Sensations

A Defense of Type Materialism

AvChristopher S. Hill,Ernest Sosa

Inbunden, Engelska, 1991

Del i serien Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

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Häftad

491 kr

Beskrivning

This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1991-01-25
Mått:150 x 225 x 22 mm
Vikt:442 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Antal sidor:264
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521394239

Utforska kategorier

Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Recensioner i media

"This is a fine book, one of the most valuable in philosophy of mind in recent years. Hill persuasively advocates type-materialism about sensations and defends it effectively against well known objections, with incisive rebuttals of other positions. He proposes distinctive theses that deserve attention, e.g. about the structure of sensation-concepts, about what is special about visual sensations, about the unity of consciousness. Absolutely first rate." Brian Loar, University of Southern California

Innehållsförteckning

Preface; Part I. Introduction: 1. Topics and themes; Part II. The Mind-Body Problem: 2. The failings of dualism and the double-aspect theory; 3. The failings of functionalism; 4. In defense of type materialism; Part III. Introspection: 5. Introspective awareness of sensations; 6. Introspection and the skeptic; Part IV. Sensory Concepts: 7. Concepts of bodily sensations: Their semantic properties; 8. Concepts of visual sensations: Their content and their deployment; Part V. Other Minds: 9. Knowledge of other minds; 10. Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space; Index.