W. Charlton – författare

In the first two books of the Physics Aristotle discusses philosophical issues involved in the investigation of the physical universe. He introduces his distinction between form and matter and his fourfold classification of causes or explanatory factors, and defends teleological explanation. These books therefore form a natural entry into Aristotle's system as a whole, and also occupy an important place in the history of scientific thought. The present volume provides a close literal translation, which can be used by serious students without Greek. The introduction and commentary deal with the interpretation and assessment, from a philosophical standpoint, of what Aristotle says.This translation was first published in 1970.

First published in 1970. What is a work of art? What is the status of things in pictures and books? How are we to distinguish and ascertain the meaning of a literary work at various levels? This book is intended both to introduce the reader to classic philosophical accounts of art and beauty, and to bring out the significance for aesthetics of recent developments in philosophy.

First published in 1970. What is a work of art? What is the status of things in pictures and books? How are we to distinguish and ascertain the meaning of a literary work at various levels? This book is intended both to introduce the reader to classic philosophical accounts of art and beauty, and to bring out the significance for aesthetics of recent developments in philosophy.

In On the Soul 3.1-8, Aristotle first discusses the functions common to all five senses, such as self-awareness, and then moves on to Imagination and Intellect. This commentary on Aristotle''s text has traditionally been ascribed to Philoponus, but William Charlton argues here that it should be ascribed to a later commentator, Stephanus. (The quotation marks used around his name indicate this disputed authorship.) ''Philoponus'' reports the postulation of a special faculty for self-awareness, intended to preserve the unity of the person. He disagrees with ''Simplicius'', the author of another commentary on On the Soul (also available in this series), by insisting that Imagination can apprehend things as true or false, and he disagrees with Aristotle by saying that we are not always free to imagine them otherwise than as they are. On Aristotle''s Active Intellect. ''Philoponus'' surveys different interpretations, but ascribes to Plutarch of Athens, and rejects, the view adopted by the real Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle''s On Intellect that we have innate intellectual knowledge from a previous existence. Instead he takes the view that the Active Intellect enables us to form concepts by abstraction through serving as a model of something already separate from matter. Our commentator further disagrees with the real Philoponus by denying the Idealistic view that Platonic forms are intellects. Charlton sees ''Philoponus'' as the excellent teacher and expositor that Stephanus was said to be.

The earlier part of the commentary by ''Philoponus'' on Aristotle''s On the Soul is translated by William Charlton in another volume in the series. This volume includes the latter part of the commentary along with a translation of Stephanus'' commentary on Aristotle ''s On Interpretation. It thus enables readers to assess for themselves Charlton''s view that the commentary once ascribed to Philoponus should in fact be ascribed to Stephanus. The two treatises of Aristotle here commented on are very different from each other. In On Interpretation Aristotle studies the logic of opposed pairs of statements. It is in this context that Aristotle discusses the nature of language and the implications for determinism of opposed predictions about a future occurrence, such as a sea-battle. And Stephanus, like his predecessor Ammonius, brings in other deterministic arguments not considered by Aristotle (''The Reaper'' and the argument from God''s foreknowledge). In On the Soul 3.9-13, Aristotle introduces a theory of action and motivation and sums up the role of perception in animal life. Despite the differences in subject matter between the two texts, Charlton is able to make a good case for Stephanus'' authorship of both commentaries. He also sees Stephanus as preserving what was valuable from Ammonius'' earlier commentary On Interpretation, while bringing to bear the virtue of greater concision. At the same time, Stephanus reveals his Christian affiliations, in contrast to Ammonius, his pagan predecessor.

In On the Soul 3.1-8, Aristotle first discusses the functions common to all five senses, such as self-awareness, and then moves on to Imagination and Intellect. This commentary on Aristotle's text has traditionally been ascribed to Philoponus, but William Charlton argues here that it should be ascribed to a later commentator, Stephanus. (The quotation marks used around his name indicate this disputed authorship.) 'Philoponus' reports the postulation of a special faculty for self-awareness, intended to preserve the unity of the person. He disagrees with 'Simplicius', the author of another commentary on On the Soul (also available in this series), by insisting that Imagination can apprehend things as true or false, and he disagrees with Aristotle by saying that we are not always free to imagine them otherwise than as they are. On Aristotle's Active Intellect. 'Philoponus' surveys different interpretations, but ascribes to Plutarch of Athens, and rejects, the view adopted by the real Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle's On Intellect that we have innate intellectual knowledge from a previous existence. Instead he takes the view that the Active Intellect enables us to form concepts by abstraction through serving as a model of something already separate from matter. Our commentator further disagrees with the real Philoponus by denying the Idealistic view that Platonic forms are intellects. Charlton sees 'Philoponus' as the excellent teacher and expositor that Stephanus was said to be.