History of Military Aviation – serie

Airpower over the Rhine is a critical new perspective on the air battle between the French Air Force (FAF) and the Luftwaffe in the skies over France during May and June 1940. Why were the French overpowered in the air? What factors led to their defeat? Author James F. Slaughter III examines how each country’s leadership created the circumstances that enabled the Luftwaffe’s victory over the FAF and Germany’s ultimate defeat of France.   Conventional wisdom—especially in the English-speaking world—purports that the FAF was a nonentity whose loss was all but guaranteed. But the FAF did, in fact, show up to fight. With virtually every disadvantage and under impossible conditions, FAF pilots nevertheless managed to land significant blows against the Luftwaffe—far more than they are given credit for today. Slaughter traces this misconception to a largely collaborationist cover-up beginning with the Rion Trials in Vichy France that was then perpetuated by Cold War politics and popular mythology.   Rather than absence or incompetence, the FAF lost due to a series of complex internal conflicts within French leadership, both political and military, that set them up to fail. This work compares and examines six fundamental areas that affected the development of the FAF and the Luftwaffe: aircraft and equipment, the aircraft industries, intelligence, the experiences of the Spanish Civil War, doctrine and training, and politics and air power. It also offers new details about and insights into Pierre Cot, a controversial French politician largely unknown outside France. Airpower over the Rhine explains Cot’s internal and external impact on the development of the French Air Force and details what is known about his apparent efforts to spy for the Soviet Union. Thoroughly researched and compellingly written, this book will appeal to anyone with an interest in World War II.

Airpower in the War against ISIS chronicles the planning and conduct of Operation Inherent Resolve by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) from August 2014 to mid-2018, with a principal focus on the contributions of U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT). Benjamin S. Lambeth contends that the war's costly and excessive duration resulted from CENTCOM's inaccurate assessment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), determining it was simply a resurrected Iraqi insurgency rather than recognizing it as the emerging proto-state that it actually was. This erroneous decision, Lambeth argues, saw the application of an inappropriate counterinsurgency strategy and use of rules of engagement that imposed needless restrictions on the most effective use of the precision air assets at CENTCOM's disposal. The author, through expert analysis of recent history, forcefully argues that CENTCOM erred badly by not using its ample air assets at the outset not merely for supporting Iraq's initially noncombat-ready ground troops but also in an independent and uncompromising strategic interdiction campaign against ISIS's most vital center-of-gravity targets in Syria from the effort's first moments onward.

This illuminating work explores the importance of senior leadership in the development of the British Royal Air Force, focusing on the role of friendship and the influence of personality and character in delivering effective leadership. The lessons have continuing relevance in the exercise of command functions and the role of senior leaders.  More specifically, The Birth of British Airpower explains how Hugh Trenchard, a man with few obvious leadership skills, became a much-loved and inspirational commander who laid the foundations for British airpower on the Western Front in World War I and created the preconditions for the establishment of the world’s first independent air service, the Royal Air Force. It examines how friendship can overcome significant personal and character deficiencies and, by assembling the right senior leadership team, achieve greatness.  Trenchard was a poor public speaker who found it difficult to express himself either in speech or in writing. Fortunately for him, his close relationship with his personal assistant Maurice Baring, an accomplished poet, playwright, and author, provided the emotional and social support that he needed to succeed.  This book also demonstrates that the development of airpower doctrine in World War I was a slow process that owed as much to accident as to careful planning and how air superiority was only achieved by a sustained effort, underpinned by an effective and responsive logistic system. Finally, it explains how the ethos of the post-war air force was built around these experiences, and the collective effort of all those involved in the air war.