near crisis stage is included, as well as from cases that did not escalate to crisis. Overall, this volume contributes toward higher levels of understanding about how and why some international conflicts escalate while others do not.

This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, conflict studies, foreign policy and International Relations.

This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions.

High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic penalties and rewards?

In order to answer these questions, this book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic statecraft poses to the Target’s Strategic Interests (TSI); while the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases, such as Iran and North Korea.

This book will be of much interest to students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international security in general.

This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions.

High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic penalties and rewards?

In order to answer these questions, this book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic statecraft poses to the Target’s Strategic Interests (TSI); while the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases, such as Iran and North Korea.

This book will be of much interest to students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international security in general.