Roberto Di Ceglie – författare

In this book, Roberto Di Ceglie offers an historical, theological, and epistemological investigation exploring how commitments to God and/or the good generate the optimum condition to achieve knowledge. Di Ceglie criticizes the common belief that to attain knowledge, one must always be ready to replace one's convictions with beliefs that appear to be proven. He defends a more comprehensive view, historically exemplified by outstanding Christian thinkers, whereby believers are expected to commit themselves to God and to related beliefs no matter how convincing the evidence contradicting such beliefs appears to be. He also argues that both believers and unbelievers can commit themselves to God and the good, respectively, thereby creating a spiritual turn in epistemology that enables them to generate the best possible condition for conducting rational enquiries and discussion.

In this book, Roberto Di Ceglie offers an historical, theological, and epistemological investigation exploring how commitments to God and/or the good generate the optimum condition to achieve knowledge. Di Ceglie criticizes the common belief that to attain knowledge, one must always be ready to replace one's convictions with beliefs that appear to be proven. He defends a more comprehensive view, historically exemplified by outstanding Christian thinkers, whereby believers are expected to commit themselves to God and to related beliefs no matter how convincing the evidence contradicting such beliefs appears to be. He also argues that both believers and unbelievers can commit themselves to God and the good, respectively, thereby creating a spiritual turn in epistemology that enables them to generate the best possible condition for conducting rational enquiries and discussion.

Traditionally, Christians have viewed unbelief as resulting from moral and/or cognitive shortcomings. However, a recent proposal such as John Schellenberg's 'divine hiddenness argument' for atheism has supported the idea that there is no-fault unbelief. In this Element, the author draws on important insights from medieval Christian thought to argue that both believers and non-believers should stop blaming each other based on mere evidence. Believers may recognise that no-fault unbelief can, in a sense, apply to them, too. They may find it perplexing that they neither believe nor achieve communion with God as much as they would like. Proponents of no-fault unbelief might focus on achieving communion with God rather than solely worrying about absolving themselves of blame. Ultimately, believers and non-believers alike might promote spiritual progress by setting aside the primacy of evidence and committing themselves to God and the good.

Traditionally, Christians have viewed unbelief as resulting from moral and/or cognitive shortcomings. However, a recent proposal such as John Schellenberg's 'divine hiddenness argument' for atheism has supported the idea that there is no-fault unbelief. In this Element, the author draws on important insights from medieval Christian thought to argue that both believers and non-believers should stop blaming each other based on mere evidence. Believers may recognise that no-fault unbelief can, in a sense, apply to them, too. They may find it perplexing that they neither believe nor achieve communion with God as much as they would like. Proponents of no-fault unbelief might focus on achieving communion with God rather than solely worrying about absolving themselves of blame. Ultimately, believers and non-believers alike might promote spiritual progress by setting aside the primacy of evidence and committing themselves to God and the good.

This book offers a new reading of Aquinas’s views on faith. The author argues that the theological nature of faith is crucial to Aquinas’s thought, and that it gives rise to a particular and otherwise incomprehensible relationship with reason.The first part of the book examines various modern and contemporary accounts of the relationship between faith and reason in Aquinas’s thought. The author shows that these accounts are unconvincing because they exhibit what he calls a Lockean view of faith and reason, which maintains that the relationship between faith and reason should be treated only by way of evidence. In other words, the Lockean view ignores the specific nature of the Christian faith and the equally specific way it needs to relate to reason. The second part offers a comprehensive account of Aquinas’s view of faith. It focuses on the way the divine grace and charity shape the relationship between evidence and human will. The final part of the book ties these ideas together to show how Christian faith, with its specifically theological nature, is perfectly compatible with rational debate. It also argues that employing the specificity of faith may constitute the best way to promote autonomous and successful rational investigations.Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Aquinas, philosophy of religion, Christian theology, and medieval philosophy.