Gregory Mellema – författare

In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema presents a philosophical approach to the moral issues involved in complicity. Starting with a taxonomy of Thomas Aquinas, according to whom there are nine ways for one to become complicit in the wrongdoing of another, Mellema analyzes each kind of complicity and examines the moral status of someone complicit in each of these ways. Mellema's central argument is that one must perform a contributing action to qualify as an accomplice, and that it is always morally blameworthy to perform such an action. Additionally, he argues that an accomplice frequently bears moral responsibility for the outcome of the other's wrongdoing, but he distinguishes this case from cases in which the accomplice is tainted by the wrongdoing of the principal actor. He further distinguishes between enabling, facilitating, and condoning harm, and introduces the concept of indirect complicity. Mellema tackles issues that are clearly important to any case of collective and shared responsibility and yet are rarely discussed in depth, and he always presents his arguments clearly, concisely, and engagingly. His account of the nonmoral as well as moral qualities of complicity in wrongdoing—especially of the many and varied ways in which principles and accomplices can interact—is highly illuminating. Liberally sprinkled with helpful and nuanced examples, Complicity and Moral Accountability vividly illustrates the many ways in which one may be complicit in wrongdoing.

In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema presents a philosophical approach to the moral issues involved in complicity. Starting with a taxonomy of Thomas Aquinas, according to whom there are nine ways for one to become complicit in the wrongdoing of another, Mellema analyzes each kind of complicity and examines the moral status of someone complicit in each of these ways. Mellema's central argument is that one must perform a contributing action to qualify as an accomplice, and that it is always morally blameworthy to perform such an action. Additionally, he argues that an accomplice frequently bears moral responsibility for the outcome of the other's wrongdoing, but he distinguishes this case from cases in which the accomplice is tainted by the wrongdoing of the principal actor. He further distinguishes between enabling, facilitating, and condoning harm, and introduces the concept of indirect complicity. Mellema tackles issues that are clearly important to any case of collective and shared responsibility and yet are rarely discussed in depth, and he always presents his arguments clearly, concisely, and engagingly. His account of the nonmoral as well as moral qualities of complicity in wrongdoing—especially of the many and varied ways in which principles and accomplices can interact—is highly illuminating. Liberally sprinkled with helpful and nuanced examples, Complicity and Moral Accountability vividly illustrates the many ways in which one may be complicit in wrongdoing.

This book brings clarification to our understanding of the nature of sin and will be of interest to nonphilosophers as well as philosophers.Most of the scholarly literature on sin has focused on theological issues, making book-length philosophical treatments of the topic hard to find. Sin, the newest contribution by Gregory Mellema, fills the gap by providing a short and lively summary of what contemporary philosophers are saying about the relationship between the traditional theological category of sin and contemporary philosophical ethics. Mellema brings together contributions by a number of philosophers, including Marilyn Adams, Robert Adams, Rebecca DeYoung, Alvin Plantinga, Michael Rea, Eleonore Stump, and Richard Swinburne, into a coherent discussion that clarifies our understanding of the nature of sin. The topics covered include the doctrine of original sin, accessory sins, mortal (or cardinal) sins, and venial sins. Mellema also examines Islamic codes of ethics, which include a category of acts that are "discouraged," some of which qualify as sins, and the final chapter surveys the teachings of six major world religions concerning sin. The overarching link between the chapters is that sin is fundamentally connected to the subject matter of morality. Analyzing the points of connection is profitable not just to enhance our theoretical understanding of sin but to provide a greater depth of knowledge as to how the moral choices we make can more effectively help us avoid sin and contribute to lives that are satisfying and authentically worthwhile. This concise introduction to sin and moral wrongdoing will have a wide readership and is intended for use in introductory level philosophy, philosophy of religion, or theological ethics courses.

A surprisingly large number of people have denied that it is possible for human moral agents to act in such a way as to go beyond or transcend what moral duty or obligation requires of them. Some of this opposition to the possibility of supererogation, as it is called, has been motivated by theological concerns. This book surveys the concerns of Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon, as they react to certain teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the concerns of several contemporary theologians. It also examines some contemporary philosophers whose concerns have grown out of a commitment to a Kantian, utilitarian, or prescriptive type of ethics and urges that there are valuable lessons to be learned from these theologians and philosophers. At the same time it is argued that some of their concerns are the result of a mistaken idea of what it means to perform an act of supererogation. In addition, it is argued that some of their concerns can be addressed in ways that do not require a denial of the possibility of going beyond the call of duty in human life. This stage of the argument involves a discussion of virtue ethics and an examination of the concept of vocation, particularly as it has developed in Protestant thought, and illustrates the relevance of virtue and vocation to the problem of supererogation.