Deontic Morality and Control

AvIshtiyaque Haji,Ernest Sosa

Inbunden, Engelska, 2002

Del i serien Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

1 192 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar. Fri frakt över 249 kr.

Fler format och utgåvor

Häftad

547 kr

Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar

Beskrivning

This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2002-07-18
Mått:152 x 229 x 17 mm
Vikt:580 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Antal sidor:304
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521813877

Utforska kategorier

Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Recensioner i media

'Readers interested in recent debates not only in its main field but in virtue ethics, or on the relation of morality to practical reason, will find the work impressively up to date and incisively engaged.' Journal of Moral Philosophy

Innehållsförteckning

Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; Part I. Determinism and Deontic Morality: 2. Obligation and control; 3. Frankfurt-type cases and deontic control; 4. Control requirements of deontic anchors: some objections; 5. Determinism and deontic anchors; Part II. Indeterminism and Deontic Morality: 6. Transition: from determinism to indeterminism; 7. Robust modest R-libertarianism and luck; 8. Robust model R-libertarianism and deontic anchors; Part III. Consequences of Being Deprived of Deontic Anchors: 9. The significance of the possibility of being without deontic anchors; 10. Determinism, deontic anchors and appraisability; 11. Virtue ethics without metaphysical freedom; 12. On the connection between morality's dethronement and deontic anchors; 13. Concluding remarks; Notes; Glossary and list of principles; References; Index.