Richard Sorabji – författare

Proclus' On the Existence of Evils is not a commentary, but helps to compensate for the dearth of Neoplatonist ethical commentaries. The central question addressed in the work is: how can there be evil in a providential world? Neoplatonists agree that it cannot be caused by higher and worthier beings. Plotinus had said that evil is matter, which, unlike Aristotle, he collapsed into mere privation or lack, thus reducing its reality. He also protected higher causes from responsibility by saying that evil may result from a combination of goods. Proclus objects: evil is real, and not a privation. Rather, it is a parasite feeding off good. Parasites have no proper cause, and higher beings are thus vindicated as being the causes only of the good off which evil feeds.

This is the second volume of the new Rutgers Lectures in Philosophy series, which publishes lectures of prominent intellectuals and philosophers delivered annually on the Rutgers New Brunswick campus. Sir Richard Sorabji here examines free speech through a historical lens from antiquity up to today. He first traces the concept's origins in ancient India, Rome, and Greece, and follows its evolution through early Christian, medieval, and Arabic philosophy. He then evaluates historical threats to free speech in literary, political, and religious contexts, and various legal constraints that have attempted to protect it. He discusses the tension between the benefits of free speech and its frustations and abuses, and argues for the use of voluntary self-restraint on such speech that frustrates its benefits, citing for example the art identified by Gandhi as "opening ears." Finally, he closes with an analysis of free speech on social media and the abuse of personal data and voter manipulation. With Freedom of Speech and Expression, Sorabji provides a comprehensive overview of the topic informed by his distinct philosophical analysis and perceptive commentary.

Richard Sorabji presents a ground-breaking study of ancient Greek views of the emotions and their influence on subsequent theories and attitudes, pagan and Christian. The key questions are ones that concern everyone: what is emotion, and how does one cope with one's own emotions and establish peace of mind? The central focus of the book is the Stoics, but Sorabji draws on a vast range of texts to give a rich historical survey of how Western thinking about this central aspect of human nature developed. The result is a magisterial work of scholarship which will be fascinating for anyone with an interest in the emotions from a historical or contemporary perspective.

Richard Sorabji presents a fascinating study of Gandhi's philosophy in comparison with Christian and Stoic thought. Sorabji shows that Gandhi was a true philosopher. He not only aimed to give a consistent self-critical rationale for his views, but also thought himself obliged to live by what he taught--something that he had in common with the ancient Greek and Christian ethical traditions. Understanding his philosophy helps with re-assessing the consistency of his positions and life. Gandhi was less influenced by the Stoics than by Socrates, Christ, Christian writers, and Indian thought. But whereas he re-interpreted those, he discovered the congeniality of the Stoics too late to re-process them. They could supply even more of the consistency he sought. He could show them the effect of putting their unrealised ideals into actual practice. They from the Cynics, he from the Bhagavadgita, learnt the indifference of most objectives. But both had to square that with their love for all humans and their political engagement. Indifference was to both a source of freedom. Gandhi was converted to non-violence by Tolstoy's picture of Christ. But he addressed the sacrifice it called for, and called even protective killing violent. He was nonetheless not a pacifist, because he recognized the double-bind of rival duties, and the different duties of different individuals, which was a Stoic theme. For both Gandhi and the Stoics it accompanied doubts about universal rules. Sorabji's expert understanding of these ethical traditions allows him to offer illuminating new perspectives on a key intellectual figure of the modern world, and to show the continuing resonance of ancient philosophical ideas.

Richard Sorabji presents a ground-breaking study of ancient Greek views of the emotions and their influence on subsequent theories and attitudes, pagan and Christian. The central focus of the book is the Stoics, but Sorabji draws on a vast range of texts to give a rich historical survey of how Western thinking about this central aspect of human nature developed.Stoicism is not, Sorabji makes clear, about gritting your teeth. It can successfully banish stress by showing you how to assess your situation differently. But there were rival views, that emotional stress depends on irrational forces in the mind, or, as modern brain research explains, physical forces in the body, so that changing your assessment is only sometimes effective. The debate also concerns the different roles of philosophy, music, and the arts in calming stress.Orthodox Stoics marginalized as mere side-effects the initial agitations which they could not treat. In Christianity we see how one culture can transform another. Sorabji shows how the Christians turned the Stoic theory of initial agitations into a theory of initial temptations and devised new techniques to combat what came to be called the seven cardinal sins.Emotion and Peace of Mind is a magisterial work of scholarship which will be fascinating for anyone with an interest in the emotions from a historical or contemporary perspective.

Richard Sorabji presents a brilliant exploration of the history of our understanding of the self, which has remained elusive and mysterious throughout the spectacular development of human knowledge of the outside world. He ranges from ancient to contemporary thought, Western and Eastern, to reveal and assess the insights of a remarkable variety of thinkers. He discusses a set of topics which are at the heart of our understanding of ourselves: personal identity; memory; the importance of seeing one's life as a whole; the relation between self, intellect, will, and agency; self-awareness; the stream of consciousness; embodiment; death and survival. He rejects the view, found in various philosophical and religious writings, that the self is an illusion, and develops his own original conception of the self as essential to our ownership of our experience and our apprehension of the world.

Richard Sorabji presents a brilliant exploration of the history of our understanding of the self, which has remained elusive and mysterious throughout the spectacular development of human knowledge of the outside world. He ranges from ancient to contemporary thought, Western and Eastern, to reveal and assess the insights of a remarkable variety of thinkers. He discusses a set of topics which are at the heart of our understanding of ourselves: personal identity; memory; the importance of seeing one's life as a whole; the relation between self, intellect, will, and agency; self-awareness; the stream of consciousness; embodiment; death and survival. He rejects the view, found in various philosophical and religious writings, that the self is an illusion, and develops his own original conception of the self as essential to our ownership of our experience and our apprehension of the world.

Richard Sorabji presents a fascinating study of Gandhi's philosophy in comparison with Christian and Stoic thought. Sorabji shows that Gandhi was a true philosopher. He not only aimed to give a consistent self-critical rationale for his views, but also thought himself obliged to live by what he taught--something that he had in common with the ancient Greek and Christian ethical traditions. Understanding his philosophy helps with re-assessing the consistency of his positions and life. Gandhi was less influenced by the Stoics than by Socrates, Christ, Christian writers, and Indian thought. But whereas he re-interpreted those, he discovered the congeniality of the Stoics too late to re-process them. They could supply even more of the consistency he sought. He could show them the effect of putting their unrealised ideals into actual practice. They from the Cynics, he from the Bhagavadgita, learnt the indifference of most objectives. But both had to square that with their love for all humans and their political engagement. Indifference was to both a source of freedom. Gandhi was converted to non-violence by Tolstoy's picture of Christ. But he addressed the sacrifice it called for, and called even protective killing violent. He was nonetheless not a pacifist, because he recognized the double-bind of rival duties, and the different duties of different individuals, which was a Stoic theme. For both Gandhi and the Stoics it accompanied doubts about universal rules. Sorabji's expert understanding of these ethical traditions allows him to offer illuminating new perspectives on a key intellectual figure of the modern world, and to show the continuing resonance of ancient philosophical ideas.

In Moral Conscience through the Ages, Richard Sorabji brings his erudition and philosophical acumen to bear on a fundamental question: what is conscience? Examining the ways we have conceived of that little voice in our heads - our self-directed judge - he teases out its most enduring elements, the aspects that have survived from the Greek playwrights in the fifth century BCE through St Paul, the Church Fathers, Catholics and Protestants, all the way to the 17th centurys political unrest and the critics and champions of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. Sorabji traces a history of conscience over this long period and examines an impressive breadth of recurrent topics: the longing for different kinds of freedom of conscience, the proper limits of freedom itself, protests at consciences being terrorized, dilemmas of conscience, the value of conscience to human beings, its secularization, its reliability, and ways to improve it. These historical issues are alive today, with fresh concerns about topics such as conscientious objection, the force of conscience, or the balance between freedoms of conscience, religion, and speech. The result is a stunningly comprehensive look at a central component of our moral understanding.

"Animals can't construct sentences. Therefore we can eat them." That was the view the Stoics eventually settled for, though they began with Aristotle's much broader claim that animals lack reason. In this book, the author argues that the Western tradition has been rather complacent. St Augustine incorporated the Stoic view into Christianity, but in doing so he took up only half the ancient debate, for there were many philosophers who defended animals. The controversy affected the whole of the philosophy of mind, because if animals are denied reason and belief, we have to redefine not only reason and belief, but perception, emotion, intention, moral responsibility, memory, speech and the power to conceptualize. Sorabji argues that a broader view of ethics is needed than is found either in the ancient opponents of animals, or in their modern defenders.

Aristotle's treatise "De Memoria" is close to theories of memory in the British empiricist tradition. Because of its richness of detail it serves as a good introduction to the topic. This book, first published in 1972, provides a translation of the text which is more faithful to the original than previous ones, together with extensive introduction, summaries and commentary. It has never been superseded. For this second edition of the book, Richard Sorabji has provided a substantial new introduction, taking account of scholarly debate over the intervening thirty years, particularly on the role of mental images in the imagination.

Until the launch of this series nearly twenty years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 AD, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. Over 40 volumes have now appeared in the series, which is planned in some 80 volumes altogether. Syrianus, originally from Alexandria, moved to Athens and became the head of the Academy there after the death of Plutarch of Athens. Syrianus attacked Aristotle in his commentary on Books 13 and 14 of the "Metaphysics", just as his pupil Proclus was to do later in his commentaries on Plato. This is because in "Metaphysics 13-14", Aristotle himself was being thoroughly polemical towards Platonism, in particular against the Academic doctrine of Form-numbers and the whole concept of separable number. In reply, Syrianus gives an account of mathematical number and of geometrical entities, and of how all of these are processed in the mind, which was to influence Proclus and all subsequent Neoplatonists.

Until the launch of this series nearly twenty years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 AD, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. Over 40 volumes have now appeared in the series, which is planned in some 80 volumes altogether. 'The universe is, as it were, one machine, wherein the celestial spheres are analogous to the interlocking wheels and the particular beings are like the things moved by the wheels' and all events are determined by an inescapable necessity. To speak of free choice or self determination is only an illusion we human beings cherish. Thus writes Theodore the engineer to his old friend Proclus. Proclus' reply is one of the most remarkable discussions on fate, providence and free choice in Late Antiquity. It continues a long debate that had started with the first polemics of the Platonists against the Stoic doctrine of determinism. How can there be place for free choice and moral responsibility in a world governed by an unalterable fate?Notwithstanding its great interest, Proclus' treatise has not received the attention it deserves, probably because its text is not very accessible to the modern reader. It has survived only in a Latin medieval translation. This first English translation will bring the arguments he formulates again to the fore.

Themistius' treatment of "Books 5-8" of Aristotle's "Physics" shows this commentator's capacity to identify, isolate and discuss the core ideas in Aristotle's account of change, his theory of the continuum, and his doctrine of the unmoved mover. His paraphrase offered his ancient students, as they will now offer his modern readers, an opportunity to encounter central features of Aristotle's physical theory, synthesized and epitomized in a manner that has always marked Aristotelian exegesis but was raised to a new level by the innovative method of paraphrase pioneered by Themistius. Taking selective but telling account of the earlier Peripatetic tradition (notably Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias), this commentator creates a framework that can still be profitably used by Aristotlian scholars today.

Syrianus, originally from Alexandria, moved to Athens and became the head of the Academy there after the death of Plutarch of Athens. In discussing "Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' 3-4", shows how metaphysics, as a philosophical science, was conceived by the Neoplatonic philosopher of Late Antiquity. The questions raised by Aristotle in "Metaphysics" 3 as to the scope of metaphysics are answered by Syrianus, who also criticizes the alternative answers explored by Aristotle.In presenting "Metaphysics" 4, Syrianus explains in what sense metaphysics deals with 'being as being' and how this includes the essential attributes of being (unity/multiplicity, sameness/difference, etc.), showing also that it comes within the scope of metaphysics to deal with the primary axioms of scientific thought, in particular the Principle of Non-Contradiction, for which Syrianus provides arguments additional to those developed by Aristotle. Syrianus thus reveals how Aristotelian metaphysics was formalized and transformed by a philosophy which found its deepest roots in Pythagoras and Plato.

Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics" elaborates for the first time in the history of Western philosophy the notions of science and the requirements for the distinctive kind of knowledge scientists possess. His model is mathematics and his treatment of science amounts to a philosophical discussion, from the perspective of Aristotelian syllogistic, of mathematical proofs and the principles they are based on. Chapters 1-8 expound the foundations of Aristotle's theory, pointing out the similarities and differences between scientific knowledge and other types of knowledge, establishing the need for basic principles, and identifying the types of principles and the source of necessity associated with scientific facts. Philoponus' massive commentary, the most complete ancient discussion of "Posterior Analytics Book 1", offers uniquely valuable testimony to the way this book was read and understood in late antiquity, as well as providing information on earlier interpretations. Of particular interest is Philoponus' account of scientific principles, which is based not only on Aristotle but also on the Greek mathematical tradition, especially Euclid and his commentator Proclus.

Of Philoponus' commentary on the Meteorology only that on chapters 1-9 and 12 of the first book has been preserved. It is translated in this series in two volumes, the first covering chapters 1-3; the second (this volume) chapters 4-9 and 12. The subjects discussed here include the nature of fiery and light phenomena in the sky, the formation of comets, the Milky Way, the properties of moist exhalation, and the formation of hail. Philoponus pays special attention to the distinction between the apparent and the real among the sky phenomena; he criticises Aristotle's theory of the Milky Way as sublunary, and argues for its origin in the heavenly realm; gives a detailed exposition of Aristotelian theory of antiperistasis, mutual replacement of the hot and the cold, as the mechanism of condensation and related processes. As in the first volume, Philoponus demonstrates scholarly erudition and familiarity with methods and results of post-Aristotelian Greek science. Despite the fragmented state of the work and the genre of commentary, the reader will find the elements of a coherent picture of the cosmos based on a radical re-thinking of Aristotelian meteorology and physics.

Aristotle's Meteorology influenced generations of speculation about the earth sciences, ranging from atmospheric phenomena to earthquakes. The commentary of John Philoponus (6th century AD) on the opening three chapters of Meteorology is here translated for the first time into English by Dr Inna Kupreeva, building on the work of L.G. Westerink. Philoponus, who today is increasingly respected as a philosopher in his own right, here engages critically with Aristotle's views about the building-blocks of our world, its size and relationship to other heavenly bodies, and reception of warmth from the sun. The translation in this volume is accompanied by a detailed introduction, extensive commentary notes and a bibliography.

In the chapters discussed in this section of "Philoponus' Physics commentary" Aristotle explores a range of questions about the basic structure of reality, the nature of prime matter, the principles of change, the relation between form and matter, and the issue of whether things can come into being out of nothing, and if so, in what sense that is true. Philoponus' commentaries do not merely report and explain Aristotle and the other thinkers whom Aristotle is discussing. They are also the philosophical work of an independent thinker in the Neoplatonic tradition. Philoponus has his own, occasionally idiosyncratic, views on a number of important issues, and he sometimes disagrees with other teachers whose views he has encountered perhaps in written texts, and sometimes in oral delivery. A number of distinctive passages of philosophical importance occur in this part of Book 1, in which we see Philoponus at work on issues in physics and cosmology, as well as logic and metaphysics.

The "Posterior Analytics" contains Aristotle's Philosophy of Science. In Book 2, Aristotle asks how the scientist discovers what sort of loss of light constitutes lunar eclipse. The scientist has to discover that the moon's darkening is due to the earth's shadow. Once that defining explanation is known the scientist possesses the full scientific concept of lunar eclipse and can use it to explain other necessary features of the phenomenon. The present commentary, arguably misascribed to Philoponus, offers some interpretations of Aristotle that are unfamiliar nowadays. For example, the scientific concept of a human is acquired from observing particular humans and repeatedly receiving impressions in the sense image or percept and later in the imagination. The impressions received are not only of particular distinctive characteristics, like paleness, but also of universal human characteristics, like rationality. Perception can thus in a sense apprehend universal qualities in the individual as well as particular ones.

The subject of Aristotle's "On the Heavens, Books 3-4", is the four elements of earth, air, fire and water, which exist below the heavens. Book 3, in chapters 1 to 7, frequently criticizes the Presocratic philosophers. Because of this Simplicius' commentary is one of our main sources of quotations of the Presocratics. Mueller's translation gains added importance from its enabling us to see the context which guided Simplicius' selection of Presocratic texts to quote. Simplicius also criticizes the lost commentary of the leading Aristotelian commentator, Alexander, and thereby gives us important information about that work.

Concerning embryos, Porphyry takes an original view on issues that had been left undecided by his teacher Plotinus and earlier by the doctor Galen. What role is played in the development of the embryo by the souls or the natures of the father, of the mother, of the embryo, or of the whole world? Porphyry's detailed answer, in contrast to Aristotle's, gives a significant role to the soul and to the nature of the mother, without, however, abandoning Aristotle's view that the mother supplies no seed. In the fragments of On What is in Our Power, "Porphyry" discusses Plato's idea that we choose each of our incarnations, and so are responsible for what happens in our lives.This volume contains an English translation of the two commentaries, as well as extensive notes, an introduction and a bibliography.

In one of the most original books of late antiquity, "Philoponus" argues for the Christian view that matter can be created by God out of nothing. It needs no prior matter for its creation. At the same time, "Philoponus" transforms Aristotle's conception of prime matter as an incorporeal 'something - I know not what' that serves as the ultimate subject for receiving extension and qualities. On the contrary, says "Philoponus", the ultimate subject is extension. It is three-dimensional extension with its exact dimensions and any qualities unspecified. Moreover, such extension is the defining characteristic of body. Hence, so far from being incorporeal, it is body, and as well as being prime matter, it is form - the form that constitutes body. This uses, but entirely disrupts, Aristotle's conceptual apparatus. Finally, in Aristotle's scheme of categories, this extension is not to be classified under the second category of quantity, but under the first category of substance as a substantial quantity.

Boethius (c. 480-c. 525) wrote his highly influential second commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretationin Latin, but using the style of the Greek commentaries on Aristotle. It was part of his project to bring knowledge of Plato and Aristotle to the Latin-speaking world of his fellow Christians. The project was cruelly interrupted by his execution at the age of about 45, leaving the Latin world under-informed about Greek Philosophy for 700 years. Boethius reveals to us how On Interpretation was understood not only by himself, but also by some of the best Greek interpreters, especially Alexander and Porphyry. Alexander had insisted that its subject was composite thoughts, not composite sentences nor composite things - it is thoughts that are primarily true or false. Although Aristotle's first six chapters define name, verb, sentence, statement, affirmation and negation, Porphyry had claimed that Aristotelians believe in three types of name and verb, written, spoken and mental, in other words a language of the mind.Boethius discusses individuality and ascribes to Aristotle a view that each individual is distinguished by having a composite quality that is not merely unshared, but unshareable. Boethius also discusses why we can still say that the dead Homer is a poet, despite having forbidden us to say that the dead Socrates is either sick or well. But Boethius' most famous contribution is his interpretation of Aristotle's discussion of the threat of that tomorrow's events, for example a sea battle, will have been irrevocable 10,000 years ago, if it was true 10,000 years ago that there would be a sea battle on that day. In Boethius' later "Consolation of Philosophy", written in prison awaiting execution, he offered a seminal conception of eternity to solve the related problem of future events being irrevocable because of God's foreknowledge of them.