Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics - Böcker

If numbers were objects, how could there be human knowledge of number? Numbers are not physical objects: must we conclude that we have a mysterious power of perceiving the abstract realm? Or should we instead conclude that numbers are fictions?This book argues that numbers are not objects: they are magnitude properties. Properties are not fictions and we certainly have scientific knowledge of them. Much is already known about magnitude properties such as inertial mass and electric charge, and much continues to be discovered. The book says the same is true of numbers.In the theory of magnitudes, the categorial distinction between quantity and individual is of central importance, for magnitudes are properties of quantities, not properties of individuals. Quantity entails divisibility, so the logic of quantity needs mereology, the a priori logic of part and whole. The three species of quantity are pluralities, continua and series, and the book presents three variants of mereology, one for each species of quantity. Given Euclid’s axioms of equality, it is possible without the use of set theory to deduce the axioms of the natural, real and ordinal numbers from the respective mereologies of pluralities, continua and series. Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number carries out these deductions, arriving at a metaphysics of number that makes room for our a priori knowledge of mathematical reality.

The cognitive potency of the human mind can be fully appreciated only if it is conceived of as a linguistic mind. This is the starting point of Nikola Kompa’s investigation into the relationship between language and cognition. Underpinned by philosophical ideas from Plato to Ockham, and from Locke to Vygotsky, Kompa uses theories within the philosophy of language, mind, and cognitive science and draws on neuro-psychology and psycholinguistic studies to explore core ideas about language and cognition. How did language transform our ancestors into creatures of considerable cognitive and social accomplishment? How does language augment cognition? Is language only a means of communicating our ideas or is a means of thinking itself? Her study has repercussions for a broad range of questions, from how humans differ from other animals and what a cognitive architecture looks like if it approximates the achievements of the human mind, to questions of education and cross-cultural communication.Theorizing and forming hypotheses about how language and cognition might have coevolved, how the availability of (symbolic) labels enhance various cognitive functions, what the cognitive function of inner speech might be and how inner speech and thought relate to each other, Kompa addresses the perennial philosophical question of what the benefits of having a language might be, and brings into sharper relief the intimate connection between linguistic and other cognitive functions. Informed by recent discussions on language evolution, labels, and inner speech, this timely contribution helps us understand more about how language changes the way we think.

Dolf Rami contributes to contemporary debates about the meaning and reference of proper names by providing an overview of the main challenges and developing a new contextualist account of names.Questions about the use and semantic features of proper names are at the centre of philosophy of language. How does a single proper name refer to the same thing in different contexts of use? What makes a thing a bearer of a proper name? What is their meaning? Guided by these questions, Rami discusses Saul Kripke’s main contributions to the debate and introduces two new ways to capture the rigidity of names, proposing a pluralist version of the causal chain picture. Covering popular contextualist accounts of names, both indexical and variabilist, he presents a use-sensitive alternative based on a semantic comparison between names, pronouns and demonstratives. Extending and applying his approach to a wide variety of uses, including names in fiction, this is a comprehensive explanation of why we should interpret proper names as use-sensitive expressions.

Dolf Rami contributes to contemporary debates about the meaning and reference of proper names by providing an overview of the main challenges and developing a new contextualist account of names.Questions about the use and semantic features of proper names are at the centre of philosophy of language. How does a single proper name refer to the same thing in different contexts of use? What makes a thing a bearer of a proper name? What is their meaning? Guided by these questions, Rami discusses Saul Kripke’s main contributions to the debate and introduces two new ways to capture the rigidity of names, proposing a pluralist version of the causal chain picture. Covering popular contextualist accounts of names, both indexical and variabilist, he presents a use-sensitive alternative based on a semantic comparison between names, pronouns and demonstratives. Extending and applying his approach to a wide variety of uses, including names in fiction, this is a comprehensive explanation of why we should interpret proper names as use-sensitive expressions.

The growing interest in fragmentalism is one of the most exciting trends in philosophy of time and is gradually reshaping the contemporary debate. Providing an extensive interpretation of this view, Samuele Iaquinto and Giuliano Torrengo articulate a novel theory of the passage of time and argue that it is the most effective in vindicating the inherent dynamism of reality. Iaquinto and Torrengo offer the first full-range application of fragmentalism to a number of metaphysical topics, including the open future, causation, the A-theoretic interpretation of special relativity and time travel. The resulting picture, they argue, conveys the potential of a radically new understanding of time.

The growing interest in fragmentalism is one of the most exciting trends in philosophy of time and is gradually reshaping the contemporary debate. Providing an extensive interpretation of this view, Samuele Iaquinto and Giuliano Torrengo articulate a novel theory of the passage of time and argue that it is the most effective in vindicating the inherent dynamism of reality. Iaquinto and Torrengo offer the first full-range application of fragmentalism to a number of metaphysical topics, including the open future, causation, the A-theoretic interpretation of special relativity and time travel. The resulting picture, they argue, conveys the potential of a radically new understanding of time.

Philosophers approach the problem of possibility in two markedly different ways: with reference to worlds, whereby an event is possible if there is a world in which it occurs, and with reference to modal properties, whereby an event is a possible manifestation of a property of some substance or object.Showing how the world-account cannot properly explain the nature of possibilities within worlds, Ferenc Huoranszki argues that the latter approach is more plausible. He develops a theory of contingent possibilities grounded in a distinction between abilities and dispositions as real, first-order modal properties of objects, with fundamentally distinct ontological roles. By understanding abilities as first-order modal properties, and by linking such modal properties to counterfactual conditionals, Huoranszki argues we can distinguish between variably generic or specific abilities and identify more or less abstract possibilities in a world. In doing so, he furthers our understanding of how we reason with possibilities in both ordinary and theoretical contexts. Providing a novel account of dispositions, abilities and their capacity to explain modality, this book advances current debates in contemporary metaphysics.

Philosophers approach the problem of possibility in two markedly different ways: with reference to worlds, whereby an event is possible if there is a world in which it occurs, and with reference to modal properties, whereby an event is a possible manifestation of a property of some substance or object.Showing how the world-account cannot properly explain the nature of possibilities within worlds, Ferenc Huoranszki argues that the latter approach is more plausible. He develops a theory of contingent possibilities grounded in a distinction between abilities and dispositions as real, first-order modal properties of objects, with fundamentally distinct ontological roles. By understanding abilities as first-order modal properties, and by linking such modal properties to counterfactual conditionals, Huoranszki argues we can distinguish between variably generic or specific abilities and identify more or less abstract possibilities in a world. In doing so, he furthers our understanding of how we reason with possibilities in both ordinary and theoretical contexts. Providing a novel account of dispositions, abilities and their capacity to explain modality, this book advances current debates in contemporary metaphysics.

If numbers were objects, how could there be human knowledge of number? Numbers are not physical objects: must we conclude that we have a mysterious power of perceiving the abstract realm? Or should we instead conclude that numbers are fictions?This book argues that numbers are not objects: they are magnitude properties. Properties are not fictions and we certainly have scientific knowledge of them. Much is already known about magnitude properties such as inertial mass and electric charge, and much continues to be discovered. The book says the same is true of numbers.In the theory of magnitudes, the categorial distinction between quantity and individual is of central importance, for magnitudes are properties of quantities, not properties of individuals. Quantity entails divisibility, so the logic of quantity needs mereology, the a priori logic of part and whole. The three species of quantity are pluralities, continua and series, and the book presents three variants of mereology, one for each species of quantity. Given Euclid’s axioms of equality, it is possible without the use of set theory to deduce the axioms of the natural, real and ordinal numbers from the respective mereologies of pluralities, continua and series. Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number carries out these deductions, arriving at a metaphysics of number that makes room for our a priori knowledge of mathematical reality.

Krzysztof Poslajko offers a novel version of an anti-realist view about beliefs, rejecting the extreme proposal of eliminativism that beliefs do not exist. He shows us we should rather say that beliefs exist, but they are not real. Poslajko demonstrates how we might make sense of this idea by providing a unified account of the debates in philosophical psychology. The antirealist view interprets beliefs as being causally irrelevant, that they do not constitute a natural kind, and that their content cannot be naturalized. Exploring the status of folk psychology, Poslajko raises key questions in the analytic metaphysics of mind: Are beliefs real? Do people really possess mental states which are causally efficacious bearers of propositional content? By arguing for the antirealist view and revising our common-sense view about the nature of mind, he makes a compelling case for adopting a pragmatic metaphilosophy when we deal with questions about belief.

Krzysztof Poslajko offers a novel version of an anti-realist view about beliefs, rejecting the extreme proposal of eliminativism that beliefs do not exist. He shows us we should rather say that beliefs exist, but they are not real. Poslajko demonstrates how we might make sense of this idea by providing a unified account of the debates in philosophical psychology. The antirealist view interprets beliefs as being causally irrelevant, that they do not constitute a natural kind, and that their content cannot be naturalized. Exploring the status of folk psychology, Poslajko raises key questions in the analytic metaphysics of mind: Are beliefs real? Do people really possess mental states which are causally efficacious bearers of propositional content? By arguing for the antirealist view and revising our common-sense view about the nature of mind, he makes a compelling case for adopting a pragmatic metaphilosophy when we deal with questions about belief.

The cognitive potency of the human mind can be fully appreciated only if it is conceived of as a linguistic mind. This is the starting point of Nikola Kompa’s investigation into the relationship between language and cognition. Underpinned by philosophical ideas from Plato to Ockham, and from Locke to Vygotsky, Kompa uses theories within the philosophy of language, mind, and cognitive science and draws on neuro-psychology and psycholinguistic studies to explore core ideas about language and cognition. How did language transform our ancestors into creatures of considerable cognitive and social accomplishment? How does language augment cognition? Is language only a means of communicating our ideas or is a means of thinking itself? Her study has repercussions for a broad range of questions, from how humans differ from other animals and what a cognitive architecture looks like if it approximates the achievements of the human mind, to questions of education and cross-cultural communication.Theorizing and forming hypotheses about how language and cognition might have coevolved, how the availability of (symbolic) labels enhance various cognitive functions, what the cognitive function of inner speech might be and how inner speech and thought relate to each other, Kompa addresses the perennial philosophical question of what the benefits of having a language might be, and brings into sharper relief the intimate connection between linguistic and other cognitive functions. Informed by recent discussions on language evolution, labels, and inner speech, this timely contribution helps us understand more about how language changes the way we think.

Uncovering an aspect of Gottlob Frege’s linguistic theorizing that has until now received little attention, this volume offers the first detailed exposition of Frege’s pragmatics. Thorsten Sander explores his views on colouring, side-thoughts, presuppositions, indexicals and illocutionary force and closely relates these to current research in philosophy of language and linguistics.Throughout his career, Frege was concerned with various secondary aspects of meaning. He claims, for instance, that the two words ‘dog’ and ‘cur’ differ not in what he calls sense, but merely in colouring. By contrast, the difference between ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ is supposed to be a matter of sense. How exactly does sense differ from colouring? Frege also claims that by using a proper name one presupposes the existence of its bearer and that our utterances are frequently associated with side-thoughts. What exactly does he mean by these terms, and wherein lies the difference between these phenomena?Frege's Pragmatics answers questions such as these, providing a fresh perspective on Frege’s account of various pragmatic aspects of language. In this first book-length treatment, Sander makes the case that Frege’s groundbreaking ideas are an essential part of his overall philosophical enterprise.

Uncovering an aspect of Gottlob Frege’s linguistic theorizing that has until now received little attention, this volume offers the first detailed exposition of Frege’s pragmatics. Thorsten Sander explores his views on colouring, side-thoughts, presuppositions, indexicals and illocutionary force and closely relates these to current research in philosophy of language and linguistics.Throughout his career, Frege was concerned with various secondary aspects of meaning. He claims, for instance, that the two words ‘dog’ and ‘cur’ differ not in what he calls sense, but merely in colouring. By contrast, the difference between ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ is supposed to be a matter of sense. How exactly does sense differ from colouring? Frege also claims that by using a proper name one presupposes the existence of its bearer and that our utterances are frequently associated with side-thoughts. What exactly does he mean by these terms, and wherein lies the difference between these phenomena?Frege's Pragmatics answers questions such as these, providing a fresh perspective on Frege’s account of various pragmatic aspects of language. In this first book-length treatment, Sander makes the case that Frege’s groundbreaking ideas are an essential part of his overall philosophical enterprise.

What makes time interesting and what is time? Graeme A. Forbes presents a robust defence of the metaphysical asymmetry between past and future, providing a compelling argument for the acceptance of the Growing-Block view.Taking us from the armchair to philosophy of physics, and then out to the human world Forbes considers the ontological questions that have been the focus of most of the literature on the metaphysics of time.Across three parts, he addresses questions central to the philosophy of time. Part I asks why we should think that time does something that space does not; Part II examines why we should think that the past differs in some metaphysically interesting way from the future and Part III shows why we should accept the Growing-Block view – the view on which the past exists, the future doesn’t, and the passage of time is causation bringing about events in accordance with the laws of nature. This wide-ranging and engaging exploration of persistence, experience, agency, and more, makes a radical contribution to our understanding of the philosophy of time.