Thomas Douglas – författare

Preventing recidivism is one of the aims of criminal justice, yet existing means of pursuing this aim are often poorly effective, highly restrictive of basic freedoms, and significantly harmful. Incarceration, for example, tends to be disruptive of personal relationships and careers, detrimental to physical and mental health, restrictive of freedom of movement, and rarely more than modestly effective at preventing recidivism. Crime-preventing neurointerventions(CPNs) are increasingly being advocated, and there is a growing use of testosterone-lowering agents to prevent recidivism in sexual offenders, and strong political and scientific interest in developing pharmaceutical treatments for psychopathy and anti-social behaviour. Future neuroscientific advancescould yield further CPNs; we could ultimately have at our disposal a range of drugs capable of suppressing violent aggression and it is not difficult to imagine possible applications of such drugs in crime prevention.Neurointerventions hold out the promise of preventing recidivism in ways that are both more effective, and more humane. But should neurointerventions be used in crime prevention? And may the state ever permissibly impose CPNs as part of the criminal justice process, either unconditionally, or as a condition of parole or early release? The use of CPNs raises several ethical concerns, as they could be highly intrusive and may threaten fundamental human values, such as bodily integrityand freedom of thought. In the first book-length treatment of this topic, Treatment for Crime, brings together original contributions from internationally renowned moral and political philosophers to address these questions and consider the possible issues, recognizing how humanity has a track record ofmisguided, harmful and unwarrantedly coercive use of neurotechnological ''solutions'' to criminality.The Engaging Philosophy series is a new forum for collective philosophical engagement with controversial issues in contemporary society.

Preventing recidivism is one of the aims of criminal justice, yet existing means of pursuing this aim are often poorly effective, highly restrictive of basic freedoms, and significantly harmful. Incarceration, for example, tends to be disruptive of personal relationships and careers, detrimental to physical and mental health, restrictive of freedom of movement, and rarely more than modestly effective at preventing recidivism. Crime-preventing neurointerventions(CPNs) are increasingly being advocated, and there is a growing use of testosterone-lowering agents to prevent recidivism in sexual offenders, and strong political and scientific interest in developing pharmaceutical treatments for psychopathy and anti-social behaviour. Future neuroscientific advancescould yield further CPNs; we could ultimately have at our disposal a range of drugs capable of suppressing violent aggression and it is not difficult to imagine possible applications of such drugs in crime prevention.Neurointerventions hold out the promise of preventing recidivism in ways that are both more effective, and more humane. But should neurointerventions be used in crime prevention? And may the state ever permissibly impose CPNs as part of the criminal justice process, either unconditionally, or as a condition of parole or early release? The use of CPNs raises several ethical concerns, as they could be highly intrusive and may threaten fundamental human values, such as bodily integrityand freedom of thought. In the first book-length treatment of this topic, Treatment for Crime, brings together original contributions from internationally renowned moral and political philosophers to address these questions and consider the possible issues, recognizing how humanity has a track record ofmisguided, harmful and unwarrantedly coercive use of neurotechnological ''solutions'' to criminality.The Engaging Philosophy series is a new forum for collective philosophical engagement with controversial issues in contemporary society.

It is widely accepted that we each possess a right against interference with our bodies. In this book, Thomas Douglas argues that we also possess an analogous right against interference with our minds. He defends the existence of this right—both by appealing to intuitions regarding cases and by invoking the notion of self-ownership—and he describes its content and contours. In Douglas' view, the right against mental interference protects us against actions that significantly alter our mental states and operate via processes that are insensitive to the reasons that bear on the mental alteration. The interventions that most obviously infringe the right are 'nonconsensual neurointerventions'—interventions that alter a person's mental states by physically modulating their brain states, and are performed without the target's consent. But Douglas argues that some psychological forms of influence can infringe the right too. Examples include the use of subliminal imagery and conditioning-based interventions, such as the use of loot boxes in computer games. This book contributes both to the increasingly vigorous debate over 'neurorights' and to the wider discussion of the ethics of mental and behavioural influence. Such discussion has traditionally treated manipulation, coercion and persuasion as the most important categories of influence; this volume introduces mental interference as a further category warranting attention.An open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.

Preventing recidivism is one of the aims of criminal justice, yet existing means of pursuing this aim are often poorly effective, highly restrictive of basic freedoms, and significantly harmful. Incarceration, for example, tends to be disruptive of personal relationships and careers, detrimental to physical and mental health, restrictive of freedom of movement, and rarely more than modestly effective at preventing recidivism. Crime-preventing neurointerventions (CPNs) are increasingly being advocated, and there is a growing use of testosterone-lowering agents to prevent recidivism in sexual offenders, and strong political and scientific interest in developing pharmaceutical treatments for psychopathy and anti-social behaviour. Future neuroscientific advances could yield further CPNs; we could ultimately have at our disposal a range of drugs capable of suppressing violent aggression and it is not difficult to imagine possible applications of such drugs in crime prevention. Neurointerventions hold out the promise of preventing recidivism in ways that are both more effective, and more humane. But should neurointerventions be used in crime prevention? And may the state ever permissibly impose CPNs as part of the criminal justice process, either unconditionally, or as a condition of parole or early release? The use of CPNs raises several ethical concerns, as they could be highly intrusive and may threaten fundamental human values, such as bodily integrity and freedom of thought. In the first book-length treatment of this topic, Treatment for Crime, brings together original contributions from internationally renowned moral and political philosophers to address these questions and consider the possible issues, recognizing how humanity has a track record of misguided, harmful and unwarrantedly coercive use of neurotechnological 'solutions' to criminality.The Engaging Philosophy series is a new forum for collective philosophical engagement with controversial issues in contemporary society.

This edited book provides an in-depth examination of the implications of neuroscience for the criminal justice system. It draws together experts from across law, neuroscience, medicine, psychology, criminology, and ethics, and offers an important contribution to current debates at the intersection of these fields. It examines how neuroscience might contribute to fair and more effective criminal justice systems, and how neuroscientific insights and information can be integrated into criminal law in a way that respects fundamental rights and moral values.The book’s first part approaches these questions from a legal perspective, followed by ethical accounts in part two. Its authors address a wide range of topics and approaches: some more theoretical, like those regarding the foundations of punishment; others are more practical, like those concerning the use of brain scans in the courtroom. Together, they illustrate the thoroughly interdisciplinary nature of the debate, in which science, law and ethics are closely intertwined. It will appeal in particular to students and scholars of law, neuroscience, criminology, socio-legal studies and philosophy.Chapter 8 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

This edited book provides an in-depth examination of the implications of neuroscience for the criminal justice system. It draws together experts from across law, neuroscience, medicine, psychology, criminology, and ethics, and offers an important contribution to current debates at the intersection of these fields. It examines how neuroscience might contribute to fair and more effective criminal justice systems, and how neuroscientific insights and information can be integrated into criminal law in a way that respects fundamental rights and moral values.

The book’s first part approaches these questions from a legal perspective, followed by ethical accounts in part two. Its authors address a wide range of topics and approaches: some more theoretical, like those regarding the foundations of punishment; others are more practical, like those concerning the use of brain scans in the courtroom. Together, they illustrate the thoroughly interdisciplinary nature of the debate, in which science, law and ethics are closely intertwined. It will appeal in particular to students and scholars of law, neuroscience, criminology, socio-legal studies and philosophy.

Chapter 8 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

This edited book provides an in-depth examination of the implications of neuroscience for the criminal justice system. It draws together experts from across law, neuroscience, medicine, psychology, criminology, and ethics, and offers an important contribution to current debates at the intersection of these fields. It examines how neuroscience might contribute to fair and more effective criminal justice systems, and how neuroscientific insights and information can be integrated into criminal law in a way that respects fundamental rights and moral values.The book’s first part approaches these questions from a legal perspective, followed by ethical accounts in part two. Its authors address a wide range of topics and approaches: some more theoretical, like those regarding the foundations of punishment; others are more practical, like those concerning the use of brain scans in the courtroom. Together, they illustrate the thoroughly interdisciplinary nature of the debate, in which science, law and ethics are closely intertwined. It will appeal in particular to students and scholars of law, neuroscience, criminology, socio-legal studies and philosophy.Chapter 8 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.