Criminal Law Library – serie

The Article 6 fair trial rights are the most heavily-litigated Convention rights before the European Court of Human Rights, generating a large and complex body of case law. With this book, Goss provides an innovative and critical analysis of the European Court’s Article 6 case law.The category of ‘fair trial rights’ includes many component rights. The existing literature tends to chart the law with respect to each of these component rights, one by one. This traditional approach is useful, but it risks artificially isolating the case law in a series of watertight compartments. This book takes a complementary but different approach. Instead of analysing the component rights one by one, it takes a critical look at the case law through a number of ‘cross-cutting’ problems and themes common to all or many of the component rights. For example: how does the Court view its role in Article 6 cases? When will the Court recognise an implied right in Article 6? How does the Court assess Article 6 infringements, and when will the public interest justify an infringement? The book’s case-law-driven approach allows Goss to demonstrate that the European Court's criminal fair trial rights jurisprudence is marked by considerable uncertainty, inconsistency, and incoherence.

This book combines a careful philosophical discussion of the rationale justifying self-defence with a detailed discussion of the range of statutory self-defence requirements, as well as discussions of numerous other relevant issues (i.e. putative self-defense, excessive self-defense, earlier guilt and battered women). The book argues that before formulating definitions for each aspect of self-defence (necessity, proportionality, retreat, immediacy, mental element, etc.) it is imperative to determine the proper rationale for self-defence and, only then to derive the appropriate solutions. The first part contains an in-depth discussion of why society allows a justification for acts but does not excuse the actor from criminal liability, and the author critically analyzes current theories (culpability of the aggressor; autonomy of the attacked person; protection of the social-legal order; balancing interests; choice of the lesser evil) and points out the weaknesses of each theory before proposing a new theory to explain the justification of self-defence. The new theory is that for the full justification of self-defence, a balance of interests must be struck between the expected physical injury to the attacked person and the expected physical injury to the aggressor, as well as the relevant abstract factors: the autonomy of the attacked person, the culpability of the aggressor, and the social-legal order. The author demonstrates how ignoring one or more of these factors leads to erroneous results and how the proposed rationale can be applied to develop solutions to the complex questions raised.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 re-wrote the hearsay evidence rule for the purpose of criminal proceedings, enacting the recommendations of the Law Commission together with some proposals from the Auld Review. In 2008, Professor Spencer wrote a book explaining the new law, intended for practitioners as well as academics. Following the style of his earlier book about the new law on bad character evidence, the core of the hearsay book was a section-by-section commentary on the relevant provisions of the Act, discussing the case law that had interpreted them. Since the appearance of the first edition, the new law on hearsay evidence has been the subject of a spectacular exchange between the UK Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights, the effects of which the Court of Appeal has interpreted in several leading cases. In this new edition, the commentary is revised to take account of these developments. As in the first edition, the commentary is preceded by chapters on the history of the hearsay rule, and the requirements of Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is followed by an appendix containing the text of the statutory provisions and a selection of the leading cases.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 re-wrote the hearsay evidence rule for the purpose of criminal proceedings, enacting the recommendations of the Law Commission together with some proposals from the Auld Review. In 2008, Professor Spencer wrote a book explaining the new law, intended for practitioners as well as academics. Following the style of his earlier book about the new law on bad character evidence, the core of the hearsay book was a section-by-section commentary on the relevant provisions of the Act, discussing the case law that had interpreted them. Since the appearance of the first edition, the new law on hearsay evidence has been the subject of a spectacular exchange between the UK Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights, the effects of which the Court of Appeal has interpreted in several leading cases. In this new edition, the commentary is revised to take account of these developments. As in the first edition, the commentary is preceded by chapters on the history of the hearsay rule, and the requirements of Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is followed by an appendix containing the text of the statutory provisions and a selection of the leading cases.

The privilege against self-incrimination is often represented in the case law of England and Wales as a principle of fundamental importance in the law of criminal procedure and evidence. A logical implication of recognising a privilege against self-incrimination should be that a person is not compellable, on pain of a criminal sanction, to provide information that could reasonably lead to, or increase the likelihood of, her or his prosecution for a criminal offence. Yet there are statutory provisions in England and Wales making it a criminal offence not to provide particular information that, if provided, could be used in a subsequent prosecution of the person providing it. This book examines the operation of the privilege against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings in England and Wales, paying particular attention to the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. Among the questions addressed are how the privilege might be justified, and whether its scope is clarified sufficiently in the relevant case law (does the privilege apply, for example, to pre-existing material?). Consideration is given where appropriate to the treatment of aspects of the privilege in Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, the USA and elsewhere.

The privilege against self-incrimination is often represented in the case law of England and Wales as a principle of fundamental importance in the law of criminal procedure and evidence. A logical implication of recognising a privilege against self-incrimination should be that a person is not compellable, on pain of a criminal sanction, to provide information that could reasonably lead to, or increase the likelihood of, her or his prosecution for a criminal offence. Yet there are statutory provisions in England and Wales making it a criminal offence not to provide particular information that, if provided, could be used in a subsequent prosecution of the person providing it. This book examines the operation of the privilege against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings in England and Wales, paying particular attention to the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. Among the questions addressed are how the privilege might be justified, and whether its scope is clarified sufficiently in the relevant case law (does the privilege apply, for example, to pre-existing material?). Consideration is given where appropriate to the treatment of aspects of the privilege in Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, the USA and elsewhere.

The Article 6 fair trial rights are the most heavily-litigated Convention rights before the European Court of Human Rights, generating a large and complex body of case law. With this book, Goss provides an innovative and critical analysis of the European Court''s Article 6 case law.The category of ''fair trial rights'' includes many component rights. The existing literature tends to chart the law with respect to each of these component rights, one by one. This traditional approach is useful, but it risks artificially isolating the case law in a series of watertight compartments. This book takes a complementary but different approach. Instead of analysing the component rights one by one, it takes a critical look at the case law through a number of ''cross-cutting'' problems and themes common to all or many of the component rights. For example: how does the Court view its role in Article 6 cases? When will the Court recognise an implied right in Article 6? How does the Court assess Article 6 infringements, and when will the public interest justify an infringement? The book''s case-law-driven approach allows Goss to demonstrate that the European Court''s criminal fair trial rights jurisprudence is marked by considerable uncertainty, inconsistency, and incoherence.

The Article 6 fair trial rights are the most heavily-litigated Convention rights before the European Court of Human Rights, generating a large and complex body of case law. With this book, Goss provides an innovative and critical analysis of the European Court''s Article 6 case law.The category of ''fair trial rights'' includes many component rights. The existing literature tends to chart the law with respect to each of these component rights, one by one. This traditional approach is useful, but it risks artificially isolating the case law in a series of watertight compartments. This book takes a complementary but different approach. Instead of analysing the component rights one by one, it takes a critical look at the case law through a number of ''cross-cutting'' problems and themes common to all or many of the component rights. For example: how does the Court view its role in Article 6 cases? When will the Court recognise an implied right in Article 6? How does the Court assess Article 6 infringements, and when will the public interest justify an infringement? The book''s case-law-driven approach allows Goss to demonstrate that the European Court''s criminal fair trial rights jurisprudence is marked by considerable uncertainty, inconsistency, and incoherence.

The privilege against self-incrimination is often represented in the case law of England and Wales as a principle of fundamental importance in the law of criminal procedure and evidence. A logical implication of recognising a privilege against self-incrimination should be that a person is not compellable, on pain of a criminal sanction, to provide information that could reasonably lead to, or increase the likelihood of, her or his prosecution for a criminal offence. Yet there are statutory provisions in England and Wales making it a criminal offence not to provide particular information that, if provided, could be used in a subsequent prosecution of the person providing it. This book examines the operation of the privilege against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings in England and Wales, paying particular attention to the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. Among the questions addressed are how the privilege might be justified, and whether its scope is clarified sufficiently in the relevant case law (does the privilege apply, for example, to pre-existing material?). Consideration is given where appropriate to the treatment of aspects of the privilege in Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, the USA and elsewhere.

This book combines a careful philosophical discussion of the rationale justifying self-defence with a detailed discussion of the range of statutory self-defence requirements, as well as discussions of numerous other relevant issues (i.e. putative self-defense, excessive self-defense, earlier guilt and battered women). The book argues that before formulating definitions for each aspect of self-defence (necessity, proportionality, retreat, immediacy, mental element, etc.) it is imperative to determine the proper rationale for self-defence and, only then to derive the appropriate solutions. The first part contains an in-depth discussion of why society allows a justification for acts but does not excuse the actor from criminal liability, and the author critically analyzes current theories (culpability of the aggressor; autonomy of the attacked person; protection of the social-legal order; balancing interests; choice of the lesser evil) and points out the weaknesses of each theory before proposing a new theory to explain the justification of self-defence.The new theory is that for the full justification of self-defence, a balance of interests must be struck between the expected physical injury to the attacked person and the expected physical injury to the aggressor, as well as the relevant abstract factors: the autonomy of the attacked person, the culpability of the aggressor, and the social-legal order. The author demonstrates how ignoring one or more of these factors leads to erroneous results and how the proposed rationale can be applied to develop solutions to the complex questions raised.

A number of jurisdictions world-wide have changed or are considering changing their homicide laws. Important changes have now been recommended for England and Wales, and these changes are an important focus in the book, which brings together leading experts from jurisdictions across the globe (England and Wales; France; Germany; Scotland; Australia; The United States of America; Canada; Singapore and Malaysia) to examine key aspects of the law of homicide. Key areas examined include the structure of the law of homicide and the meaning of fault elements. For example, the definition of murder, or its equivalent, is very different in France and Germany from the definition used in England and Wales. French law, like the law in a number of American states, ties the definition of murder to the presence or absence of premeditation, unlike the law in England and Wales. Unlike most other jurisdictions, German law makes the killer's motive, such as a sadistic sexual motive, relevant to whether or not he or she committed the worst kind of homicide.England and Wales is in a minority of English-speaking jurisdictions in that it does not employ the concept of 'wicked' recklessness, or of extreme indifference, as a fault element in homicide. Understanding these often subtle differences between the approaches of different jurisdictions to the definition of homicide is an essential aspect of the law reform process, and of legal study and scholarship in the criminal law. Every jurisdiction tries to learn from the experience of others, and this book seeks to make a contribution to that process, as well as providing a lively and informative resource for scholars and students.

The right to a fair trial has become an issue of increasing public concern, following a series of high profile cases such as the Bulger case, Khan (Sultan) and R v DPP ex p Kebilene. In determining the scope of the right, we now increasingly look to the ECHR, but the court has given little guidance, focusing on reconciling procedural rules rather than addressing the broader issues. This book addresses the issue of the meaning of the right by examining the contemporary jurisprudence in the light of a body of historical literature which discusses criminal procedure in a European context. It argues that there is in fact a European criminal procedural tradition which has been neglected in contemporary discussions, and that an understanding of this tradition might illuminate the discussion of fair trial in the contemporary jurisprudence. This challenging new work elucidates the meaning of the fair trial and in doing so challenges the conventional approach to the analysis of criminal procedure as based on the distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial procedural systems. The book is divided into two parts.The first part is dominated by an examination of the fair trial principles in the works of several notable European jurists of the nineteenth century, arguing that their writings were instrumental in the development of the principles underlying the modern conception of criminal proceedings. The second part looks at the fair trials jurisprudence of the ECHR and it is suggested that although the Court has neglected the European tradition, the jurisprudence has nevertheless been influenced, albeit unconsciously, by the institutional principles developed in the nineteenth century.

This book combines a careful philosophical discussion of the rationale justifying self-defence with a detailed discussion of the range of statutory self-defence requirements, as well as discussions of numerous other relevant issues (i.e. putative self-defense, excessive self-defense, earlier guilt and battered women). The book argues that before formulating definitions for each aspect of self-defence (necessity, proportionality, retreat, immediacy, mental element, etc.) it is imperative to determine the proper rationale for self-defence and, only then to derive the appropriate solutions. The first part contains an in-depth discussion of why society allows a justification for acts but does not excuse the actor from criminal liability, and the author critically analyzes current theories (culpability of the aggressor; autonomy of the attacked person; protection of the social-legal order; balancing interests; choice of the lesser evil) and points out the weaknesses of each theory before proposing a new theory to explain the justification of self-defence. The new theory is that for the full justification of self-defence, a balance of interests must be struck between the expected physical injury to the attacked person and the expected physical injury to the aggressor, as well as the relevant abstract factors: the autonomy of the attacked person, the culpability of the aggressor, and the social-legal order. The author demonstrates how ignoring one or more of these factors leads to erroneous results and how the proposed rationale can be applied to develop solutions to the complex questions raised.

The right to a fair trial has become an issue of increasing public concern, following a series of high profile cases such as the Bulger case, Khan (Sultan) and R v DPP ex p Kebilene. In determining the scope of the right, we now increasingly look to the ECHR, but the court has given little guidance, focusing on reconciling procedural rules rather than addressing the broader issues. This book addresses the issue of the meaning of the right by examining the contemporary jurisprudence in the light of a body of historical literature which discusses criminal procedure in a European context. It argues that there is in fact a European criminal procedural tradition which has been neglected in contemporary discussions, and that an understanding of this tradition might illuminate the discussion of fair trial in the contemporary jurisprudence.This challenging new work elucidates the meaning of the fair trial and in doing so challenges the conventional approach to the analysis of criminal procedure as based on the distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial procedural systems. The book is divided into two parts. The first part is dominated by an examination of the fair trial principles in the works of several notable European jurists of the nineteenth century, arguing that their writings were instrumental in the development of the principles underlying the modern conception of criminal proceedings. The second part looks at the fair trials jurisprudence of the ECHR and it is suggested that although the Court has neglected the European tradition, the jurisprudence has nevertheless been influenced, albeit unconsciously, by the institutional principles developed in the nineteenth century.

A number of jurisdictions world-wide have changed or are considering changing their homicide laws. Important changes have now been recommended for England and Wales, and these changes are an important focus in the book, which brings together leading experts from jurisdictions across the globe (England and Wales; France; Germany; Scotland; Australia; The United States of America; Canada; Singapore and Malaysia) to examine key aspects of the law of homicide. Key areas examined include the structure of the law of homicide and the meaning of fault elements. For example, the definition of murder, or its equivalent, is very different in France and Germany from the definition used in England and Wales. French law, like the law in a number of American states, ties the definition of murder to the presence or absence of premeditation, unlike the law in England and Wales. Unlike most other jurisdictions, German law makes the killer''s motive, such as a sadistic sexual motive, relevant to whether or not he or she committed the worst kind of homicide. England and Wales is in a minority of English-speaking jurisdictions in that it does not employ the concept of ''wicked'' recklessness, or of extreme indifference, as a fault element in homicide. Understanding these often subtle differences between the approaches of different jurisdictions to the definition of homicide is an essential aspect of the law reform process, and of legal study and scholarship in the criminal law. Every jurisdiction tries to learn from the experience of others, and this book seeks to make a contribution to that process, as well as providing a lively and informative resource for scholars and students.

The presumption of innocence is universally recognized as a fundamental human right and a core principle in the administration of criminal justice. Nonetheless, statutes creating criminal offences regularly depart from the presumption of innocence by requiring defendants to prove specific matters in order to avoid conviction. Legislatures and courts seek to justify this departure by asserting that the reversal of the burden of proof is necessary to meet the community interest in prosecuting serious crime and maintaining workable criminal sanctions. This book investigates the supposed justifications for limitation of the presumption of innocence. It does so through a comprehensive analysis of the history, rationale and scope of the presumption of innocence. It is argued that the values underlying the presumption of innocence are of such fundamental importance to individual liberty that they cannot be sacrificed on the altar of community interest. In particular, it is argued that a test of ''proportionality'', which seeks to weigh individual rights against the community interest, is inappropriate in the context of the presumption of innocence and that courts ought instead to focus on whether an impugned measure threatens the values which the presumption is designed to protect. The book undertakes a complete and systematic review of the United Kingdom and Strasbourg authority on the presumption of innocence. It also draws upon extensive references to comparative material, both judicial and academic, from the United States, Canada and South Africa.

The last year has seen the largest and most comprehensive reform of Coronial Law since the early nineteenth century. The new Coroners and Justice Act 2009 impacts upon every aspect of the Inquest and this comprehensive new work lays out both the substantive law and new procedure following the recent legislation and authorities.The whole coronial process is laid out in distinct chapters which consider the present and developing law.The book provides practical guidance from the beginning to the end of the process and includes a special chapter on Military inquests, creating an invaluable reference for both the practitioner and student of this fast developing area of law.

Since the first edition of this book - the first on the new system of case management in Crown Courts - much has happened, and the controversial and often misunderstood elements of case management have gradually evolved into a system which now appears to be having its intended effect. This book is designed to provide all those who work in the Crown Courts -judges, administrators, barristers and solicitors - with a one-stop guide to the day-to-day practical problems that arise both before and during trial. In particular it deals with all the problems that pre-trial case management can pose as well as those management type problems that can arise during the course of a trial such as problems with jurors, witnesses and absent defendants. It deals with all the main applications such as bad character disclosure and abuse of process. This is a unique and invaluable work of reference for all lawyers whose work brings them into contact with the Crown Court, as well as students studying for their Bar Finals.

Since the first edition of this book - the first on the new system of case management in Crown Courts - much has happened, and the controversial and often misunderstood elements of case management have gradually evolved into a system which now appears to be having its intended effect. This book is designed to provide all those who work in the Crown Courts -judges, administrators, barristers and solicitors - with a one-stop guide to the day-to-day practical problems that arise both before and during trial. In particular it deals with all the problems that pre-trial case management can pose as well as those management type problems that can arise during the course of a trial such as problems with jurors, witnesses and absent defendants. It deals with all the main applications such as bad character disclosure and abuse of process. This is a unique and invaluable work of reference for all lawyers whose work brings them into contact with the Crown Court, as well as students studying for their Bar Finals.

The presumption of innocence is universally recognized as a fundamental human right and a core principle in the administration of criminal justice. Nonetheless, statutes creating criminal offences regularly depart from the presumption of innocence by requiring defendants to prove specific matters in order to avoid conviction. Legislatures and courts seek to justify this departure by asserting that the reversal of the burden of proof is necessary to meet the community interest in prosecuting serious crime and maintaining workable criminal sanctions. This book investigates the supposed justifications for limitation of the presumption of innocence. It does so through a comprehensive analysis of the history, rationale and scope of the presumption of innocence. It is argued that the values underlying the presumption of innocence are of such fundamental importance to individual liberty that they cannot be sacrificed on the altar of community interest.In particular, it is argued that a test of 'proportionality', which seeks to weigh individual rights against the community interest, is inappropriate in the context of the presumption of innocence and that courts ought instead to focus on whether an impugned measure threatens the values which the presumption is designed to protect. The book undertakes a complete and systematic review of the United Kingdom and Strasbourg authority on the presumption of innocence. It also draws upon extensive references to comparative material, both judicial and academic, from the United States, Canada and South Africa.

The last year has seen the largest and most comprehensive reform of Coronial Law since the early nineteenth century. The new Coroners and Justice Act 2009 impacts upon every aspect of the Inquest and this comprehensive new work lays out both the substantive law and new procedure following the recent legislation and authorities.The whole coronial process is laid out in distinct chapters which consider the present and developing law.The book provides practical guidance from the beginning to the end of the process and includes a special chapter on Military inquests, creating an invaluable reference for both the practitioner and student of this fast developing area of law.

Since the first edition of this book - the first on the new system of case management in Crown Courts - much has happened, and the controversial and often misunderstood elements of case management have gradually evolved into a system which now appears to be having its intended effect. This book is designed to provide all those who work in the Crown Courts -judges, administrators, barristers and solicitors - with a one-stop guide to the day-to-day practical problems that arise both before and during trial. In particular it deals with all the problems that pre-trial case management can pose as well as those management type problems that can arise during the course of a trial such as problems with jurors, witnesses and absent defendants. It deals with all the main applications such as bad character disclosure and abuse of process. This is a unique and invaluable work of reference for all lawyers whose work brings them into contact with the Crown Court, as well as students studying for their Bar Finals.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 re-wrote the hearsay evidence rule for the purpose of criminal proceedings, enacting the recommendations of the Law Commission together with some proposals from the Auld Review. In 2008, Professor Spencer wrote a book explaining the new law, intended for practitioners as well as academics. Following the style of his earlier book about the new law on bad character evidence, the core of the hearsay book was a section-by-section commentary on the relevant provisions of the Act, discussing the case law that had interpreted them. Since the appearance of the first edition, the new law on hearsay evidence has been the subject of a spectacular exchange between the UK Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights, the effects of which the Court of Appeal has interpreted in several leading cases. In this new edition, the commentary is revised to take account of these developments. As in the first edition, the commentary is preceded by chapters on the history of the hearsay rule, and the requirements of Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is followed by an appendix containing the text of the statutory provisions and a selection of the leading cases.