Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory

A Dynamic Approach

AvRoss Cressman

Häftad, Engelska, 1992

Del 94 i serien Lecture Notes in Biomathematics

539 kr

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Beskrivning

This book considers, in detail, the game-theoretic effects of contestant information and two-species interactions. Of major significance to evolutionary biologists are the dynamic consequences, on the evolutionary process, of territorial ownership or repeated interactions betweem the same individuals. The book is intended as a text/reference for students/researchers in either discipline (evolutionary biology or game theory) who have a minimum mathematical maturity of a senior undergraduate.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1992-06-24
Mått:170 x 244 x 8 mm
Vikt:256 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Lecture Notes in Biomathematics
Antal sidor:129
Förlag:Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
ISBN:9783540554196

Utforska kategorier

Optimering inom Naturvetenskap och teknik
Biologi inom Naturvetenskap och teknik

Innehållsförteckning

1. Introduction.- 2. Frequency-Dependent Evolution in a Single Haploid Species.- 1. Pure and Mixed Strategies.- 2. Monomorphic ESS’s and Stability.- 3. The Hawk-Dove Game.- 4. The Static Characterization of an ESS.- 5. Stability for the Continuous Dynamic.- 6. The Strong Stability Concept and the Dynamic Characterization of an ESS.- 7. Stability for the Discrete Dynamic.- 8. Alternative Proof of Theorem 2.5.2.- 9. Nonlinear Fitness Functions.- 10. Appendix on Centre Manifold Theory.- 3. Frequency-Dependent Evolution in a Two-Species Haploid System.- 1. Frequency-Dependent Fitness.- 2. Monomorphic ESS’s and Stability.- 3. Examples: Battle-of-the-Sexes and Edgeworth Market Games.- 4. The Static Characterization of a Two-Species ESS.- 5. Strong Stability for the Continuous Dynamic.- 6. Multi-Species Frequency-Dependent Evolution.- 4. Frequency-Dependent Evolution in a Randomly-Mating Diploid Species.- 1. Natural Selection as an Evolutionary Game.- 2. Single-Locus Models.- 3. Two-Phenotype, Frequency-Dependent Evolution at a Single Locus.- 4. Multi-Phenotype, Frequency-Dependent Evolution at a Single Locus.- 5. A Two-Locus, Two-Allele, Two-Phenotype Example.- 5. Frequency- and Density-Dependent Evolution in a Haploid Species.- 1. Frequency- and Density-Dependent Fitness (and the Haploid Dynamic).- 2. Monomorphic DDESS’s and Stability.- 3. The Density-Dependent Hawk-Dove Game.- 4. The DDESS Conditions and Strong Stability.- 5. Density-Dependent Natural Selection as a Haploid Evolutionary Game.- 6. Evolutionary Stability in Multi-Species Population-Dynamic Models.- An Intermission.- 6. Evolutionary Stable Sets and Contestant Information.- 1. A Mixed-Strategy Hawk-Dove Game.- 2. The Static Characterization of an ES Set.- 3. The Dynamic Characterization of an ES Set.- 4.The Hawk-Dove Game with Varying Resource.- 5. ES Sets for Games in Extensive Form.- 6. The Owner-Intruder Game.- 7. Multi-Stage Games.- 7. References.- 8. Index.