Elements in Indo-Pacific Security – serie

Hedging, not balancing or bandwagoning, is the modal behavior of the non-great powers under uncertainty. Despite its prevalence as a state alignment choice, hedging has remained an undertheorized subject in the study of international relations. This Element presents one of the first theoretical works on strategic hedging in world politics. Tracing the multidisciplinary roots of hedging as an instinctive human behavior, I contend that sovereign actors hedge in ways similar to commodity traders, farmers, fund managers, academic writers, politicians, and individuals in competitive organizations under conditions of high-stakes and high-uncertainties. I then develop a two-level theoretical framework to explain when, how and why states hedge, rather than balance or bandwagon. Using selected Indo-Pacific countries as empirical cases, I conclude that while structural-level conditions largely explain the shifts in alignment decisions (e.g., from non-hedging to hedging, or vice versa), domestic factors explain the variations in hedging choices.

Hedging, not balancing or bandwagoning, is the modal behavior of the non-great powers under uncertainty. Despite its prevalence as a state alignment choice, hedging has remained an undertheorized subject in the study of international relations. This Element presents one of the first theoretical works on strategic hedging in world politics. Tracing the multidisciplinary roots of hedging as an instinctive human behavior, I contend that sovereign actors hedge in ways similar to commodity traders, farmers, fund managers, academic writers, politicians, and individuals in competitive organizations under conditions of high-stakes and high-uncertainties. I then develop a two-level theoretical framework to explain when, how and why states hedge, rather than balance or bandwagon. Using selected Indo-Pacific countries as empirical cases, I conclude that while structural-level conditions largely explain the shifts in alignment decisions (e.g., from non-hedging to hedging, or vice versa), domestic factors explain the variations in hedging choices.

The author presents contrarian arguments contesting mainstream US views on the danger of a Sino-American war over Taiwan's status. They contend that these countries' dispute about Taiwan is motivated by opposing strategic interests and security concerns rather than just, or even mainly, clashing values such as national reunification, sovereignty, democracy, and self-determination. The danger of a Sino-American confrontation has become more elevated recently due to a confluence of several concurrent developments. Despite this increased danger compared to any time since Richard Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, they conclude that war is not imminent or likely-barring extreme hardliners and radical nationalists taking over policymaking in Beijing, Taipei and/or Washington. Despite a rising chorus urging Washington to commit more firmly to Taiwan's defense, they argue that the United States will not likely intervene directly on Taiwan's behalf. Even more controversially, they submit that Beijing will eventually prevail in this dispute.

The author presents contrarian arguments contesting mainstream US views on the danger of a Sino-American war over Taiwan's status. They contend that these countries' dispute about Taiwan is motivated by opposing strategic interests and security concerns rather than just, or even mainly, clashing values such as national reunification, sovereignty, democracy, and self-determination. The danger of a Sino-American confrontation has become more elevated recently due to a confluence of several concurrent developments. Despite this increased danger compared to any time since Richard Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, they conclude that war is not imminent or likely-barring extreme hardliners and radical nationalists taking over policymaking in Beijing, Taipei and/or Washington. Despite a rising chorus urging Washington to commit more firmly to Taiwan's defense, they argue that the United States will not likely intervene directly on Taiwan's behalf. Even more controversially, they submit that Beijing will eventually prevail in this dispute.

What explains change and continuity in Japan's economic statecraft? This Element examines the interplay between factional dynamics in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan's foreign policy through two cases: Japan's unprecedented decision to impose severe sanctions on Russia following its 2022 Ukraine invasion, and its decades-long ASEAN strategy amid political uncertainty and great power competition. The authors find that factional balance or the outsized influence of a large faction facilitates abrupt political-economic shifts, sustained until a similar dynamic triggers correction. Unlike most systems, Japan's intra-party politics do not lead to full leadership turnover, enabling factions to influence policy while empowering non-leadership members to drive change. This dual role strengthens barriers to change, embedding political inertia. Using factional membership data from 1961 to 2024, they argue that factions are a more systematic unit of analysis than political entrepreneurs in understanding the relationship between Japan's domestic politics and foreign policy decisions.

What explains change and continuity in Japan's economic statecraft? This Element examines the interplay between factional dynamics in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan's foreign policy through two cases: Japan's unprecedented decision to impose severe sanctions on Russia following its 2022 Ukraine invasion, and its decades-long ASEAN strategy amid political uncertainty and great power competition. The authors find that factional balance or the outsized influence of a large faction facilitates abrupt political-economic shifts, sustained until a similar dynamic triggers correction. Unlike most systems, Japan's intra-party politics do not lead to full leadership turnover, enabling factions to influence policy while empowering non-leadership members to drive change. This dual role strengthens barriers to change, embedding political inertia. Using factional membership data from 1961 to 2024, they argue that factions are a more systematic unit of analysis than political entrepreneurs in understanding the relationship between Japan's domestic politics and foreign policy decisions.

China's Green Belt and Road Initiative (GBRI) was launched in 2017 to address key criticisms of the original BRI and to better align China's overseas development strategy with the global climate agenda. This research examines whether the GBRI represents a genuine shift in China or just a symbolic gesture, and explores its underlying domestic and international drivers. Specifically, it interrogates three prevailing interpretations of the GBRI: a greenwashing tactic, a geopolitical strategy, and a global climate cooperation effort. Our analysis reveals a more dynamic and nuanced process behind the GBRI's emergence and evolution in China. On the one hand, the initiative is rooted in Chinese green industrialization and globalization, interacting with external opportunities and constraints. On the other hand, the rise of GBRI has elicited diverse responses: while US-aligned countries have imposed barriers, emerging markets, while selectively, have embraced Chinese green energy investments.

China's Green Belt and Road Initiative (GBRI) was launched in 2017 to address key criticisms of the original BRI and to better align China's overseas development strategy with the global climate agenda. This research examines whether the GBRI represents a genuine shift in China or just a symbolic gesture, and explores its underlying domestic and international drivers. Specifically, it interrogates three prevailing interpretations of the GBRI: a greenwashing tactic, a geopolitical strategy, and a global climate cooperation effort. Our analysis reveals a more dynamic and nuanced process behind the GBRI's emergence and evolution in China. On the one hand, the initiative is rooted in Chinese green industrialization and globalization, interacting with external opportunities and constraints. On the other hand, the rise of GBRI has elicited diverse responses: while US-aligned countries have imposed barriers, emerging markets, while selectively, have embraced Chinese green energy investments.

How and why are key Indo-Pacific states adapting respective foreign and defence policies to secure submarine cable networks amid heightened Sino-US network-based competition? States are driven to control submarine cable networks as these infrastructures transmit information between continents and islands, traverse vulnerable maritime zones, and constrict data through limited chokepoints. China's Digital Silk Road has challenged Western submarine cable dominance, prompting a suite of countermeasures by Western states individually and in coalition. This Element posits a nodes-flows-production typology to illustrate how states are attempting to control connectivity nodes, secure transmission flows and dominate production. The analysis highlights how states are pursuing central network positions to mitigate vulnerability - but this structural competition risks enabling weaponisation. This microcosm of network-based competition reveals how the contest to control submarine cable infrastructure is defining contemporary great power rivalry and re-wiring the Indo-Pacific's arteries. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

How and why are key Indo-Pacific states adapting respective foreign and defence policies to secure submarine cable networks amid heightened Sino-US network-based competition? States are driven to control submarine cable networks as these infrastructures transmit information between continents and islands, traverse vulnerable maritime zones, and constrict data through limited chokepoints. China's Digital Silk Road has challenged Western submarine cable dominance, prompting a suite of countermeasures by Western states individually and in coalition. This Element posits a nodes-flows-production typology to illustrate how states are attempting to control connectivity nodes, secure transmission flows and dominate production. The analysis highlights how states are pursuing central network positions to mitigate vulnerability - but this structural competition risks enabling weaponisation. This microcosm of network-based competition reveals how the contest to control submarine cable infrastructure is defining contemporary great power rivalry and re-wiring the Indo-Pacific's arteries. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The extreme instability caused by the interminable war in Ukraine, Sino-American tensions, and Trump's return to power raises an essential question: How can the states of the Global South - particularly those endowed with significant resources and full of ambition - navigate this current global turbulence? Are they succumbing to the logic of bipolarity, or are they escaping from it by amplifying their hedging power, and, in the process, making the international system more multipolar? To answer these key questions, we analyze the strategic behavior of eight states: India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, South Africa, and Brazil. Their selection is based on eight precise metrics. It is these eight key states that we call the Hedgers. They are among the countries of the Global South that have good opportunities to navigate - with some challenges - the troubled environment of what is increasingly difficult to call the 'world order.'

The extreme instability caused by the interminable war in Ukraine, Sino-American tensions, and Trump's return to power raises an essential question: How can the states of the Global South - particularly those endowed with significant resources and full of ambition - navigate this current global turbulence? Are they succumbing to the logic of bipolarity, or are they escaping from it by amplifying their hedging power, and, in the process, making the international system more multipolar? To answer these key questions, we analyze the strategic behavior of eight states: India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, South Africa, and Brazil. Their selection is based on eight precise metrics. It is these eight key states that we call the Hedgers. They are among the countries of the Global South that have good opportunities to navigate - with some challenges - the troubled environment of what is increasingly difficult to call the 'world order.'

Decolonizing Security in East Asia challenges failing sovereign-centric models in the Indo-Pacific. It identifies a 'postcolonial security dilemma' where states camouflage ontological identity anxieties as existential survival discourse to secure Western recognition. The advocacy for an 'Asian NATO' epitomizes this mimicry, institutionalizing rigid binaries that provoke regional friction and invite the very external interventions they claim to deter. While regional groupings such as ASEAN or BRICS attempt to 'delink' from Western hegemony, they often fall into a 'Sovereign Sensibility Trap.' By hyper-fixating on sovereign equality, they ironically reproduce colonial logic, inviting fragmentation and marginalizing local peace. Moving beyond state-centrism, this Element proposes 'pluriversal coexistence' as a radical alternative. Through subaltern sites and grassroots vignettes, it demonstrates how security is found in relational, nonbinary practices rather than rigid borders. This Element provides a transformative framework for moving beyond the colonial architectures currently fracturing East Asian security.

Decolonizing Security in East Asia challenges failing sovereign-centric models in the Indo-Pacific. It identifies a 'postcolonial security dilemma' where states camouflage ontological identity anxieties as existential survival discourse to secure Western recognition. The advocacy for an 'Asian NATO' epitomizes this mimicry, institutionalizing rigid binaries that provoke regional friction and invite the very external interventions they claim to deter. While regional groupings such as ASEAN or BRICS attempt to 'delink' from Western hegemony, they often fall into a 'Sovereign Sensibility Trap.' By hyper-fixating on sovereign equality, they ironically reproduce colonial logic, inviting fragmentation and marginalizing local peace. Moving beyond state-centrism, this Element proposes 'pluriversal coexistence' as a radical alternative. Through subaltern sites and grassroots vignettes, it demonstrates how security is found in relational, nonbinary practices rather than rigid borders. This Element provides a transformative framework for moving beyond the colonial architectures currently fracturing East Asian security.

Since Korean cultural products and entertainers have gained global popularity - the so-called Korean Wave - many studies have regarded the Korean Wave as Korea's soft power. However, the concept of soft power remains contested in the political science literature, particularly because it is difficult to clearly distinguish it from hard power. This Element, therefore, examines whether the Korean Wave can be considered Korea's soft power within the debate surrounding the concept. The findings indicate that the Korean Wave has enhanced Korea's national image and increased trade and international interest in the country. As Korea is not a superpower, this case suggests that soft power can be real without hard power support and that the Korean Wave is Korea's soft power. Nevertheless, due to the limited evidence that the Korean Wave leads to policy changes in other countries, the term "soft power" should be used with caution.

Since Korean cultural products and entertainers have gained global popularity - the so-called Korean Wave - many studies have regarded the Korean Wave as Korea's soft power. However, the concept of soft power remains contested in the political science literature, particularly because it is difficult to clearly distinguish it from hard power. This Element, therefore, examines whether the Korean Wave can be considered Korea's soft power within the debate surrounding the concept. The findings indicate that the Korean Wave has enhanced Korea's national image and increased trade and international interest in the country. As Korea is not a superpower, this case suggests that soft power can be real without hard power support and that the Korean Wave is Korea's soft power. Nevertheless, due to the limited evidence that the Korean Wave leads to policy changes in other countries, the term "soft power" should be used with caution.

Since the 1980s, China has become steadily enmeshed in multilateral international organizations (MIOs). A rich body of rhetoric and behaviour is available to deepen our understanding of why and how Beijing engages with MIOs, additionally allowing a response to the question of whether China's engagement is shifting the global normative landscape in ways that significantly affect the on-going transition in global order. With these aims in mind, this Element first adopts a 'snapshot' macro-analytical perspective that draws on existing scholarship and official documentation to compare two eras of Chinese MIO engagement across several issue areas. The Element next adopts a case-study, process-driven, understanding of China and MIOs, examining the evolution of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It concludes that China, through incremental measures, is fashioning reordering that pushes in similar directions. However, this capacity to effect significant change varies considerably across institutional settings.

Since the 1980s, China has become steadily enmeshed in multilateral international organizations (MIOs). A rich body of rhetoric and behaviour is available to deepen our understanding of why and how Beijing engages with MIOs, additionally allowing a response to the question of whether China's engagement is shifting the global normative landscape in ways that significantly affect the on-going transition in global order. With these aims in mind, this Element first adopts a 'snapshot' macro-analytical perspective that draws on existing scholarship and official documentation to compare two eras of Chinese MIO engagement across several issue areas. The Element next adopts a case-study, process-driven, understanding of China and MIOs, examining the evolution of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It concludes that China, through incremental measures, is fashioning reordering that pushes in similar directions. However, this capacity to effect significant change varies considerably across institutional settings.

How has Indian public opinion toward the United States, China, and Russia/USSR evolved from the 1950s to the present and to what extent does it shape foreign policy? This Element assembles and analyzes more than sixty years of survey data, including newly recovered United States Information Agency-funded polls from the Indian Institute of Public Opinion as well as contemporary nationally representative surveys from Pew, Gallup, and others. The authors use the data to examine long-run trends, short-term reactions to shocks, and the domestic cleavages that structure opinion. They argue that Indian public attitudes are more coherent and responsive to international events than commonly assumed, yet are unequally voiced across socioeconomic groups. The findings speak both to India-specific debates about democracy and foreign policy and to broader international relations theories of public opinion, accountability, and major power politics.