SUNY series in Ethical Theory - Böcker

Arguing that a psychological basis for ethics can be found in human motivation, Rethinking Goodness proposes a naturalistic ethics that transcends the conflict between liberalism and authoritarianism-the conflict between freedom at the price of narcissism and morality at the price of coercion. The authors offer a third option, an ethic broader than liberalism's pursuit of the personal, that avoids jeopardizing, as do authoritarian positions, the centrality of individual autonomy.

This book presents a theory of personhood and moral personhood using results from recent work on intentionality in the philosophy of mind. An account of intentional kinds, causation, and explanation is provided to resolve some current issues in moral and legal theory, and to examine questions raised in law and medicine where it is necessary to deal with human individuals at the boundaries of their lives. Topics discussed include abortion, death, euthanasia, personal identity, rights - including the right to privacy and the right to die - servility, and suicide.

A surprisingly large number of people have denied that it is possible for human moral agents to act in such a way as to go beyond or transcend what moral duty or obligation requires of them. Some of this opposition to the possibility of supererogation, as it is called, has been motivated by theological concerns. This book surveys the concerns of Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon, as they react to certain teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the concerns of several contemporary theologians. It also examines some contemporary philosophers whose concerns have grown out of a commitment to a Kantian, utilitarian, or prescriptive type of ethics and urges that there are valuable lessons to be learned from these theologians and philosophers. At the same time it is argued that some of their concerns are the result of a mistaken idea of what it means to perform an act of supererogation. In addition, it is argued that some of their concerns can be addressed in ways that do not require a denial of the possibility of going beyond the call of duty in human life. This stage of the argument involves a discussion of virtue ethics and an examination of the concept of vocation, particularly as it has developed in Protestant thought, and illustrates the relevance of virtue and vocation to the problem of supererogation.

This book grounds ethics in the capacity for suffering shared by all sentient beings, and sees the avoidance and amelioration of suffering as the prima facie condition of moral interaction. Loewy sees social contract as originating in the original nurturing of individuals, and selfhood and autonomy as emerging in the embrace of beneficence. Communities thus have an implicit obligation to their members, which necessitates a just distribution of resources.

There is a growing need for interventions in ethics to counteract the tendency to generalize about moral issues. This book contains essays, written between 1965 and 1990, which focus on the need to explore such issues as the nature of moral endeavor, the request for a justification of moral endeavor; the appeal to human flourishing; the nature of the good life; the nature of moral change; and moral relativity. The author argues his case in relation to the work of contemporary philosophers including G.E.M. Anscombe, Annette Baier, Max Black, Cora Diamond, Ilham Dilman, Philippa Foot; Thomas Nagel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, and Peter Winch.