SUNY series in Ethical Theory – serie

Arguing that a psychological basis for ethics can be found in human motivation, Rethinking Goodness proposes a naturalistic ethics that transcends the conflict between liberalism and authoritarianism-the conflict between freedom at the price of narcissism and morality at the price of coercion. The authors offer a third option, an ethic broader than liberalism's pursuit of the personal, that avoids jeopardizing, as do authoritarian positions, the centrality of individual autonomy.

This book presents a theory of personhood and moral personhood using results from recent work on intentionality in the philosophy of mind. An account of intentional kinds, causation, and explanation is provided to resolve some current issues in moral and legal theory, and to examine questions raised in law and medicine where it is necessary to deal with human individuals at the boundaries of their lives. Topics discussed include abortion, death, euthanasia, personal identity, rights - including the right to privacy and the right to die - servility, and suicide.

As early as 1916, Wittgenstein states that ethics and aesthetics are one, that only through aesthetics and art can what is truly important in human life be shown. This is the first book to clarify Wittgenstein's ideas about ethics and aesthetics, and to illustrate how those ideas apply to art history and criticism. Tilghman shows how a study of Wittgenstein illuminates not only the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, but also the relationship between art and our lives. The result is that we can better understand the human importance of abstract as well as traditional art.Chapter 1 surveys the development of the philosophy of art that has dominated aesthetics since mid-century. Chapter 2 provides a brief history of some of the ways that the relationship between ethics and aesthetics has been considered in the philosophy of art. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss Wittgenstein's views on ethics and aesthetics at the time he wrote Tractatus, and chapter 5 examines the question of what it is to discern the humanity in a person, as reflected in Wittgenstein's later viewpoints found in Philosophical Investigations. Chapters 6 and 7 investigate what it is to discern the art in a work of art, and what it is to discern the humanity in a work of art. These investigations, in turn, lead to some conclusions about the importance of art in people's lives and the failure of much recent aesthetic theory to accommodate art's human importance.

As early as 1916, Wittgenstein states that ethics and aesthetics are one, that only through aesthetics and art can what is truly important in human life be shown. This is the first book to clarify Wittgenstein's ideas about ethics and aesthetics, and to illustrate how those ideas apply to art history and criticism. Tilghman shows how a study of Wittgenstein illuminates not only the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, but also the relationship between art and our lives. The result is that we can better understand the human importance of abstract as well as traditional art.Chapter 1 surveys the development of the philosophy of art that has dominated aesthetics since mid-century. Chapter 2 provides a brief history of some of the ways that the relationship between ethics and aesthetics has been considered in the philosophy of art. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss Wittgenstein's views on ethics and aesthetics at the time he wrote Tractatus, and chapter 5 examines the question of what it is to discern the humanity in a person, as reflected in Wittgenstein's later viewpoints found in Philosophical Investigations. Chapters 6 and 7 investigate what it is to discern the art in a work of art, and what it is to discern the humanity in a work of art. These investigations, in turn, lead to some conclusions about the importance of art in people's lives and the failure of much recent aesthetic theory to accommodate art's human importance.

This book defends the derivation of the ethical principle of universalizability presented by Jürgen Habermas, and illustrates the importance of this principle for both social science and social policy. Beginning with a comprehensive analysis of social theory, Smith divides the theory into nine distinct branches, each devoted to a fundamental question; three branches fall under social science, three under social ethics, and the last three make up social policy. He shows in detail how each branch has its own methodologies and basic categories, while being systematically connected to the others as well. Next, he makes a compelling defense of Habermas's main contribution to social ethics and contrasts Habermas's rational foundation for ethics with the decisionism defended by Max Weber. Smith then examines the implications of the principle of universalizability for a number of important issues in social theory.

This book defends the derivation of the ethical principle of universalizability presented by Jürgen Habermas, and illustrates the importance of this principle for both social science and social policy. Beginning with a comprehensive analysis of social theory, Smith divides the theory into nine distinct branches, each devoted to a fundamental question; three branches fall under social science, three under social ethics, and the last three make up social policy. He shows in detail how each branch has its own methodologies and basic categories, while being systematically connected to the others as well. Next, he makes a compelling defense of Habermas's main contribution to social ethics and contrasts Habermas's rational foundation for ethics with the decisionism defended by Max Weber. Smith then examines the implications of the principle of universalizability for a number of important issues in social theory.

A surprisingly large number of people have denied that it is possible for human moral agents to act in such a way as to go beyond or transcend what moral duty or obligation requires of them. Some of this opposition to the possibility of supererogation, as it is called, has been motivated by theological concerns. This book surveys the concerns of Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon, as they react to certain teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the concerns of several contemporary theologians. It also examines some contemporary philosophers whose concerns have grown out of a commitment to a Kantian, utilitarian, or prescriptive type of ethics and urges that there are valuable lessons to be learned from these theologians and philosophers. At the same time it is argued that some of their concerns are the result of a mistaken idea of what it means to perform an act of supererogation. In addition, it is argued that some of their concerns can be addressed in ways that do not require a denial of the possibility of going beyond the call of duty in human life. This stage of the argument involves a discussion of virtue ethics and an examination of the concept of vocation, particularly as it has developed in Protestant thought, and illustrates the relevance of virtue and vocation to the problem of supererogation.

This book grounds ethics in the capacity for suffering shared by all sentient beings, and sees the avoidance and amelioration of suffering as the prima facie condition of moral interaction. Loewy sees social contract as originating in the original nurturing of individuals, and selfhood and autonomy as emerging in the embrace of beneficence. Communities thus have an implicit obligation to their members, which necessitates a just distribution of resources.

There is a growing need for interventions in ethics to counteract the tendency to generalize about moral issues. This book contains essays, written between 1965 and 1990, which focus on the need to explore such issues as the nature of moral endeavor, the request for a justification of moral endeavor; the appeal to human flourishing; the nature of the good life; the nature of moral change; and moral relativity. The author argues his case in relation to the work of contemporary philosophers including G.E.M. Anscombe, Annette Baier, Max Black, Cora Diamond, Ilham Dilman, Philippa Foot; Thomas Nagel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, and Peter Winch.

In suggesting that general ethics be modeled on legal ethics, this book is a call for more creativity in our moral experience. Luizzi argues that lawyers regularly re-think their roles and the rules related to these roles. Their rejection of a prohibition on advertising, for example, was part of their re-thinking of the traditional view of the lawyer's noble calling, one for whom advertising was inappropriate. What this says for general ethics is that we are to become active participants in defining our roles. Our daily experiences can help us in constructing fresh and better conceptions to guide us.A Case for Legal Ethics rejects fixed conceptions of human nature and extends our constructive efforts beyond specific roles to human nature itself and to our environments. Luizzi appeals to role modeling, both to keep our constructed conceptions within moral bounds, and to develop the literature on moral education. We must be willing for others to imitate us as we live according to the conceptions we construct.

This book presents a thorough and systematic integration of Aristotle's analysis of friendship with the main lines of the rest of his work in Politics and Nicomachean Ethics. The author conveys a clear sense of the continuing illumination that Aristotle's analysis of friendship provides to contemporary ethical theorists and to students of Aristotle. Other Selves speaks to both audiences.

This book presents a thorough and systematic integration of Aristotle's analysis of friendship with the main lines of the rest of his work in Politics and Nicomachean Ethics. The author conveys a clear sense of the continuing illumination that Aristotle's analysis of friendship provides to contemporary ethical theorists and to students of Aristotle. Other Selves speaks to both audiences.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of Kant's treatment of happiness in ethics. It considers the definition of happiness and the possible roles happiness may serve in ethics. It argues against critics who maintain that Kant's deontological ethic rejects happiness and against critics who assert that Kant's ethic is, in fact, consequential and concerned above all with ends such as happiness. By pointing to a system that organizes Kant's various claims about happiness, the book supports the view that happiness has positive roles to play in Kant's ethic.

Imagination and Ethical Ideals is an interdisciplinary work which investigates some of the links between moral philosophy and moral psychology, with implications for both personal ethics and social philosophy. Tierney begins with the argument that the widespread fascination with moral principles has led moral philosophers into a dead end, which is revealed both by their inability to deal with the problem of relativism, and by the felt irrelevancy of moral philosophy to the lives that people are actually striving to lead. He then offers an alternative account of the nature of ethical thought, grounded in a theory of imaginative ethical ideals. A psychological framework for ideals is then developed using the results of contemporary psychoanalysis and psychology, particularly the self psychology of Heinz Kohut.